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ABSTRACT 
 
 Southern Methodist University was the first Methodist institution in the South to open its 
doors to African Americans in the early 1950s.  There were several factors that contributed to 
SMU pushing for desegregation when it did.   When SMU started the process of desegregation in 
the fall of 1950, two schools in the Southwest Conference had already admitted at least one black 
graduate student.  University officials, namely then President Umphrey Lee, realized that 
because other schools had desegregated, it would not be long before SMU would have to do the 
same.  Lee started the path towards desegregation in 1950, and it continued through the 
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And SMU/PST was two steps ahead of its city and region.  The position 
of being one step ahead was occupied by the Methodist Church, whose 
members could be found among both the laggards and the leaders. 
Methodist women in their “Society for Christian Service” had been 
studying better “race relations” for quite some time, and the Church 
as a whole had developed a pretty good case of guilty conscience about 
the “Negroes,” mixed in with a longtime reluctance to change.  Many 
faculty and students at SMU and nearly all at Perkins were ready (and 
this time, it is the correct word). On balance, just maybe, the right 
time and place.  There was a pretty good chance that desegregation 
could succeed.1 
  
Merrimon Cuninggim served as the dean of the Perkins School of 
Theology in the early 1950s when Southern Methodist University decided 
to open its doors to African American students.  The above quotation 
is credited to Cuninggim in a pamphlet he wrote in 1994 that recalled 
his effort, as well as that of others at the university, to bring 
about desegregation fully two years before the Brown decision was 
handed down in the federal court.  One might ask why a private church- 
affiliated school such as SMU would worry admitting of blacks at a 
time when it was not necessary for them to do so.  It is because of 
men like Cunninggim and Umphrey Lee (then the president of the school) 
that made this happen when it did.  Lee was able to go to the SMU 
Board of Trustees as early as 1950 and argued to change the school’s 
admissions policy bylaws that restricted African-Americans from 
attending the university.2  The board conceded without much of a fight 
and it is important because SMU was the only school in the South of 
its kind to do so that early.  The exact opposite happened at the 
1 Merrimon Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way: The Story of Desegregation 
at Southern Methodist University (Dallas: Perkins School of Theology, 
1994), 7. 
2 Cunninggim, 8.  
                                                 
 2 
Methodist Church’s other two major institutions of higher learning in 
the South, Duke University and Emory University.  Neither of these 
schools’ presidents was able to convince their board of trustees to 
even consider the idea of admitting black students until the early 
1960s.  Duke admitted its first black student in the fall of 1961 and 
Emory the fall of 1962.  The main reason why for this is that at both 
Duke and Emory the board of trustees was adamant against the idea of 
changing the status quo, and for them the status quo was an all white 
institution.3  SMU, by contrast started the process of desegregation 
fully a decade before. 
There have been numerous works on the desegregation of the 
South’s public institutions of higher learning. While this is not an 
exhaustive list several of the important studies include E. Culpepper 
Clark’s 1993 piece The Schoolhouse Door that followed the path of 
Autherine Lucy and her efforts to attend school at the University of 
Alabama despite the wishes of the school and the state government. A 
few years before Culpepper’s book came out sociology professor Gordon 
Morgan produced The Edge of Campus which provided a first-hand account 
of the process of desegregation at the University of Arkansas. Robert 
Pratt contributed to the literature in 2002 with his book We Shall Not 
be Moved that traced the paths taken by three African American 
students attempting to break the color line at the University of 
Georgia. In 2006 Dwonna Goldstone published her book Integrating the 
Forty Acres and focused her attention on the efforts of the University 
3 Melissa Kean, Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South: 
Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State 
University Press, 2008), 185 and 193. 
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of Texas to overcome the color line. One of the most recent additions 
to this growing literature is Charles Eagles’ 2009 book The Price of 
Defiance which described in great detail how difficult it was for The 
University of Mississippi to admit James Meredith in the early 1960s.4  
While there have been plenty of books about the South’s public 
schools and desegregation, much less has been written about the 
region’s private institutions and how they handled the matter.  There 
are numerous institutional histories of the region’s private colleges 
and universities but very few that are devoted just to desegregation.  
One of the few of note is Melissa Kean’s 2008 book Desegregating 
Private Higher Education in the South.  Kean’s work provides an in-
depth look at what she considered the South’s five elite private 
schools: Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt.  While Vanderbilt 
was the first of these five schools to desegregate in 1953, Kean shows 
how each school was hindered in their progress to desegregate by the 
reluctance of the board of trustees to break with tradition and be 
leaders in admitting black students. This work also provides a model 
on how to write a similar story of SMU, and is also important in that 
she did not include SMU in her study because of the relative ease with 
44 E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand 
at the University of Alabama (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993); Charles Eagles The Price of Defiance: James Meredith and the 
Integration of Ole Miss (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009); Dwonna Goldstone, Integrating the Forty Acres: The Fifty 
Year Struggle for Racial Equality at the University of Texas (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2006); Gordon Morgan, The Edge of Campus: 
A Journal of the Black Experience at the University of Arkansas 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1990); Robert Pratt, We 
Shall Not be Moved: The desegregation of the University of Georgia 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002). 
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which the SMU Board of Trustees accepted the inevitability of 
desegregation and forged ahead of the others.5 
Even less has been written about SMU’s desegregation that these 
other schools despite it being the first major Methodist institution 
in the South to do so.  There are several books and articles that 
mention the university’s efforts in this regard, but these only 
mention the role of the Perkins School of theology’s attempt to do so 
in 1952.  The overall university experience of desegregation at SMU 
has not been studied.  SMU never experienced any major problems, at 
least publicly, with desegregation as other schools.  Even though this 
is the case, it does not mean that the story should not be told.  The 
intention of this study is to tell the entire story of SMU’s 
desegregation from Perkins, to the overall student body, to the 
athletic programs, and any other aspect of the university in this 
regards.  
This study will be broken into six different chapters, each that 
will explore some aspect of the university’s efforts to open its 
doors.  The first two chapters will focus mainly on the Methodist 
Church and the city of Dallas.  Understanding the story behind both of 
these entities will help show how different Southern Methodist 
University actually was.  Chapter One will offer an in-depth look at 
the policies of the Methodist Church to keep the church structure 
segregated at a time when the civil rights movement called for an end 
to such segregated structures.  The church brought together several 
5 Melissa Kean, Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South: 
Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2008). 
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branches to bring an end to a separate church for whites and blacks, 
but within that united church the church created the Central 
Jurisdiction to keep African Americans from having a real say in 
religious matters within the church. It would not be until 1968 that 
the United Methodist Church was created formally ending the Central 
Jurisdiction and a segregated church structure.  By 1968, SMU had 
desegregated virtually every aspect of the university so this first 
chapter will be important in showing how the school was breaking from 
the tradition of the church. 
Chapter Two will discuss the city of Dallas and its continued 
efforts to remain a segregated Jim Crow city well into the twentieth 
century.  Dallas was a classic southern city in its racial policies 
during this period. African Americans were given menial jobs, little 
access to good schools, and even less access to the political order in 
Dallas.  Well into the twentieth century (at least until the 1950s) 
African Americans in Dallas feared the threat of physical violence 
against them or their families.  This is just as important to show as 
the story of the Methodist church because it shows once again how 
different SMU was when it started to desegregate in this hostile 
setting. 
Chapters Three and Four focus on the earliest attempts by 
Southern Methodist University to open its doors to African Americans 
in the early 1950s.  The Perkins School of Theology tried to 
desegregate under the deanship of Eugene Hawk in 1951.  However, Hawk, 
was not very enthusiastic about the prospect of black students 
entering the school that year.  He was not the only one, as there were 
 6 
other administrators and several influential boosters that felt the 
same way. Chapter Three describes the haphazard efforts by Hawk to 
bring black students to Perkins in 1951.  By the end of the fall of 
1951, the two black students enrolled had both failed.  It is not 
until Cuninggim was brought in as dean in the summer of 1952 that true 
desegregation of Perkins would take place.  One of the first things 
Cuninggim did as dean was enroll five black men into Perkins during 
the fall of 1952. All five graduated on time without much incident, 
due in no small part to Cuninggim’s leadership.  Chapter Four will 
look at Cuninggim and his role in achieving desegregation in the 
school of theology as well as the five men he brought in to achieve 
this goal.   
Chapter Five will trace the continued effort of desegregation 
effort at SMU post 1952.  By the time the initial five blacks 
graduated from Perkins in 1955, other areas of the university began to 
bring in their own black students.  The law school started the process 
in 1955.  Paula Elaine Jones became the first black undergraduate at 
SMU in 1962.  Jerry LeVias was not only the first black football 
player to receive a scholarship at SMU, but in the entire Southwest 
Conference.  When LeVias left SMU in 1969, most departments at the 
university had at least begun the process of removing racial barriers, 
and those that had not would do so by the end of the 1970s. 
While desegregation went relatively smoothly at SMU, this does 
not mean that African-American students on the campus did not see room 
for improvement.  Chapter Six explores this topic with the creation of 
BLAACS, the Black League of Afro-American and African College Students 
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in 1967.  This group staged a protest in 1969, briefly taking over the 
president’s office, in an effort to demand better conditions for black 
students, faculty, and staff on the campus.  While the protest was 
very short, and nonviolent the organization did get the university’s 
administration to look at the problem further and make some changes.  
This chapter is important because it shows that while SMU did not have 
very many problems with desegregation, there was some dissension among 
the black students at the progress being made by the school and its 
administration to fully make them a true part of the university. 
As a private, church backed institution it did not have to 
voluntarily open its doors to African American students in 1952 but it 
did.  There were people on campus like Merrimon Cuninggim, Umphrey 
Lee, and others who felt compelled to get out ahead of the situation 
and bring blacks to SMU.  The school did so at a time when the 
Methodist Church as well as the city of Dallas was struggling with 
their racial pasts.  Neither the church nor the city was ready to do 
what SMU did in 1952, and this is what makes the story so intriguing. 
It is a story that has been largely forgotten, save the story of the 
Perkins School of Theology in 1952.  Hopefully this study will help 





From Central Jurisdiction to Unity 
 
 
It was the Church which created the Central Jurisdiction. It was the 
Church which accepted the principle of segregation.  It is therefore, 
the Church which should be given the opportunity to speak against 
segregation and to express its opinion upon segregation, against 
segregation and in favor of abolishing the Central Jurisdiction and 
placing the Conferences now within the Central Jurisdiction in the 
remaining Jurisdictions under the Plan of Union.1 
  
Chester A. Smith, a member of the Methodist General Conference 
from New York, made the statement above during the 1956 General 
Conference of the Methodist Church.  It is clear that as late as 1956, 
and in fact well before and beyond, the Methodist Church was 
struggling with how to deal with segregation within the church’s 
overall structure. In 1939, northern and southern branches of the 
Church united creating the Methodist Church.  Within this structure, 
the Central Jurisdiction was created which allowed for legal 
separation of whites and blacks within the overall church 
organization.  Black Methodists were only allowed to participate in 
the Central Jurisdiction.  When the Methodist Church was created as 
such in 1939, there were approximately 308,000 African American 
members in the church.  This was the largest number of African 
Americans in any protestant church that had a white majority in the 
United States.  Despite this, they were still segregated into the 
Central Jurisdiction.  The Central Jurisdiction was created to keep 
1 Journal of the 1956 General Conference of the Methodist Church Held 
at Minneapolis, Minnesota April 25-May 7, 1956 edited by Lud H. Estes, 
Secretary General Conference (Nashville:  Methodist Publishing House),  
467-468. 
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white and black Methodists separate and this was important for whites 
in the church, particularly those that lived in the Southeast.2 
Despite the efforts of men and women like Chester A. Smith the 
church maintained segregated conferences for blacks and whites for 
nearly thirty years. It would not be until 1968 that the Central 
Jurisdiction, and the segregation that it established, would formally 
come to an end.3  In the meantime, the Church struggled with how to 
deal with the problem.  As the Civil Rights Movement emerged and began 
to blossom by the late 1950s and 1960s, white Methodists, especially 
those in the South, had to decide whether to hold on to the segregated 
structure or to further the goals of the overall church.  While many 
held to the ideal of segregation as long as they could, the writing 
was on the wall that the Methodist Church would eventually have to 
change its ways or lose members, particularly those of color outside 
the borders of the United States.  Methodists prided themselves on 
their missionary work outside the country and for this to work the 
Central Jurisdiction would have to go.  Little did men like Chester A. 
Smith know that it would take so long for this to happen. 
From the time the Methodist Church created the Central 
Jurisdiction in 1939 there were people within the church that made it 
their mission to get rid of the segregated structure. Each General 
2 Peter C. Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 1930-1975 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 3. 
3 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 195.  Murray notes that 
the last meeting of the Central Jurisdiction took place in 1967 in 
Nashville. The following year the General Conference of the Methodist 
Church convened as the United Methodist Church which included the 
members of the Central Jurisdiction. 
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Conference, which met every four years, from 1944 until the late 1960s 
debated the issue in some form.  Even though the world was focused on 
war, the members of the 1944 conference still took the time to expound 
on the inequities of racism within the church.  The General Conference 
of 1944 stated in its opening address, “We look to the ultimate 
elimination of racial discrimination within the Methodist Church.  
Accordingly, we ask the Council of Bishops to create forthwith a 
Commission to consider afresh the relations of all races included in 
the membership of the Methodist Church and to report to the General 
Conference of 1948”.  While this seemed to be a step in the right 
direction, the idea of creating a committee to study the issue would 
be a means of dodging the issue rather than actually finding ways to 
end segregation within the church.  Peter Murray noted in Methodists 
and the Crucible of Race this when he stated, “During the early 1940s, 
the Methodist Church did relatively little regarding civil rights.  
After the struggle for unification, a movement to make sweeping 
changes in the jurisdictional system, especially regarding its racial 
structure, had little prospect for success”.  While there were people 
within the 1944 General Conference that wanted to end segregation in 
the church, there were other more pressing problems, like keeping the 
newly unified church together.  Pushing the racial issue at that time 
would not have helped do that.4 
4 Journal of the 1944 General Conference of the Methodist Church held at 
Kansas City, Missouri, April 26-May 6, 1944 edited by Lud H. Estes, 
Secretary General Conference (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House), 
729.  Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 56. 
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It is not much of a surprise that the Methodist Church did not 
make racial policies more of a priority during the mid-1940s.  The 
world at large was at war, and this undoubtedly was on the minds of 
most in the United States including the church. It is important to 
note that despite this the church did take a step towards at least 
acknowledging there was a problem that needed to be fixed by 
subsequent general conferences.  
 The fact that the 1944 General Conference looked at race at all 
is indicative of the already changing landscape in the United States 
in regards to the issue.  By 1944, A. Philip Randolph’s threatened 
march on Washington had already compelled President Roosevelt to sign 
executive order 8802 calling for the creation of the Fair Employment 
Practices Committee. He also agreed to give a certain percentage of 
defense plant jobs throughout the country to African Americans, thus 
giving them an economic opportunity many had not had to that point.  
By 1944, the idea of the “Double V Campaign” was also well entrenched. 
This started in 1942 when an editorial was sent by African Americans 
to the Pittsburgh Courier, one of the most respected black newspapers 
in the country at the time. The basic notion of this campaign was 
victory abroad and victory at home.  The victory abroad referred to 
winning the war against totalitarianism and Nazism.  Victory at home 
was to end racism here in the United States.  Black men were serving 
in great numbers in the war and felt that in return for this they 
should be given more respect and equality at home.  Members of the 
12 
 
Methodist Church would have been aware of both of these events by 
1944.5 
Not much had changed by 1948. Still, there was more talk about 
the idea than action in 1948.  Murray writes, “The 1948 Methodist 
General Conference spoke more candidly about racial problems, but it 
took little action within its own house”. The Methodist Women’s 
Society of Christian Service admitted, “Our accomplishments in inter-
racial cooperation between Negro and white groups during the past 
quadrennium have been slight indeed”.  Women, like those in this 
society, continually tried to get the male dominated church structure 
to look at the inequities of the church in regards to race.  They 
would ultimately play an important role as a counter to the men who 
wanted to keep segregation going strong in the church.6 
The racial backdrop of the United States had changed by 1948.  
Two major color barriers had been broken by 1948.  The first was major 
league baseball which opened its doors to blacks in 1947. Jackie 
Robinson became the first African American to play in the majors when 
he suited up for the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947.  The second major color 
barrier broken by 1948 was the military.  President Harry Truman 
signed executive order 9981 in July of 1948 officially desegregating 
the US military.  Before this African Americans that served in the 
military did so in segregated units with white officers.  The writing 
was starting to appear on the wall by 1948 that the Jim Crow era was 
nearing its end, yet the Methodist Church did nothing to set an 
5 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 53-54. 
6 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 59-60. 
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example and lead this movement.  1948 was one of a number of times the 
church could have stepped up and taken this leadership role and it 
failed to do so.7 
Reverend Edgar A. Love of the Washington Annual Conference of the 
Central Jurisdiction tried to turn the words into action at the 1952 
General Conference. He offered up an amendment in a report titled “The 
Methodist Church and Race” where he wanted “Methodist institutions 
including local churches, colleges, universities, theological schools, 
hospitals and homes, take steps immediately to open their doors to all 
people alike, without distinction as to race, creed, or color”.8  This 
was the first time that someone within the General Conference had 
actually called for concrete change.  Even so, the Love initiative as 
it was called was very controversial and caused much debate during the 
1952 General Conference meeting.  There were those that came out in 
favor of adopting the initiative and there were those that were 
strongly in favor of getting rid of it.  One of the strongest voices 
of opposition came from Charles Parlin of Newark, New Jersey, who was 
the Chairman of the General Standing Committee on the State of the 
Church.  When he was given the floor to speak to the General 
Conference he opined, “Should this amendment carry it would require 
reharmonizing the whole Discipline. We would be completely out of 
order in my opinion, if this amendment went through.  It would throw 
the whole thing into utter confusion”.  In the end, Parlin won out and 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 67. 
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the amendment was defeated.  For many this was simply going too far 
for the Methodist Church in 1952.9 
Love and Parlin represented the major arguments within the church 
for and against segregation in 1952.  Love was an African American who 
was a part of the Central Jurisdiction and therefore knew how 
segregation created inequality, in society and within the church as a 
whole.  The way to end that was to get rid of segregation, and Love 
was trying to push the Methodist Church to take a role in leading the 
way with his initiative in 1952.  He wanted the church to take an 
active role in ending racial injustice, yet the church stood idly by 
and let other organizations take the lead.  Parlin on the other hand 
was not as convinced that the church should follow this path in 1952.  
This was not necessarily due to a lack of understanding of the issue, 
but concern for how it would affect the church at large.  Parlin was a 
yes man to the Methodist Church and he simply did not feel that church 
should take the risk at that time because it would cause a lot of 
problems in reorganizing the church structure.  This in essence is the 
argument the church was struggling with at the time; integrate at the 
request of men like Love who had intimate knowledge of the Central 
Jurisdiction, or stay the course for the sake of church structure.10 
One part of Love’s initiative that did get a second look in 1952 
was that of desegregating Methodist seminaries.  Towards the end of 
9 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 68. Journal of the 1952 
General Conference of the Methodist Church held at San Francisco, 
California, April 23-May 6, 1952, edited by Lud H. Estes, Secretary 
General Conference (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House), 650. 
10 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 67-68. 
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the conference, there were several memorials put forth from theology 
students at Duke and Emory that asked the General Conference to 
“urgently recommend that all Methodist Schools of Theology admit 
qualified students without regard to race or color.  The Committee 
voted concurrence except in those instances where State laws would 
force an undue hardship upon the institution involved”.  Despite Edgar 
Love trying to remove the last part of this statement from the vote, 
it allowed for a loophole in North Carolina and Georgia that made it 
where neither Duke nor Emory took action to remove their racial 
barriers.  The church knew that Duke and Emory would not do so because 
of laws in both states and according to Peter Murray, “The church, in 
effect, declined to put any pressure on these two divinity schools to 
open their doors to African American applicants”.  One bright spot for 
the Methodist affiliated seminaries was SMU which adhered to this 
memorial and admitted its first African American students in the fall 
of 1952. This was not a problem for SMU because of the actions taken 
by university president Umphrey Lee in late 1950. In November of 1950, 
Lee convinced the Board of Trustees at SMU to change the school’s 
bylaws to ensure there would not be a problem with desegregation when 
the matter arose.  Little did he know it would happen so quickly 
thereafter.11   
Southern Methodist University was not the first southern 
institution to integrate by 1952.  It was simply the first Methodist 
11 Journal of the 1952 General Conference of the Methodist Church, 
1212. Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 68.  Merrimon 
Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way: The Story of Desegregation at Southern 
Methodist University (Dallas: Perkins School of Theology, 1994), 8. 
                                                          
16 
 
affiliated school in the South to do so.  It was also one of the first 
to do so without the threat of litigation. Several court cases had 
come out by 1952 that forced universities in the South to open their 
doors to blacks including Sipuel v. Board of Regents in 1948, Sweatt 
v. Painter in 1950, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma in 1950.  The Sipuel case 
came out of the University of Oklahoma and while it did not end 
segregation it put the onus on the state to provide a truly equal 
education for African Americans that wanted to attend law school in 
the state. The McLaurin case was also from Oklahoma and officially 
opened the doors of the University of Oklahoma to African American 
students.  The Sweatt ruling was a similar decision out of Texas that 
called for ending segregation at the state’s major institution, the 
University of Texas in Austin. The difference put forth by the Love 
memorial at the 1952 Methodist General Conference is that the 
University of Oklahoma and the University of Texas were public 
institutions being forced to desegregate by the courts.  SMU was 
simply adhering to the Love amendment of its own accord.12 
When the Brown decision came out in 1954 the Methodist Church had 
a difficult time dealing with the ruling.  The Church did have legal 
segregation written into its constitution with the Central 
Jurisdiction and many were not sure what to do.  While there was no 
General Conference in 1954, the Council of Bishops did meet in 
November to decide how to approach the issue and whether or not the 
church would make a formal statement in regards to the case.  
12 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 60-61. 
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Congregants within the Central Jurisdiction praised the ruling, while 
southern members of the church were not as optimistic.  In December of 
1954 nearly three hundred Methodist ministers and laymen met in 
Birmingham, Alabama, to create the Association of Methodist Members 
and Laymen.  Their intended goal was to defend segregation within the 
church, as well as convince as many Methodists as they could to not 
push for change in the jurisdictional system at the 1956 General 
Conference.  However, for many Methodists the problems with race 
within the church went well beyond the Central Jurisdiction and this 
was discussed thoroughly at the next General Conference in 1956.  When 
the conference opened in Minneapolis in April of 1956, race relations 
and the Central Jurisdiction was one of the most important agenda, and 
this would be the most important decision the conference had faced 
since unification in 1939.13 
By 1956, the civil rights movement was truly beginning to take 
shape so it is not a shock that the Methodists were at least nominally 
taking this into account in the General Conference of that same year.  
The Montgomery Bus Boycott had taken place in late 1955 and continued 
through much of 1956. This was one of the galvanizing moments in the 
early movement and proved that African Americans were now ready en 
masse to fight the system.  At the same time, 1956 was the start of 
the massive resistance movement among many southern whites in which 
they tried to keep Jim Crow alive.  One way they did this was to 
create the Southern Manifesto, a document designed to create a way to 
13 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 70, 73, 78, 80. 
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legally resist Brown.  This dichotomy would play itself out in the 
Methodist General Conference in 1956.14 
Debate raged almost from the beginning of the General Conference,  
due in large part to the introduction of Amendment IX, a 
constitutional amendment that allowed for gradual desegregation to 
take place within the Methodist Church. The General Conference wrote 
and submitted the amendment to all conferences for ratification. The 
amendment had three major parts all which called for some form of 
desegregation with the onus being placed on local churches.  According 
to Peter Murray, “The first part permitted local churches within the 
Central Jurisdiction to transfer into annual conferences of regional 
jurisdictions. The second part streamlined desegregation by permitting 
entire annual conferences of the Central Jurisdiction to transfer into 
the regional district.”  The third part of the amendment said that 
when a quarter of the Central Jurisdiction’s membership had 
transferred into regional jurisdictions then a bishop within the 
Central Jurisdiction would transfer to the regional jurisdiction with 
the most members from the Central Jurisdiction.  While this would not 
end segregation, it was a start, and Amendment IX was looked on in a 
quite favorable way by the General Conference because it called for 
limited action and did not threaten any one jurisdiction 
specifically.15 
14 Ibid, 80-82.  David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: 
Morrow and Co., 1986) 58-62. 
15 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 84-85. 
                                                          
19 
 
W Sproule Boyd, a minister of the Northeastern Jurisdiction from 
Pittsburgh, was one of those that fought to get the amendment passed. 
Boyd was the pastor of the Franklin Street Methodist Church in 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania and was active in the NAACP in the state. In 
1956 he received the Civil Rights Award of Pennsylvania from the state 
director of the NAACP.  With this in mind, it is not a surprise that 
he would be interested in helping get Amendment IX passed.  When Boyd 
addressed the General Conference he referenced the fact that the 
Methodist Church had six jurisdictions only one of which was based on 
race.  This was clearly the definition of segregation and the church 
should at the minimum acknowledge this fact. The adoption of Amendment 
IX according to Boyd, would allow that to happen if nothing else.16 
For Boyd, the only way the Church would be able to move forward 
in race relations was to pass Amendment IX.  Others felt the same way 
and the amendment passed the 1956 General Conference with well over 
the two thirds vote needed to send the amendment out for other annual 
conferences to ratify.  Many Methodists stressed that Amendment IX 
would be implemented on a voluntary basis and this would lead to a 
lasting idea in the church-voluntarism.  Local churches could 
desegregate if they wanted based on Amendment IX, but it was not 
mandatory and this put a number of people at ease over the passing of 
the amendment.  Of course the idea of voluntarism provided an 
16 Journal of the 1956 General Conference of the Methodist Church, 413.  
James W. Ivy, editor, “Branch News,” The Crisis Vol. 64, No. 2 
(February 1957): 113.   This is the only reference I could find to 
Boyd’s role in the church, but winning this award in 1956 clearly 
indicates he would have approved of Amendment IX. 
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interesting conundrum for many African Americans within the church.  
While the plan called for voluntary desegregation within the church’s 
jurisdictions African Americans had not volunteered for the Central 
Jurisdiction.  At the same time, those in favor of the amendment felt 
that it would give the opportunity for at least limited integration 
without the possibility of losing church members, particularly those 
in the South.17 
Despite the overwhelming support for Amendment IX there were some 
within the general conference opposed to the initiative.  Oddly enough 
this opposition came from people within the Central Jurisdiction as 
well as from a few liberal whites in the church.  The argument they 
gave was that simply getting rid of the Central Jurisdiction was not 
going nearly far enough.  For those opposed to Amendment IX, like 
Reverend C. Anderson Davis of Tennessee, ending the Central 
Jurisdiction was only part of the problem and this amendment did not 
address other issues of segregation within the church, therefore it 
should not be passed.  This is evidence that at least some African 
Americans within the Central Jurisdiction did not want tokenism.  
Rather, they wanted true equality within the church but in 1956 they 
would not get this.18   
 After Amendment IX was passed the General Conference moved to 
create a commission to study how to make the process of desegregation 
more of a reality.  The Standing Legislative Committee on Conferences 
addressed the issue by endorsing the creation of a commission to study 
17 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 86, 114-115. 
18 Ibid, 85-86. 
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and recommend action in regards to the current system of jurisdictions 
within the church.  The main goal of the commission was to study the 
strengths and weaknesses of the jurisdictional system and to report on 
ways to make it better (or less segregated). The committee of 70 
members was called the Commission of Seventy. The 70 members included 
46 people from the various jurisdictions, 12 Bishops of the Church, 
and 12 laymen.  This was done to provide a cross section of the church 
in the hopes of finding answers to the race problem within the 
Methodist structure.19 
 Racial practices in the Methodist Publishing House were also 
addressed at the 1956 General Conference.  The Methodist Publishing 
House was the largest religious publisher in the United States and one 
of the largest employers in all of Nashville, Tennessee.  Prior to 
1956, accusations of discrimination and segregation were brought 
fourth against the publishing house.  The General Conference of 1956 
tried to rectify the issue by encouraging the Methodist Publishing 
House to further end segregation in its employment practices and 
provide equal opportunity to people of all races in all levels of its 
organization.  For the Methodist Church this was one more step, albeit 
a small one, toward better race relations in the overall structure of 
the church.20 
 The findings of the Commission of Seventy were the first racial 
issues discussed at the 1960 Methodist General Conference.  In an 
19 Journal of the 1956 General Conference of the Methodist Church, 498-
500.  Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 86-87. 
20 Journal of the 1956 General Conference of the Methodist Church, 
1672-1673.  Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 87. 
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address titled, The Jurisdictional System and Racial Brotherhood, the 
1960, conference stated, “Without prejudging your actions on its 
proposals, we wish to commend the general method and spirit of the 
report and to say that, in our considered judgment, your dealing with 
it is the most urgent specific obligation of this Conference.”  Many 
Methodists at the 1960 General Conference saw the writing on the wall.  
The Church realized that by 1960 the reports of the Commission of 
Seventy presented at the conference “may have a more immediate and 
far-reaching effect upon the unity and the vitality of The Methodist 
Church in America and beyond, in our mission and our impact on the 
world, in the immediate present and the longer future, than any other 
you will take in this Conference”.  The time for action had come and 
many at the Conference were now more willing to take a stand.21 
 Chester A. Smith of New York was one of these men that wanted to 
take a stand at the 1960 General Conference and in the process created 
a firestorm.  He wanted to amend a statement by the Commission of 
Seventy to get Methodist institutions of higher learning to further 
look at their racial policies.  Smith specifically wanted the church 
to quit giving money to Duke University’s seminary as well as any 
other Methodist seminary that did not admit African American students. 
Raymond E. Balcomb, a minister on the Commission of Seventy, took 
Smith’s idea even further by saying that each Methodist institution 
that received World Service funds should be required to report 
21 Journal of the 1960 General Conference of the Methodist Church, Held 
at Denver, Colorado, April 27-May 7, 1960, edited by Leon T. Moore, 
Secretary General Conference (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House) 
204, 206, 208. 
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annually on their racial policies and practices.  Smith proposed to 
the general conference that as long as Duke continued to remain 
segregated the university should get no money from the Methodist 
Church or any of its affiliate organizations.  Smith explained the 
necessity of his proposal by stating, “We have this great institution 
refusing to admit into its School of Theology men who want to study 
for the ministry, but who are refused admission into the School of 
Theology because they are Negroes”.  After noting how fine an 
institution Duke was he went on to assert, “I say that in order to put 
the stamp of approval upon such a position as the trustees of that 
institution uphold and maintain, we should express our grave 
disapproval of what they are doing by refusing to give them one dollar 
of our money from our Church or from our World Service receipts”.   
 After Smith spoke to his resolution, there was much debate about 
the issue at hand.  Some in the crowd were in agreement with Smith 
while others did not believe that this was the proper approach to this 
specific situation.  Thurman L. Dodson of the Washington Conference 
was in favor of adopting the amendment, telling to the General 
Conference about the amendment he declared, “It seems high time for he 
General Conference if it believes what it says to take a stand for 
Christ, because I am certain that all the money that goes into this 
Church, certainly we ought not to use it to uphold segregation 
practices”.  Edwin L. Jones of the Western North Carolina, SE 
Jurisdiction, opposed the amendment, questioning the right of the 
church to act as a police power on this matter.  The church should not 
24 
 
be compelled to coerce Duke, or any other Methodist affiliated 
institution for that matter, when it came to ending segregation in its 
institutions.  Another person against the amendment was Norman L. 
Trott of the Baltimore, NE Jurisdiction.  Trott begged to look at the 
issue in a different light.  He felt it was not right to deny funds to 
future ministers of the Church simply because they went to an 
institution that practiced segregation. When he spoke to the general 
conference he tried to show that if you starting taking away funds 
from Duke then you would be depriving the theology students already at 
the school of financial support.  This would be bad for the Methodist 
Church because it would dispossess the church of much needed 
leadership in the form of ministers trained at Duke.  In the end, men 
like Trott and Edwin Jones prevailed, and the amendment proposed by 
Smith was not adopted.  But it did not come without much debate and 
clearly the General Conference of 1960 was willing to work toward a 
solution to the segregation problem in a way the General Conferences 
of the past had not.22  
 It must be noted that the amendment to pull funding from Duke’s 
theology school was introduced by Chester A. Smith of New York.  In 
the general conference’s debate on whether to pass the amendment or 
not virtually to a man those in favor of the amendment were from the 
North and the West, as well as other countries like Argentina.  Those 
opposed were from the South.  There are a few exceptions to this, but 
overall the trend holds along regional lines.  People in the North 
22 Journal of the 1960 General Conference of the Methodist Church, 481-
489. 
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that supported the amendment were doing so out of blind faith that any 
end to segregation was a good thing.  This was not always the case as 
those from the South that were opposed to the amendment tried to show 
with disapproval of the amendment.23 
 In addition to finances tied to racism, the 1960 General 
Conference continued to debate the existence of the Central 
Jurisdiction.  Even with sustained debate, nothing was resolved in 
1960 in regards to ending the Central Jurisdiction immediately.  The 
General Conference adopted Recommendation No. 10 as Amended on May 5, 
1960.  This recommendation stipulated that the Church had originally 
agreed to create the Central Jurisdiction and for the time being would 
have to live with that fact.  If the church did not, many African 
American Methodists would be left out of Annual Conferences and the 
Church did not want to see this happen.  The goal was to have a 
completely inclusive church and this could not be achieved in 1960 by 
ending the Central Jurisdiction.24 
 Ending the Central Jurisdiction was not enough for a number of 
members of the 1960 General Conference.  Racism in the Methodist 
Church went far beyond the lifetime of the Central Jurisdiction 
according to men like James P. Brawley, president of Clark Atlanta 
23 Ibid. 
24 Journal of the 1960 General Conference of the Methodist Church, 
1694-1695.  Recommendation No. 10 wanted to show that if you tried to 
legislate the immediate end of the Central Jurisdiction it would be 
harmful to the church, especially the Negro members of the church.  
Without the Central Jurisdiction many life-long members would be 
without full fellowship in a local church or an Annual Conference.  In 
essence they would have no home within the church without the Central 
Jurisdiction. 
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College in Atlanta.  Brotherhood should be the main focus and until 
that was achieved the end of racism within the Methodist Church would 
not be complete.  Brawley asserted that simply ending the Central 
Jurisdiction was not the answer.  He called on the 1964 General 
Conference to declare “in unequivocal terms that the entire Church and 
all of its institutions…shall be desegregated and no one shall be 
denied admission because of color or racial identity”.  This would 
only be achieved if all Methodist churches, from the local level to 
the national level, practiced racial inclusiveness.  Brawley 
recommended, “creation of racially inclusive churches, cross-racial 
appointment of ministers, and desegregation of women’s ministerial, 
and youth groups”.  The stage was now set by 1964 to not just end 
segregation with the Central Jurisdiction but end all racist practices 
within the entire Methodist Church power structure.25 
 It is not a shock that the 1960 General Conference was a little 
more concerned about ending racial structures within the church than 
earlier ones.  Segregated structures, including those in public 
schools and lunch counters to name a few, were starting to fall across 
the country and the church did not want to be left behind in this 
matter.  While it was too late for Methodists to lead the way in 
opening doors, they could at least follow.  The church did not want a 
public spectacle like what had happened in 1957 in Little Rock.  Even 
so there were ministers willing to speak out on the subject of school 
desegregation.  This included some twenty Methodist ministers that 
25 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 131. 
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supported the idea of public school desegregation openly.  It was this 
line of thinking that made it possible by 1960 for Methodists at the 
General Conference to take on the issue with a little more urgency.26 
 Bishop Gerald Kennedy continued Brawley’s line of thinking when 
he opened the 1964 General Conference in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania with 
the Episcopal Address.  Kennedy was a well-known Bishop throughout the 
Church, due in no small part to the fact that he had been on the cover 
of Time Magazine, and he wanted the Church to end segregation and for 
people within the Church to quit trying to justify it through 
Scripture.  He noted in the Episcopal Address, “It is, therefore, most 
disturbing to see Methodists trying to justify segregation on the 
basis of weird interpretations of the Scriptures”.  He went on to say 
that, “We believe that this General Conference should insist upon the 
removal from its structure of any mark of racial segregation and we 
should do it without wasting time”.  Finally, in his closing remarks 
on segregation Bishop Kennedy stated emphatically that, “We believe 
that this General Conference should be able to say when it adjourns 
the people called Methodists, by the grace of God, have moved forward 
toward removing segregation”.  Finally, it seemed that the Methodist 
Church was on the verge of moving forward in the process of ending 
segregation throughout the Church in a meaningful way.27 
26 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 100. 
27 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 154. Journal of the 
1964 General Conference of the Methodist Church, Vol. I, Held at 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, April 26-May 8, 1964, Edited by Leon Moore, 
Secretary General Conference (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House) 
205. 
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 One new development at the 1964 General Conference was the 
presence of more than 1,000 Methodist youth, both African-American and 
white, who came to the conference on May 2, 1964 to protest the 
continuation of the Central Jurisdiction.  Several of the bishops at 
the Conference met with the youth, while several others brushed it off 
as a publicity stunt.  Nonetheless, the demonstration shows that the 
youth of the Church were ready to get involved in a way they never had 
before.  It proved that the concern over racial segregation within the 
Methodist Church was not just being discussed by the members of the 
General Conference, and that the youth were ready to respond in a way 
that would actually produce change.  The civil rights movement was in 
full swing by 1964, and by that time protests were a normal part of 
the movement.  Methodist Youth were now ready to follow that same path 
in an effort to affect change.28 
 Inside the conference James Brawley recognized that what the 
Methodist youth were doing was part of an ever changing landscape in 
America.  African-Americans would no longer sit idly by and those 
within the church were no different according to Brawley.  The time 
had come for the Methodist Church to finally move forward from its 
racist, segregated past.  Brawley noted in an address to the General 
Conference 
In the beginning, there was a reluctance, hesitation, inhibitions and 
frustrations, but now these psychological frustrations have grown to 
impatience which gives tremendous urgency to what we do at this 
General Conference and in the immediate weeks and months ahead. There 
is a revolution carried on by a New American Negro in every section of 
this country, South, North, East and West. 
28 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 156. 




This is a revolution born of conditions too long ignored by both 
church and state.  This revolution gives all Negroes everywhere a new 
sense of kinship and unity, and links them with a growing group of 
kindred spirits in a universal struggle for freedom, dignity, and 
equality. This is a new spiritual encounter for the church. 
 
The Methodist Youth demonstrating outside the Conference were a part 
of this revolution and a part of this growing group of kindred 
spirits.  This provided the perfect opportunity for those within the 
conference to realize what Brawley, and the youth, were trying to tell 
them and make a real move to end the Central Jurisdiction as well as 
all other racial barriers within the Methodist Church.29 
 The question still remained how the General Conference would do 
that.  The first step was to remove financial impediments caused by 
segregation.  Two separate funds were created in order to take care of 
minister salaries and pensions once the segregated annual conferences 
began to merge.  This was a step the church had never before taken. 
The amendment to create these two funds was proposed by Charles S. 
Scott of the Central West Jurisdiction and amended by Edwin E. Reeves 
of the Southern California Jurisdiction.  Neither was from the South, 
and provides yet another example of people from outside the region 
pushing for change within the church. After numerous debates on the 
issue Reeves’ amendment was passed and both funds were established by 
the General Conference of 1964.  The first real step had now been 
29 Journal of the 1964 General Conference of the Methodist Church, 284. 
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taken by the General Conference to end segregation and the next step 
was to fully abolish the Central Jurisdiction.30   
 The abolition of the Central Jurisdiction became imperative by 
1964 and beyond because the Methodist Church was planning a merger 
with the Evangelical United Brethren Church. The EUB Church was a 
750,000 member Midwestern denomination with a German background. It 
was similar in doctrine and polity to the Methodist Church so in this 
regard the merger made sense.  Methodists viewed it as a way to boost 
membership without having to radically change the doctrines of the 
church. The merger was to take place during a special session of the 
General Conference in 1966, and people within the Methodist church 
feared the merger would not happen if the Central Jurisdiction was 
allowed to continue.  The thought was that, “The EUB Church might 
reject union if its leaders perceived that the Methodist Church was 
not making sufficient progress on racial practices”.  Sufficient 
progress on racial practices at this point meant completely ending the 
Central Jurisdiction and not allowing it to be a part of the merger.  
Since it was a church of German origin, there were almost no African 
Americans among its membership.  Despite this, the EUB was a church 
that had opposed racial discrimination over the years and would not 
compromise that for the sake of the merger. The Methodist Church 
needed the new members the EUB Church would provide so the 1964 
30 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 158. Journal of the 
1964 General Conference, 320-327. 
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General Conference needed to act in a manner that would finally end 
the Central Jurisdiction.31 
 With the merger in mind the 1964 General Conference laid out a 
plan to formally end the Central Jurisdiction, thereby, leaving it out 
of the merger. William Astor Kirk of the West Texas Jurisdiction spoke 
before the General Conference with the idea of leaving the Central 
Jurisdiction out of the merger with the EUB Church.  He noted in his 
address, “That the Methodist Church record its judgment that the 
Central Jurisdiction structure of the Methodist Church not be made a 
part of the plan of merger with the Evangelical United Brethren 
Church”.  It did not make sense to Astor to bring the Central 
Jurisdiction into a new church.  The merger would allow for a clean 
slate of sorts, to start anew without the segregated structure of the 
previous church.  Astor felt that the church was contradicting itself 
by bringing this structure into the merger while at the same time 
asking men like himself, those within the Central Jurisdiction with 
leadership responsibility, to end the race based jurisdiction. 32  
 In the end the motion to merge was adopted by a vote of 464 to 
362. While this is a margin of 102 votes, it does not exactly provide 
a mandate for the merger. It seems evident that a good number of 
people did not want the merger to take place because it would end the 
Central Jurisdiction.  However, the merger with the Evangelical United 
Brethren Church would take place as planned and the Central 
31 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 159, 186-187. 
32 Journal of the 1964 General Conference, 529-537. 
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Jurisdiction was on its way to being completely abolished when this 
new united Church was formed.33 
 As the 1964 General Conference was winding down those in 
attendance created a statement of principles that would guide the 
church in years to come. This included that the aim of the church was 
to be an inclusive church in an inclusive society.  This included 
racial inclusiveness.  Pastors in the church were called upon to make 
sure their local worship services were open to all races and that 
anyone, regardless of color, would have equal opportunity on the local 
level in the Methodist Church. The statement of principles asked the 
church as a whole to practice fair employment policies and render 
services to the public without discrimination. Even though the church 
had a past full of racial indignation, it did not mean that the 
present day church should continue down that path. Methodists should 
work to end segregation within the church but in society at large as 
well.  This included all public and Methodist schools that still clung 
to the idea of separate but equal. Clearly the ending of the Central 
Jurisdiction was now not enough for the Methodist Church. Since that 
was in the process of being achieved, Methodists at the 1964 General 
Conference wanted to completely end segregation within the entire 
church and this statement of principles was the first step towards 
that goal.34 
 In 1966, the Methodist Church held a special session of the 
General Conference to finalize the merger of the church with the 
33 Ibid. 
34 Journal of the 1964 General Conference, 1269-1272. 
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Evangelical United Brethren Church.  In order for this to occur, the 
church would have to end the Central Jurisdiction once and for all.  A 
progress report from the 1964 General Conference was read during the 
Episcopal Address of this special session in regard to that matter.  
The progress report was meant to ease the minds of those in the EUB 
Church about the upcoming merger with the Methodist Church.  It noted 
the headway the church had made between 1964 and 1966 to end 
segregation as well as to continue to do so after the merger in 1968.  
The merger was predicated on the fact that the progress report was put 
into effect.  It is highly likely that members of the EUB Church would 
have backed out of the deal if they did not feel the Methodist Church 
was acting in a manner that would soon see the end of the Central 
Jurisdiction.35 
 1968 was the target date for ending the Central Jurisdiction.  
The landscape of the United States, and the Civil Rights Movement, was 
vastly different by 1968. Many racial barriers had been taken down and 
others were on their way to the ground by this date.  The civil rights 
movement had become much more militant by this point with groups like 
the Black Panthers creating the Black Power Movement.  No longer did 
African Americans sit idly by, or protest like Dr. King.  Those in the 
Methodist Church knew the Central Jurisdiction had to be ended because 
of the merger with the EUB Church.  With this in mind, it only makes 
sense that 1968 would be the date to do so.  Joseph E. Lowery of the 
35 Journal of the 1966 Adjourned Session of the 1964 General Conference 
of the Methodist Church Vol. III, Held at Chicago, Illinois, November 
8-11, 1966, edited by J. Wesley Hole, Secretary General Conference 
(Nashville: The Methodist Publishing House) 2537-2538. 
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Central Alabama Jurisdiction made this very clear when he stated, 
“When we began these discussions, members of the Central Jurisdiction 
Advisory Councils insisted that 1968 should be the terminal date for 
segregated structures in the Methodist Church”. He went on to say, “It 
was our feeling that both the spirit and letter of action taken in the 
1964 General Conference would be served by the elimination of 
segregated Conferences by ’68”.36   
There were still those within the church that did not agree with 
setting a hard date.  Men like George Atkinson from California 
believed that the Central Jurisdiction would be ended by 1968 but “we 
don’t think you can do it by forcing it”.  He compared the Central 
Jurisdiction to a marriage and said a forced marriage has very little 
chance of success.  Atkinson and others felt that Lowery was trying to 
force the issue to end the Central Jurisdiction by 1968, but also said 
that if given time it would be ended by that date.37 
By the end of the special conference in 1966, the Methodist 
Church had adopted a new statement of purpose in regard to ending 
racism in the church.  The report was titled Resolution for the 
Elimination of Racial Structure and the Development of Greater 
Understanding and Brotherhood in the Methodist Church. By adopting the 
resolution every level of the church structure agreed to eliminate all 
forms of racism within the church as quickly as possible.  This 
36 Journal of the 1966 Adjourned Session of the 1964 General 
Conference, 2602.  Lowery was a prominent civil rights leader and 
would later become the head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee. 
37 Ibid, 2604. 
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contradicted previous statements made by the church as it had taken 
nearly thirty years to get to this point. The resolution sought to 
make it where no new annual conferences of the church would have a 
jurisdiction based solely on those from the Central Jurisdiction. All 
levels of the church organization would resolve to fully end racism 
within its structure by 1972 at the latest if not before.  This goes 
well beyond the Central Jurisdiction which would stick to the 1968 
target date.  As had been mentioned before just ending the Central 
Jurisdiction was not enough as the racism in the church was at all 
levels, not just geography of the annual conferences.  Once the 
resolution was put forth the Methodist church finally had a formal 
plan in place to end racial discrimination within its structure at 
every level.38 
 The Central Jurisdiction met for the last time in Nashville, 
Tennessee in August of 1967.  The church was finally moving in the 
right direction in regards to racism within its organization.  African 
Americans at this last meeting were cautiously optimistic for the 
future.  One obstacle to creating an all-inclusive church had been 
removed, but this did not mean that the church was free of racial 
strife.  African-American Methodists, “wanted inclusiveness to create 
a brotherhood that truly transcended all racial barriers”.39   
The ending of the Central Jurisdiction was just the first step in 
creating this inclusiveness and the General Conference of the newly 
38 Journal of the 1966 Adjourned Session of the 1964 General 
Conference, 3076-3079. 
39 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 195, 199. 
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united church in 1968, as well as those to follow, continued to 
struggle with how to make the church truly united.  Murray noted when 
he wrote, “This building of an inclusive church would not be easy, and 
it would require the church to be more aggressive in fighting racism 
in American society.  Without true inclusiveness, the United Methodist 
Church would be a church without racial structures but with little 
genuine fellowship”. This genuine fellowship and racial brotherhood 
would truly be an accomplishment for the Methodist Church as no other 
large American church had achieved the type of racial brotherhood the 
Methodist Church now sought.40 
The General Conference of 1968 would be the first conference of 
the newly created United Methodist Church.  While the Central 
Jurisdiction had been formally ended, the United Methodist Church 
still had many problems to fix when it came to the issue of race, and 
the 1968 General Conference would begin to address those problems.  
The first was the remaining racial structures in the church, 
especially the segregated annual conferences in the Southeastern and 
South Central Jurisdictions. The second would be the idea that the 
newly created church needed to further promote interracial harmony and 
fellowship among all Methodists.  African American Methodists feared 
that they would be ignored by their white brethren within the church 
and that tokenism would replace exclusion.  Once the aforementioned 
had been achieved, the church would then try to make itself an agent 
for racial change within society.  This would prove incredibly 
40 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 199. 
                                                          
37 
 
difficult as many Methodists did not see themselves as harbingers of 
change within overall society. Nonetheless, a number of Methodists 
felt that pushing for that change in society was the most important of 
all of the racial problems confronting the new church and worked 
tirelessly to this end.41 
The notion of the United Methodist Church becoming an 
organization for social change was brought forth during the Episcopal 
Address of the 1968 General Conference.  The bishops asserted that the 
Methodists should take a trip to the impoverished areas of the cities 
and decide whether or not they have done enough as Christians to right 
these wrongs.  The Episcopal Address read as follows 
Having the miracle of Christ-like sight and hearing performed, may we 
suggest that members of the fellowship walk humbly through the 
depressed sections of any great city of the world.  Visit the 
schoolhouse, the local market, the apartment house, the neighborhood 
where our brothers dwell.  Then, decide, whether we, members of the 
fellowship, have done justice, whether we have shown loving kindness, 
whether the expectations which our proclamation of the Good News has 
lifted could possibly be realized in these neighborhoods.  Ask 
yourself, “Is this the realization of Christ’s dream? Is this the City 
of God?” An honest answer would reveal whether his spirit, his mind 
possesses us; whether we have been his obedient servants. 
 
The idea is that if Methodists truly considered doing this they would 
realize that they had not done enough to help social change within the 
country and hopefully seeing the impoverished areas would help them 
get more involved.42 
41 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 200-201. 
42 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 204.  Journal of the 
1968 General Conference Vol. I,  Held at Dallas, Texas, April 21-May 
4, 1968, edited by Emerson D. Bragg, J. Wesley Hole, and Charles D. 
White (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House), 231. 
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 Ending all the segregated annual conferences left over by the 
abolition of the Central Jurisdiction was crucial in order for the 
church to truly achieve the inclusiveness and brotherhood it sought.  
The general conference of 1968 made this clear stating, “In the United 
Methodist Church no conference or other organizational unit of the 
church shall be structured so as to exclude any member or any 
constituent body of the church because of race, color, national 
origin, or economic condition”.  Organizational units were defined by 
the General Conference as, “the structures into with the Church was 
constitutionally organized as set for in Division Two, namely 
Conferences (General, Jurisdictional, Central, Annual, District, and 
Charge), the Episcopacy, and the Judiciary”.43 
 In addition to ending the racial structures, the General 
Conference of 1968 also wanted to raise the pensions and salaries of 
those previously in the Central Jurisdiction.  This was a major 
concern for the last of the segregated conferences and a hurdle the 
General Conference needed to address.  According to Peter Murray, “The 
national church had to accept more of the financial burden for mergers 
to take place in the Deep South because it had ignored very low 
pensions and inadequate minimum salary scales in the Central 
Jurisdiction for years”.  Once the conference was over, the new church 
began to end the last of the segregated conferences within the church.  
This would rely heavily on the local populations of the churches, and 
43 Journal of the 1968 General Conference, 967-68, 971-972.  Murray, 
Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 206. 
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while this would be difficult at times the segregated local 
conferences would eventually all be ended within the new church.44 
 1968 was a pivotal year for the Methodist Church.  This was the 
year the Methodist Church merged with the Evangelical United Brethren 
Church, but it was also the year the Central Jurisdiction was ended 
for good.  The Central Jurisdiction had been created in 1939 and every 
General Conference from that point until 1968 tried to find a way to 
end it.  This finally occurred with the merger in 1968.  While the new 
church still had its racial problems, by 1968 it was well on its way 
to completely eradicating racism within the structures of the church. 
It had been a long road with many bumps along the way, but the United 
Methodist Church was closer than it had ever been by 1968 to being 
truly united in racial attitudes and brotherhood.   
44 Murray, Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 207-209. 




Desegregating the Dallas Way 
 
Dallas is a good city and we want to keep it that way.  We need all of 
our citizens to accept their civic and their personal responsibilities 
and stand up and be counted for law and order.  We need your help.  As 
your mayor and speaking for your city council, we pledge our 
assistance in this program and earnestly hope to have yours.  Together 
we will show America the Dallas Way.1 
 
 The idea of the “Dallas Way” is as old as the city itself. It 
came about in the 1840s as a way to promote the city as one of 
cooperation, hard work, and civic conduct.  The concept continued to 
grow along with the city into an idea that “people should obey the law 
in a spirit of enthusiasm, cooperation, faith, courage, vision, 
perseverance, hospitality, and brotherly love.” While this model would 
be used in all facets of life in Dallas, it especially rings true of 
the civil rights movement in the city.  It provided Dallas a way for 
peaceful, albeit slow at times, desegregation in all aspects of public 
life in the metroplex.  For the most part, Dallas adhered to this 
model when beginning the process of desegregation.  The city did not 
experience the riots and upheaval of many areas of the South during 
the civil rights movement.  Desegregation, according to William 
Brophy, “was a result of hard work and excellent communication between 
the city’s black and white communities.”  This was the essence of the 
“Dallas Way” and numerous other communities throughout the region took 
notice and had their own versions of this model. Greensboro had 
“Civility”, Atlanta was the “City too busy to hate”, and Tampa had the 
“Tampa Technique”.  All of these cities were using some version of the 
1 Mayor Earle Cabell, Dallas at the Crossroads, Film Commissioned by 
the Dallas Citizens Council in 1961 and produced by Sam Bloom.  Found 
on Youtube. 
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“Dallas Way” to promote peaceful race relations and for the most part 
it worked.  The “Dallas Way” made for peaceful civil rights 
transitions through the 1950s and 1960s.2 
 In order to keep the city under control and follow the “Dallas 
Way”, Dallas businessmen formed the Dallas Citizens Council.3  The 
council was created in 1937 by R.L. “Bob” Thornton and would control 
politics and business in the city for decades.  Thornton was born in 
1880 and grew up poor in rural central Texas.  As a child he did 
everything from pick cotton to clearing brush so he was instilled with 
a drive and hard work ethic from his earliest days.  By the early 
1900s this determination helped him become a banker in Dallas and 
eventually the president of Mercantile National Bank.  He was made 
president of the Texas Bankers Association in 1924 and eventually the 
president of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce in 1933. It was from this 
position that the idea of the Dallas Citizens Council began to take 
shape.  With Thornton at the helm, the DCC included real estate 
magnates, department store owners, bankers, manufacturers, insurance 
company executives, and owners of utility and media outlets.  The 
group came up with a strategy that would serve the entire city saying 
2 Brian D. Behnken, “The ‘Dallas Way’: Protest, Response, and the Civil 
Rights Experience in Big D and Beyond”, Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly, Vol. 111,  No. 1, (July 2007), 3-4.  William Brophy, 
“Active Acceptance-Active Containment: The Dallas Story” in Southern 
Businessmen and Desegregation edited by Elizabeth Jacoway and David 
Colburn (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 146. 
3 This organization is not to be confused with the citizens councils 
created to resist Brown vs. Board (which had a chapter in Dallas).  
Rather this is an organization created by Dallas’ big business owners 
to instill the values of the Dallas Way and keep business steady in 
the city.  In order to do this they had to begin to negotiate with the 
black community to get at least token integration in exchange for them 
not causing racial strife. 
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that what was good for the business community in Dallas was good for 
all of Dallas.  This included the black community. In other words, it 
was to the advantage of Dallas’ black citizens to keep the business 
community happy and the way to do this was to not cause a stir with 
racial issues.  If the black community would bring its concerns to the 
DCC, in a nonviolent way, the business leaders in turn would help 
desegregate the city.  While this would take time, often decades, and 
only provide nominal racial change in the city, many of the black 
elite bought into the plan and began negotiating with the DCC on a 
regular basis to help bring what change they could to Dallas. They 
felt this was the only way that they would achieve any change, and at 
the time even small differences in the city’s thinking on racial 
issues were welcomed.4 
 One way the Dallas Citizens Council started the negotiation 
process was to create a biracial committee to look at the city’s 
racial problems and figure out ways to solve them peacefully.  The 
Committee of 14 as it was called was created in 1960 when then Mayor 
Bob Thornton (founder of the DCC) had a meeting with several key 
members of Dallas’ black community to talk strategy. Thornton told 
those in attendance that if they wanted to push for change they needed 
to get the DCC on board because “these guys have power”.  The 
committee consisted of seven leaders from both the white and black 
4 Phillips, White Metropolis, 13. W. Martin Dulaney, “Whatever Happened 
to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, Texas?” in Essays on the 
American Civil Rights Movement edited by W. Martin Dulaney and 
Kathleen Underwood (College State:  Texas A&M University Press, 1993), 
78.  Mark Rice, “R.L. Thornton: Embodying the Spirit of Dallas”, 
Legacies: A Historical Journal for Dallas and North Central Texas, 
Vol. 24, No. 1, (Spring 2012), 16-19. 
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communities, and these 14 men would significantly bolster the chances 
of peaceful desegregation in Dallas.  The black members of the 
Committee of 14 included George Allen, president of Great Liberty Life 
Insurance Company; W.J. Durham, one of the most prominent black 
attorneys in Dallas; Reverend E.C. Estell, president of the 
Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance; C.J. Clark, undertaker and 
spokesman for various fraternal organizations; Reverend B.E. Joshua, 
president of the Baptist Ministerial alliance; E.L.V. Reed, a tire 
dealer; and A. Maceo Smith, a leading black businessman and one of the 
most prominent Negro leaders in Texas.  The white members of the 
committee were James Aston, president of the Republic National Bank; 
Carr P. Collins, Sr., president of Fidelity Life Insurance Company; 
Karl Hoblitzelle, chairman of the board of the Republic National Bank; 
W.W. Overton, board chairman of the Texas Bank and Trust Company; John 
Mitchell, cotton machinery manufacturer; Julian Scheppes, wholesale 
liquor dealer and a leading Jewish layman; and C.A. Tatum, president 
of the Dallas Power and Light Company.  It should be noted that the 
black members of the group were chosen by the black community.  
According to A. Maceo Smith, who was perhaps the most important black 
member of the Committee of 14, “What made the committee a useful tool 
is that we were talking with the people who were able to do 
something”.  This also gave the committee an air of respect in the 
black community.  When Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP, 
met with the Committee of 14, he came away impressed asserting, “If 
this sort of thing had been done throughout the country—people willing 
44 
 
to sit down together and talk about the problem—we would have a 
different picture now”.5 
 The first thing the Committee of 14 did in its initial meeting 
was come up with a list of goals to accomplish in Dallas. Smith led 
the way in challenging the organization with six objectives to help 
desegregate the city of Dallas.  The first was to provide integrated 
food services to the city.  The second was to provide integrated 
public accommodations.  Neither of these was new, as black leaders 
like Smith and others had been trying to accomplish these goals for 
years.  The third goal was to provide equal employment opportunities 
for Negroes at City Hall.  The fourth called for the removal of racial 
designation signs from all public places.  The fifth goal was to 
provide integrated seating accommodations at sporting events and other 
public places and the sixth goal was to open accommodations in hotels 
and motels. This would indeed be a challenge to the Committee of 14 to 
accomplish all six of these goals, but they began working on each one 
as quickly as possible after the first meeting.6 
 While A. Maceo Smith’s work with the committee was important to 
furthering black rights in Dallas, this effort started well before the 
group was formed in 1960.  Originally from Texarkana, he graduated 
from Fisk University in 1924 and obtained a masters’ degree from New 
York University in 1928.  Smith came to Dallas in 1933 and immediately 
5 Brophy, “Active Acceptance-Active Containment: The Dallas Story”, 
140. “Leader Recalls Evolution of Battle: Smith’s Civil Rights Fight 
Had Bleak Start”, Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1973, 14 (author not 
given). 
6 Theodore M. Lawe, “Racial Politics in Dallas in the Twentieth 
Century”, East Texas Historical Journal Vol. 46, Issue 2 (2008), 35. 
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helped to resuscitate the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce as well as 
the local chapter of the NAACP. He said the DNCC was needed “because 
at that time there was little or no involvement of blacks with the 
ongoing of the city, you had your little thing on this side of town, 
while white folks were on the other side of town and the twain didn’t 
meet”.  This sounds very similar to his position in later years with 
the Committee of 14. Smith was already setting up the idea of more 
black involvement with the workings of the city by bringing back the 
Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce.7 
 Politics, more specifically black political participation, 
quickly became a concern for Smith after he came to Dallas. In 1933, 
right after coming to Dallas, Smith helped create the Progressive 
Citizens League.  This organization provided African Americans the 
opportunity to register to vote in Dallas by paying their poll taxes 
if they could not afford to do so.  He also assisted in organizing the 
Progressive Voters League in the city in 1936 to get blacks more 
involved in voting and the political process. It was organized right 
after Ammon Wells, an African American man, ran for the state House of 
Representatives and came in 6th out of 60 candidates.  Wells garnered 
1,001 votes while the winner polled 1,844 votes and Smith, as well as 
Maynard Jackson (leader of the PVL), felt that if there had been more 
black voters registered Wells probably would have won the race. By 
joining the Progressive Voters League, black Dallasites were adhering 
7 Phillips, White Metropolis, 70-71, 112.  “Leader Recalls Evolution of 
Battle” Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1973, 14. 
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to the “Dallas Way” because they were fulfilling their civic duty and 
acting responsibly as put forth by the Dallas Citizens Council.8 
 Once the PVL was formed, Smith and Jackson came up with a five 
point program to help blacks in the city. The program indicated that 
Smith and Jackson were actively pushing for change in Dallas. The 
first of the five points was to get African Americans hired as 
policemen.  Second they wanted an adequate public housing program put 
in place to allow blacks access to affordable housing.  The next part 
of the program focused on getting a recreational center for blacks 
that was run by blacks and fourth they wanted a new high school built 
for African American students.  Finally, they wanted to increase 
African American employment in the city government of Dallas.  These 
issues were brought to the forefront during the 1937 Dallas city 
council elections.  By this point the PVL had gained enough influence 
that it was crucial in deciding five out of the nine seats.  This was 
important to Smith because it took away some power of the Citizens 
Charter Association which had been winning or at least controlling 
elections for decades. Smith noted the 1937 election was unique 
because it was the first time the white CCA had not completely 
dominated an election.  The group had never gotten a complete majority 
but came close most years, and controlled the seats that they did not 
win. With more blacks voting in 1937 even this came to an end, and the 
power of the CCA was somewhat broken.  Not long after, the ideas 
coming from the five point program were put into place in various 
8 Phillips, White Metropolis, 113.  Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the 
Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, Texas?” 71-72. 
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ways.  Lincoln High School, a new black high school, was a product of 
the PVL’s influence in this election.  Also, blacks gained access to 
Wahoo Lake recreational center and employment in city government 
increased by 300 to 400 per cent.9 
 The late 1930s was also the time that A. Maceo Smith, Maynard 
Jackson, and an African American woman named Juanita Craft helped 
revive the NAACP chapter in Dallas.10  The chapter had been defunct 
since the 1920s, but Smith and company held the group’s first meeting 
in years in 1936.  Smith quickly rose through the ranks to become the 
state secretary of the Texas State Conference of Branches of the 
NAACP.  Because of his position statewide as well as his prominence in 
the Dallas chapter, Dallas would become the epicenter to help end the 
white primary, not just in Dallas but throughout Texas.  Dallas at the 
time was typically southern in that it was dominated by one-party 
Democrat politics.  In a one-party state, essentially the only vote 
that matters is the primary vote, and blacks were disfranchised from 
this vote.  Smith and others in the Dallas chapter of the NAACP wanted 
to change this by getting rid of the white primary.  They had been 
trying to do this since 1937 when they put a case through the courts 
that eventually made it to the Supreme Court and failed (which Smith 
recalls only briefly in an interview years later).  Despite the 
setback Smith continued to use this as the means of ending the white 
9 Theodore Lawe, “Racial Politics in Dallas in the Twentieth Century”, 
30-31.  “Leader Recalls Evolution of Battle” Dallas Morning News, May 
3, 1973, 14. 
10 Craft is a woman that would become heavily involved in the NAACP in 
Dallas especially with the youth movement of the 1950s.  Her role in 
that endeavor will be explained further in the chapter. 
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primary. In 1940, the Dallas NAACP got a dentist from Houston named 
Lonnie Smith to be the plaintiff in a new case designed to get rid of 
the white primary.  The dentist was chosen because he had been denied 
a ballot in Harris County’s Democrat party primary in 1940, and the 
NAACP took action against this.  Thurgood Marshall and local attorney 
W.J. Durham (a member of the Committee of 14) were the lead 
prosecutors in the case which made it all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court.  While this was early in Marshall’s career he would go 
on to be a champion of the civil rights movement first as chief legal 
counsel for the NAACP and then as the first black man to be Supreme 
Court Justice.  Marshall was the main litigator that helped win the 
Brown case so it is fitting that he would be helping to fight the 
white primary in Dallas at this early stage. It took four years but 
the white primary system was finally defeated in the case.  While A. 
Maceo Smith was not involved directly in the legal proceedings, he 
worked diligently to see this case won.  His dealings helped open the 
door for ending the white primary throughout the South, and he made 
note of this when he recalled the decision years later Smith 
remembered that “In 1944 on April 4 we had a sweeping decision against 
the white primary.  It opened up the primary throughout the South. 
This started right in my living room.  We prepared the strategy there, 
and we financed the case here in Texas”.11 
11 Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, 
Texas?”, 72-73. “Leader Recalls Evolution of Battle” Dallas Morning 
News, May 3, 1973, 14.  Linda Greenhouse, “Thurgood Marshall, Civil 
Rights Hero Dies at 84”, New York Times obituary, January 25, 1993. 
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 The next thing Smith and the local chapter of the NAACP did was 
fight to equalize teacher pay in Dallas. This was actually done 
through the efforts of an umbrella organization created in 1942 called 
the Dallas Council of Negro Organizations.  The DCNO consisted of all 
the major African American organizations in the city including the 
NAACP, the PVL, the Negro Chamber of Commerce, as well as 20 other 
major black organizations in the city.  Even so the NAACP took the 
lead with this organization and found a young teacher named Thelma 
Page to be the plaintiff in the case.  Smith personally told her that 
if she got fired from her job that the NAACP would pay her salary for 
a year.  The case was filed in November of 1942 as Page v. Board of 
Education, City of Dallas, once again with W.J. Durham as lead 
counsel. The case did not last long as a ruling was handed down in 
February of 1943 to grant pay raises over the next two years until 
salaries were equalized.  City leaders did not want a long drawn out 
trial because it could hurt the city’s image.  According to Smith, 
“The case never went to trial.  When the evidence we had built up was 
presented to Judge William Atwell we got a consent decree equalizing 
salaries”.12  
Smith and the Dallas NAACP also got involved in the case to 
desegregate the University of Texas beginning in the late 1940s.  
Smith recalled years later that a group of men that included Thurgood 
Marshall, Carter Wesley publisher of the Houston Informer newspaper, 
Charley Thompson of Howard University, and a few others (not named) 
12 Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, 
Texas?”, 74.  “Leader Recalls Evolution of Battle” Dallas Morning 
News, May 3, 1973, 14. 
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were sitting on his front porch in Dallas drinking whiskey when they 
came up with a plan to put a case through the courts to test 
segregation in higher education in Texas.  Originally Wesley wanted 
the group to file suit to make Prairie View equal to Texas A&M, but 
Marshall’s ambitions were bigger than that because he opined, “No we 
ain’t fooling with that, we’re going to file this against the 
University of Texas”.  Thus was born the case of Sweatt v. Painter in 
which Smith and the Dallas NAACP chapter filed suit against the 
University of Texas to open its doors to black students. Before the 
case was heard the state tried to be proactive and build a law school 
for Heman Sweatt in the basement of the capitol building in Austin. He 
refused to attend so then the state of Texas built a separate law 
school in Houston and again he refused. Eventually the case that was 
started on Smith’s porch over a glass of whiskey made it to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  It is clear Smith was proud of his involvement when he 
remembered years later, “We filed and carried the case of Sweatt vs. 
Painter to the United States Supreme Court, and the court in 1950 
declared segregated public education illegal, and that was the 
forerunner of the Brown case”.13 
While the Sweatt case did not directly involve progress for 
blacks in Dallas, it is clear men like Smith and the Dallas chapter of 
the NAACP were heavily involved the matter.  The group was also 
working towards gains in the city itself during this time as well.  
African Americans served on juries in Dallas in 1941 for the first 
13 “Leader Recalls Evolution of Battle” Dallas Morning News, May 3, 
1973, 14. 
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time in 50 years.  In 1946, African Americans won their first precinct 
chairs in the Democratic Party and participated in the Dallas County 
Democrats county convention for the first time. That same year 14 
black police officers were appointed to patrol the city’s black 
neighborhoods.  There were other small gains in the 1940s such as the 
employment of black postal workers, work in the defense plants, and 
access to Wahoo City Park.14 
Despite these gains, blacks in Dallas still lacked equal 
treatment.  There was still inadequate housing for blacks, segregated 
schools, and segregated public facilities all of which would take 
years to bring down.  Smith and the NAACP began to look into these 
local issues. One of the first hurdles they tried to change involved 
housing.  This would be a difficult task because there was very little 
in the way of adequate housing, and what was there, proved to be 
shoddy at best.  According to Smith, “At the time of the beginning 
that I am telling you about, the only housing blacks could get was 
hand-me-downs or boxes that they nailed together themselves”.  The 
Federal Housing Authority was not financing any black housing.  Banks 
were making ten year loans with incredibly high interest rates that 
could not be paid.  New houses were out of the question because the 
banks would not finance those in the slum areas.  Couple this with the 
fact that in the 1940s, there were a number of bombings that were 
designed to discourage blacks from settling in white areas.  Smith 
used his influence to gain an audience with what he called the “top-
14 Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, 
Texas?”, 74-75. 
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level leadership of Dallas”.  A committee was created within the 
Dallas Chamber of Commerce to investigate the bombings.  Then chamber 
president, Bob Thornton, called together a blue-ribbon grand jury, but 
no one was ever brought to justice.  Although the responsibility for 
the bombings was never solved, city leaders dealt to some degree with 
the issue of housing.  Projects were built to give blacks more access 
to housing, though they remained segregated for years to come.15 
Public school desegregation became a hotbed issue in Dallas after 
the Brown case was handed down in 1954.  The NAACP, as well as the 
Committee of 14 began looking into desegregating Dallas’ schools as 
early as 1955.  Twenty-eight black students attempted to integrate 
all-white schools that year, but school authorities denied them 
entrance.  The NAACP filed suit against the school board, but the case 
was continued repeatedly in order to delay desegregation of the school 
system.  This failed attempt to integrate the schools in Dallas led to 
a backlash among the white community.  Numerous whites formed the 
Texas Citizens Council of Dallas which vowed “to fight to the end to 
maintain segregation in Texas schools”.  This is the start of the 
massive resistance movement in Dallas that was sweeping the South 
after the Brown decision.  The idea behind the citizens’ councils was 
to use any lawful means they could to block Brown from being 
implemented throughout the South.  The Texas Citizens Council of 
Dallas was led by Texas Attorney General John Ben Sheppard who not 
only wanted to keep segregation in Dallas schools but also completely 
15 “Leader Recalls Evolution of Battle”, Dallas Morning News, May 3, 
1973, 14.  Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in 
Dallas, Texas?”, 75-76. 
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remove the NAACP from the city.  He actually achieved his goal, albeit 
for a brief time, when the NAACP in Dallas ceased operation from 
September of 1956 through May of 1957.  The main reason for this was 
retaliation against the organization for the desegregation law suits.  
The records of the Dallas chapter were confiscated and this in essence 
crippled the organization.  Smith was forced to resign as state 
executive secretary of the NAACP, and the local chapter had to break 
ties with the national entity.  The NAACP in Dallas did not really 
regain its former strength that had been built by Smith and others 
until 1959 when a lady named Minnie Flanagan was named president.  She 
was able to bring the group back from the brink of extinction by 
linking it to the sit-in movement in Dallas.16   
The goal of lessening the influence of the NAACP in the city was 
furthered in 1957 by the Texas State House of Representatives.  It 
passed a bill saying no state or local agency could hire NAACP members 
and this included teachers, which was a tactic used in other states 
throughout the South as well.  Ten other segregation bills were passed 
most of which were designed to delay integration further unless a 
local option vote was taken where a majority of people voted to open 
the schools.  None of the bills were viable in the long run, but they 
showed the willingness of the state legislature to do whatever it 
could to block integration. Texas had a state law in place that 
required locals to vote on school desegregation, and schools could 
lose funding if they attempted to violate this rule and open the doors 
16 Lawe, “Racial Politics in Dallas in the Twentieth Century”, 34.  
Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, 
Texas?”, 76-78. 
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to black students without going through the proper channels.  Dallas 
schools could lose $1.5 million in state aid as well as lose 
accreditation if they tried to desegregate without a majority vote.  
The school superintendent and board members also could be fined up to 
$1,000 for the same offense.17 
The issue of desegregating the schools would continue into the 
1960s in Dallas.  The citizens of the city adhered to the “Dallas Way” 
by acting on their civic duty and upholding the letter the law. In 
order to move forward with desegregation a referendum vote needed to 
be held and this occurred in August of 1960.  The vote was 4-1 (30,234 
to 7,416) against integration.  Even though the Brown decision had 
been handed down six years earlier, it is apparent that the white 
citizens of Dallas were not ready to have their children attend 
integrated schools.18   
  The NAACP forced the school board to develop a desegregation 
plan in 1961 by winning a case in the United States Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  The ruling compelled the school district to 
implement a plan that called for gradual integration starting in the 
first grade and moving each year after 1961 to a new grade until all 
grades were desegregated in the Dallas schools.  In August of 1961, 18 
African Americans enrolled in previously all-white elementary schools 
throughout the city and played a major role in ensuring a peaceful 
desegregation process in the schools.  According to Dennis Hoover, a 
17 “House Adopts NAACP Bill”, Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1957, 11 
(no author cited).  Sue Connally, “U.S. Court Ruled out of ‘Mix’ Row”, 
Dallas Morning News, May 24, 1958, 1. 
18 Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, 
Texas?”, 77-78. 
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journalist who covered desegregation of the schools for the Dallas 
Morning News, “Early in 1960 the DCC saw ultimate desegregation as 
inevitable. It vowed that for the well-being of Dallas the strife of a 
Little Rock or New Orleans must be avoided, absolutely”.  Hoover 
pointed out that the DCC repeatedly made note that if the new “stair 
step” program of desegregation was to work in Dallas, it was because 
the citizens of the city obeyed the law and abided by the “Dallas 
Way”. Hoover noted that the good people of Dallas “agree with the 
DCC’s central tenet. This is: whether you favor desegregation or not, 
good citizens obey the law”.19 
This idea of being law abiding citizens in regard to 
desegregating the schools was driven home further by a film released 
by the DCC in 1961 titled, Dallas at the Crossroads.  The film, along 
with a pamphlet of the same name, was distributed all across the city 
to thousands of organizations to help get the word out that good 
citizens should accept the law that the schools would be desegregated 
and do so without causing a ruckus in the city. The 22 minute film was 
produced by Sam Bloom and narrated by Walter Cronkite and included a 
number of Dallas’ prominent citizens (presumably most if not all were 
members of the DCC) advocating that Dallas obey the law or face the 
consequences.  According to Cronkite, “Other cities have faced, and 
faced recently, the same problems of change which Dallas now faces.  
They have met these problems with violence.  The face of violence is 
the face of hate, unreason, cruelty, personal, and civic 
19 Dennis Hoover, “DCC Works for Peaceful Mixing”, Dallas Morning News, 
August 6, 1961, 1. 
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irresponsibility”.  This reasoning permeates the film, and it almost 
seems like the business community was trying to shame miscreants in 
the city into abiding by the law and allowing desegregation to occur 
without violence.  In order for the city to move on with 
desegregation, it must do so by adhering to Dallas Way, and this could 
only be achieved by following the letter of the law.20 
At the same time school desegregation was taking place in Dallas, 
the DCC and the Committee of 14 began planning for the desegregation 
of lunch counters and other public facilities in the city.  Once again 
it was in the best interest of the DCC for things to go smoothly, so 
they began negotiating with black leaders in the Committee of 14, as 
well as others throughout the city, to achieve this as quickly and 
quietly as possible.  The DCC made note of this in a pamphlet put out 
in the early 1960s that stated, “Restaurants, theaters, increased use 
of department store facilities, hotels, churches—all are likely 
targets.  Here, as with the schools, the problem may ultimately have 
to be resolved by law”.  Starting in 1960 the Committee of 14, as well 
as the DCC, began to negotiate with several downtown Dallas stores to 
look at the possibility of opening the lunch counters.  Several stores 
in Dallas, including Woolworth’s and Walgreen’s, desegregated their 
lunch counters without incident in 1960. In April 1960, two Southern 
Methodist University theology students were served at HL Green 
Department store without incident as well.  The Green store was chosen 
because it was a national chain.  The store was not given advance 
20 Phillips, White Metropolis, 157.  Dallas at the Crossroads, Film 
commissioned by the Dallas Citizens Council and produced by Sam Bloom, 
1961, Found on YouTube. 
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warning that it had been chosen for an integration attempt.  Even so 
there was not a problem at the Green store as Reverend Richard 
Stewart, then one of the theology students, recalled years later. This 
was mainly because the university backed the students as did the town 
of Dallas. Allen Madison, a boy of 14 at the time, that was also 
involved in bringing integration to the Green store recalled that, 
“Not many people in town even know that happened.  This is undoubtedly 
due to efforts of the DCC and the Committee of 14 working behind the 
scenes to assure that there would be no violence involved in this 
encounter.  The businessmen of the DCC wanted it this way—no 
attention, no violence, and thus no possibility of loss of business 
due to exposure. According to Joe Goulden, then a reporter for the 
Dallas Morning News, “Dallasites knew the sit-ins had damaged the 
images of other cities.  They were determined not to suffer the same 
fate.  The DCC decided they were not gonna have racial strife in the 
city of Dallas”.21 
Despite the fact that several stores had desegregated their lunch 
counters by 1960, there were a good number that had not.  Because of 
this the Dallas Community Committee, an offshoot of the Committee of 
14 run by Reverend E.C. Estell, called for a boycott and picket of 
downtown stores in order to get them to open their lunch counters to 
African Americans.  The first picket started in October of 1960, and 
21 Hoover, “DCC Works for Peaceful Mixing”, Dallas Morning News, August 
6, 1961, 1.  Phillips, White Metropolis, 156.  Joe Goulden, “Negro 
Students get Service at Lunch Counter”, Dallas Morning News, April 27, 
1960 (page not given).  Eliot Kleinberg, “Dallas Blacks Recall 
Integrating Diners”, Dallas Morning News, April 27, 1985 (page not 
given). 
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included a cross-section of the African American community in Dallas. 
It continued each day of the week with a different group every time.  
One day it was the lawyers who picketed.  The next it was black 
businessmen and professionals.  Then it was the ministers, and yet 
another day it was the beauticians as well as people in similar 
occupations.  The Dallas Express, the city’s main African American 
newspaper, took out a full page ad in May of 1961 where more than 300 
women of color signed a pledge to not shop in downtown stores that 
were not desegregated. The ad, combined with the picketing, worked.  
On July 26, 1961 business establishments in downtown Dallas were to 
remove their discriminating signs, symbols, practices, and extend 
service to all customers regardless of race.  To dramatize this event, 
the Committee of 14 arranged for 159 African Americans to walk into 49 
downtown lunch counters and restaurants to be served without incident.  
This in turn prompted the Dallas Community Committee to call off its 
boycott. The boycott only lasted two months but it created tension in 
the black community as to the direction the civil rights movement 
should take in Dallas.  The boycott ultimately provided limited 
success that was seen merely as tokenism.  Several lunch counters 
still refused to serve African Americans.  Bus stations, Parkland 
Hospital, and the Texas State Fair still continued their policies of 
racial discrimination well into the 1960s.  Because of this, the 
Committee of 14 decided to abandon the idea of direct action and go 
back to the negotiating table with the white businessmen of the Dallas 
59 
 
Citizens Council. In doing so they would continue on with the notion 
of desegregating through use of the Dallas Way.22 
The idea of direct action in Dallas did not actually begin with 
the downtown boycott and picket.  Rather, it had started in the 1950s 
with a theater and the state fair. The concept was started by Juanita 
Craft, a key member of the NAACP chapter in the city. She was in 
charge of the Dallas Youth Council of the NAACP and got teenagers to 
picket a theater as early as 1955 for its discriminatory practices.  
The theater picket did not work but laid the groundwork for other 
direct action protests to occur because Craft provided an 
infrastructure with the NAACP Youth Council that would be the basis 
for other protests to come.  The most notable one was waged against 
the Texas state fair which also occurred in 1955 at the request of 
Craft and the Dallas youth Council.  The fair was held annually in 
Dallas but blacks could only attend on Negro Achievement Day which was 
just one day out of the sixteen at the fair. The youth of the NAACP 
began picketing in 1955 at six of the eleven gates open to the public.  
The young protestors held signs that voiced their discontent with 
sayings like “This is Negro Achievement Day at the Fair-Keep Out”, 
“Racial Segregation is Un-Clean, Un-American, and Un-Moral—Stay Out”, 
and “Don’t Sell Your Pride for a Segregated Ride—Stay Out”.  They also 
passed out handbills that claimed visiting the fair on any other day 
22 Dulaney, “Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, 
Texas?”, 79-82. 
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other than Negro Achievement Day would bring blacks, “humiliation and 
disgrace”.23   
The picketing was brought about by a condemnation of the fair by 
the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce which said that there were 
several midway rides blacks were banned from, as well as eating places 
at the fair, even on Negro Achievement Day.  This was met with 
compromise by then Mayor R.L. Thornton, who was also president of the 
fair.  The midway rides would be opened immediately to people of all 
races, but “moral and legal commitments” would prevent any policy 
change in the Fair Park restaurants.  James H. Stewart, executive vice 
president and general manager of the fair, was miffed by the fact that 
blacks were picketing the fair at all.  He noted that, “It is 
particularly ironic and difficult to understand (the picketing) in 
view of the fact that the State Fair of Texas has been a pioneer in 
making available to Negroes, through its 16-day run, facilities that 
are not open to them anywhere else in the state”.  Thornton tried to 
accommodate black demands at the fair, which should not be surprising 
since he was a founding member of the Dallas Citizens Council.  
However, his acquiescence could only go so far as he was bound by 
state law which would not allow any further integration in a public 
facility. While the protest did not end segregation at the fair 
completely it did bring whites to the negotiating table which is yet 
another example of abiding by the Dallas Way.  After the picketing at 
the fair, Thornton arranged several meetings with black leaders 
23 Behnken, “The Dallas Way”, 6-7.  Francis P. Raffetto, “Negroes 
Ignore Fair Picketing”, Dallas Morning News, October 18, 1955, 1.  
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including Juanita Craft and George Allen, a prominent African American 
businessman, to discuss integrating public facilities.  These meetings 
resulted in a plan to send black patrons to downtown stores to test 
segregation, and though it failed it did open the door for what would 
come in the 1960s as previously stated.24 
While Craft did not get what she wanted fully accomplished in the 
1950s, the idea of desegregation would become more of a reality by the 
early 1960s in downtown Dallas.  By the end of 1963 blacks were being 
hired as retail salesmen, cashiers, checkers, and customer contact 
employees in a broad spectrum of stores in the city.  This included 
major stores as well as those as small as shop size and it occurred 
city-wide, not just in black communities. Some 150 businesses 
including department stores, food chains, and apparel stores 
cooperated with the hiring of black employees.  Once again this 
happened without incident, and according to Morning News reporter 
Dennis Hoover, “It is the most conspicuous facet of a deliberate and 
persistent effort by Dallas business and civic leaders to open new 
employment vistas for Negroes throughout industry generally”.  This 
was yet another item on a long agenda of the desegregation plan for 
Dallas put forth by the DCC.  A spokesman for the DCC noted, “All 
along it has been recognized that the process of school, restaurant 
and other desegregation was leading up to a question of pure 
economics—helping Negroes to gain the financial means to utilize their 
new freedoms.  Expanded economic opportunity for Negroes is 
24 Behnken, “The Dallas Way”, 7-10.  Raffetto, “Negroes Ignore Fair 
Picketing”, Dallas Morning News, October 18, 1955, 1. 
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inevitable”.  Of course, expanded economic opportunity for Negroes in 
Dallas also meant expanded economic opportunity for the business 
owners in the city.  The idea of business profit, or lack thereof, 
always fueled the process of desegregation in Dallas. If the city 
looked good by hiring black employees, then the business leaders 
looked good and would continue to attract new investors.  This was the 
goal all along and the DCC spokesman noted this when he stated, “The 
effort has been intricately planned and skillfully executed, as have 
all of Dallas’ major desegregation moves”.  This is what made Dallas 
the envy of other cities throughout the South. While some had 
picketing and rioting, Dallas moved forward peacefully and quietly for 
the most part.  The DCC spokesman made this point clear when he said, 
“If and as problems arise they are nipped in the bud.  This, too, is 
part of Dallas’ envied pattern in race relations”.25 
By the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, Dallas had 
nearly completed the task of breaking down racial barriers in the 
city.  By this point, “the city unobtrusively has integrated parks, 
pools, hotels, food services, theaters, etc., with few exceptions”.  
The city was not completely integrated in public accommodations but it 
was pretty close.  Many in Dallas felt that the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act would not really have much of an impact on the city.  This 
was the definitely the case with city councilman George M. Underwood 
Jr. who told the Morning News in June of 1964, “I think the civil 
rights law passage will go practically unnoticed here, we are so 
25 Dennis Hoover, “Dallas Stores Hiring Negroes as Retail Salesmen, 
Cashiers”, Dallas Morning News, December 12, 1963, 22. 
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completely integrated now.  I doubt there will be any awareness of any 
difference in our lives.  Changes are being made smoothly right now”.  
Councilman R.B. Carpenter Jr. had much the same assessment, but also 
reinforced the idea of the Dallas Way when he was quoted as saying, “I 
believe the only thing we can do is go by the letter of the law.  Some 
more places will have to integrate. But most have already done so. 
What’s left?”.  Negro leaders were praised in these effort just as 
much as white leaders. Robert Cullum, president of the Dallas Chamber 
of Commerce, stated to the Morning News, “We must give high credit to 
the good citizenship of our Negro community.  They have responded in a 
fully responsible way to remarkably cohesive and unselfish 
leadership”.  He continued by giving credit to the idea of the Dallas 
Way as well.  According to Cullum, a businessman by trade, Dallas “has 
a promising situation—we are ahead of the law writers, will attend to 
life within the full spirit of what the law wants to do”.  Cullum’s 
statement was the embodiment of the Dallas Way.  The city would abide 
by the law, as it had with all others with few exceptions, for years.  
Just because a new civil rights bill was being passed, it did not mean 
Dallas would have to change. The city was well ahead of the curve, and 
Dallas would continue on as usual.26 
SNCC, as well as other more radical protest groups, came to 
Dallas in the 1960s intent on accelerating the sometimes slow-moving 
change brought forth by A. Maceo Smith and other black leaders in the 
Committee of 14.  However because of the influence of Smith, as well 
26 “Few Changes Seen After Rights Bill Ok’d” Dallas Morning News, June 
28, 1964, 15 (author not given). 
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as the influence of the DCC and the Committee of 14, the direction of 
the movement never really changed in Dallas.  According to Kevin 
Merida of the Morning News, “Black militants in Dallas found it 
difficult to press aggressively for change”.  There was an incident in 
Dallas in 1968 that brought the city as close as it would come to 
chaos during the civil rights movement. Ernest McMillan and Matthew 
Johnson, local leaders of SNCC in Dallas, were sentenced to ten years 
in prison for leading a food-smashing raid on a white owned South 
Dallas grocery store. They led the raid because the store did not have 
any black employees and their prices were higher than other stores 
while the quality of their products was lower.  The penalty was stiff 
for damages that only amounted to a little over $200, but after this 
SNCC would have a hard time gaining traction in Dallas.  McMillan and 
Johnson, “represented the new, unwelcomed black power movement”.  
Dallas was used to peaceful negotiations in regards to racial changes 
in the city, and the incident of 1968 was an anomaly that proved that 
this is how things would continue. The grocery store incident had 
occurred during the summer of 1968 when tensions were still high after 
the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and it would be one of 
the few incidents of this nature in Dallas. The Committee of 14 and 
the DCC had done too much to see this change.  James Smith, President 
of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce in the early 1960s told Merida 
that “C.A. Tatum (president of the Citizens Council) and the 14-man 
committee had detoothed the tiger, so to speak”. While the changes may 
not have always come as quickly as some wanted, the DCC and the 
Committee of 14 had been the voice of reason for years and this would 
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not change because of one episode of violence at a time when tensions 
were high.27   
When looking at the rights movement in Dallas it is easy to make 
comparisons to other cities, notably Houston and Atlanta.  The reason 
for this is that the businessmen in all three cities did what they 
could to make it seem like there were no racial problems in these 
areas.  Business leaders in Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta knew that if 
there was racial strife in the city, entrepreneurs were less likely to 
invest in the city.  Like Houston, Dallas tried to dilute its 
“southernness” and become more of western city.  This was done in 
order to prove that there were no racial problems in Dallas.  This 
idea can be taken all the way back to Reconstruction in Dallas because 
the business moguls knew that if they did not steer the city away from 
racial violence then there would be no one willing to invest in the 
city.  Dallas desperately wanted to become a financial hub and this 
could not be achieved in a city with internal racial turmoil.  Dallas 
mirrors Atlanta in that both cities were built by the railroads, and 
also like Houston, Atlanta tried to make big business the order of the 
city, not racial violence.28 
One parallel that can be drawn between Dallas and Atlanta was 
that Atlanta also had a biracial organization similar to Dallas’ 
Committee of 14.  Like Dallas, Atlanta’s interracial coalition 
27 Ibid.   
28 Michael Phillips, White Metropolis: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in 
Dallas, 1841-2001 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 14-15, 
46-47, 58. Alton Hornsby, “A city that was too busy to hate: Atlanta 
businessmen and desegregation” in Southern Businessmen and 
Desegregation, 121-122. 
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maintained an air of civility in dealing with the civil rights 
movement.  The goal was the same in both cities-economic growth-and 
this could only be achieved in Atlanta (and Dallas) through the work 
of negotiation on behalf of the white and black communities in regards 
to civil rights.  Businessmen in Atlanta promoted the idea of racial 
harmony by appealing to civic pride just like in Dallas.  Peace was 
kept in racial matters and thus the city prospered economically.  
Black leaders in Atlanta went along with this despite the fact that 
they knew more racial change needed to occur in the city.  The same 
can be said for Dallas’ black community beyond the Committee of 14.29  
The Progressive Voters League of Dallas is similar to the Atlanta 
Negro Voters League which was made up of black preachers, professors, 
lawyers, and businessmen in the city.  A.T. Walden, Atlanta’s version 
of A. Maceo Smith, was the leader of the organization and was seen as 
the New South’s first black political boss.  He used the influence of 
the Negro Voters League to gain favor with the white leadership of 
Atlanta’s city council much the same way Smith did with the PVL in 
Dallas.  Walden bargained with white politicians offering black votes 
in exchange for favorable race relations in Atlanta.  Atlanta’s 
business community liked this because it kept race tensions down and 
profits up as a result and the city developed a reputation as an 
“oasis of tolerance” in regards to southern race relations.30 
29 David Andrew Harmon, Beneath the Image of the Civil Rights Movement 
and Race Relations: Atlanta, Georgia, 1946-1981 (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1996), viii, 309-310. 
30 Hornsby, “A city that was too busy to hate”, 124. 
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School desegregation provides another example where a similarity 
to Atlanta is noteworthy.  Like Dallas, Atlanta also decided to put 
forth a plan to open the schools to black students in 1961.  Also like 
Dallas the city expressed a willingness to do so peacefully.  The 
Atlanta Constitution voiced the opinion in January of 1961 that the 
year was critical for the city, and expressed the hope “that the 
schools can be preserved and the children spared such experiences as 
we’ve witnessed in New Orleans”.  This provides a direct link to 
Dallas as the video aforementioned wanted to do just this.  Atlanta’s 
mayor, William B. Hartsfield, espoused the same sentiment as Dallas 
mayor Earl Cabell when he called for “cool-headedness and common sense 
to solve our problems and to preserve the city’s reputation…Mobs, 
lawlessness, and terror won’t change the courts”.  Clearly Atlanta was 
thinking very much along the same lines as Dallas as the city did not 
want to hurt its business reputation.  A violent struggle for 
desegregation in the schools would result in loss of business and the 
power structure in neither city wanted that, thus the call for law and 
order. In January of 1961 Atlanta businessmen issued a statement 
saying that, “disruption of our public school system would have a 
calamitous effect on the economic climate of Georgia”. Meanwhile, the 
fight to desegregate the University of Georgia was also taking place.  
Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes entered the campus in Athens in 
the fall of 1961 through the help of a federal court order.  According 
to Alton Hornsby, this actually “saved” the public schools from having 
to desegregate quicker.  Legislators in the state were willing to keep 
segregation intact in the public schools until court order and this 
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did not come until the UGA ruling in 1961.  However, once the ruling 
was handed down the university began desegregating and thus so did the 
public schools in Atlanta.  On August 30, 1961 nine black students who 
had survived the rigorous testing and other procedures to qualify for 
transfers entered schools in each of Atlanta’s four quadrants without 
incident.  Desegregation in Atlanta’s schools had become a token 
reality, peacefully, just like in Dallas.31 
While there are numerous similarities in the civil rights 
experience in Dallas and Atlanta as aforementioned, this ends by the 
mid to late 1960s.  By this time various southern cities appeared to 
be coming apart at the seams, and Atlanta was one of those on the 
brink of chaos.  The Civil Rights Movement had become more militant 
with the emergence of more vocal, violent protest groups and cities 
like Los Angeles were literally and figuratively on fire because of 
incidents like the 1965 Watts Riots.  The quiet, nonviolent protests 
of King and the early leaders of the movement were becoming less 
frequent.  The sit-ins were replaced by riots.  This happened in 
Atlanta where schools and churches were bombed.  The city experienced 
revolt in a black neighborhood in 1966.  People in Dallas feared the 
same would happen to their city because of the close ties to Atlanta.  
31 Hornsby, “A city that was too busy to hate”, 125-126, 131-132, 136.  
The article from the Atlanta Constitution was quoted in Hornsby’s 
article on page 125.  Columbia, South Carolina was a city that waited 
to desegregate its public schools until after the University of South 
Carolina had done so. It was not really done as a delay tactic like in 
Georgia but does show that the city wanted to make sure that there 
would be no problems, and once the university desegregated quietly, 
the public schools followed.  For more on this see Paul Loftus Jr.’s 
essay “Calm and Exemplary: Desegregation in Columbia, South Carolina” 
in Southern Businessmen and Desegregation edited by Elizabeth Jacoway 
and David Colburn. 
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However, this would not be the case in Dallas because the business 
leadership had worked for decades to ensure that would not occur.  
They men involved with the DCC continued to lead the way in Dallas and 
did not let the violence engulf Dallas.  There was one near riot but 
it remained localized and never reached the point where things would 
get out of hand.  Atlanta could not say the same and the city became 
more militant at a time that Dallas remained calm.32   
The Civil Rights Movement in Dallas never reached the fever pitch 
that it did in many southern cities.  It was, for the most part, a 
peaceful and quiet period that was made possible through negotiation. 
Business leaders in Dallas did not want to see their city engulfed in 
racial conflict, so they sought out negotiation with the black 
community. They came up with the idea of the Dallas Way and this 
became the norm even for the Civil Rights Movement.  This meant 
following the letter of the law, and doing what was right for the city 
as a whole. If this meant opening the doors of the city to African 
Americans so be it.  It was beneficial to the city to desegregate 
quietly and peacefully because it was beneficial to the businessmen.  
The Dallas Citizens Council led the way in regards to adhering to the 
Dallas Way.  They formed a biracial group, the Committee of 14, to 
help lead the city through a negotiated desegregation plan.  They 
acquiesced when necessary and brought racial change to the city, 
albeit slowly at times.  But no matter how long it took, the goal 
32 Kevin Merida, Quiet Diplomacy Helped Dallas Begin Desegregation”, 
Dallas Morning News, February 24, 1985 (page not given). 
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remained the same.  Desegregate, through negotiation, to avoid the 




Before its Time: The Desegregation of Perkins School of Theology 
 
I don’t like this proposal.  It goes against what I’ve always 
believed.  But I can tell which way the wind is blowing and I’m going 
to vote for it.1 
 
 An unnamed, but influential Board of Trustees member at Southern 
Methodist University made the above comment before voting in November 
1950 to change the school’s bylaws.  This was an important vote 
because it would remove restrictions on admitting people of color and 
would open the door for African American students to attend SMU as 
regular students.  This was a big step for a private, church 
affiliated school in 1950.  The mere idea of actually changing the 
bylaws, let alone allowing blacks to enter SMU, was something that the 
other major private schools in the South were not even contemplating 
at the time.  The others, namely Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and 
Vanderbilt held out as long as they could in regards to starting the 
process of desegregation. So, in this respect Southern Methodist 
University was before its time. While the university did not open the 
doors in all of the various schools in 1950 to African Americans, the 
door was cracked open with the board’s decision of that year. There 
were many people that were instrumental in this monumental decision 
and the subsequent admission of blacks in the coming years at SMU, 
including university president Umphrey Lee, Board of Trustees chairman 
A. Frank Smith, and Bishops William Martin and Paul Martin (no 
relation) among countless others.  Perhaps the most important, though, 
1 Lewis Howard Grimes, A History of the Perkins School of Theology 
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1993), 110. 
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was Merrimon Cuninggim.  Cuninggim became the dean of Perkins School 
of Theology at SMU in 1951, and it was his leadership from then until 
the early 1960s that truly helped bring about the desegregation of the 
School of Theology at the university.  Despite the fact that 
desegregation at Perkins was smooth and quiet for the most part, there 
were problems with, and detractors of, the experiment.  When 
opposition did rise, it was Cuninggim that stuck to his convictions 
and kept the process going without it completely coming apart at the 
seams.  Black students had attended classes at Perkins sporadically 
prior to 1950. As early as 1946 Dean Eugene Hawk, spurred on by 
faculty prodding, arranged noncredit afternoon classes for black 
ministers who wanted more training as provided by the School of 
Theology at SMU.  Dr. Hawk was quick to point out that “these Negroes 
are not enrolled in SMU, they pay no fees, they get no college 
credits.  Our instructors handle these classes outside their regular 
schedules”.  Two years later, in 1948, school administrators allowed 
African Americans to sit in on regular classes with white students. 
Neither instance raised any controversy.2 
 While there was no opposition to these incidents in 1948 at 
Perkins, there was definitely confusion.  In April, the Conference on 
Christian Action for Human Rights made a mistake when it stated that 
SMU allowed admittance to black students in the School of Theology.  
This was not true, and Dean Hawk made sure everyone knew it by issuing 
an immediate denial. Despite this, Hawk began receiving letters 
2 William R. Simon, “Breaking the Color Bar at SMU”, Legacies: A 
History Journal for Dallas and North Central Texas, Vol. 24, Issue 1 
(Spring 2012), 34. 
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commending SMU for its imagined racial progress.  Methodist pastors in 
Texas led the way in praising SMU. Reverend J. Troy Hickman of San 
Marcos wrote to Hawk and was “glad your institution is already doing 
something definite for Negro leaders in the church.  Many Perkins ex-
students who are now in the ministry are delighted with the progress 
made there since our time”. Reverend Seaborn Kiker echoed this 
sentiment from his pastorate in Falfurrias, Texas when he wrote, “It 
was gratifying to me to learn of the good service our School of 
Theology has been rendering the Negro brethren…Any door that can be 
opened to them…is a great service to the church”. However, SMU was not 
quite as racially progressive as these ministers thought.  It would 
still be a few years before blacks were admitted as regular students 
at Perkins.3   
 Not all of the commentary Dean Hawk received in 1948 was 
positive.  His worst fear, and indeed that of the Board, was that a 
school like SMU was not ready to cross the racial divide that existed 
in the South.  Doing so would break the bonds of white supremacy that 
were still very much alive even in Dallas in the late 1940s.  Race 
mixing was not something people in the church at large and the 
community wanted to see at SMU in 1948.  A letter from Allen Green to 
Hawk illustrated this point quite clearly.  Green wrote in his letter, 
“I’m in favor of helping the negroes all we can but let’s keep them 
segregated.  It is no good for races to mix.  I hope that you will 
continue to enforce segregation.  Not one true southerner wants a 
mixture of races”.  The fear was that if you allow the races to mix, 
3 Ibid. 
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even if it is just in school, then you are moving in the direction of 
social equality. One segregationist leader warned about the “serious 
problems that are sure to arise if we abandon our segregated school 
system—such as integrated social events, integrated restroom 
facilities and showers, drama classes and more…”.  Another put it more 
bluntly stating “when we come right down to it, that’s what this is 
all about: a nigger a-marrying your sister or your daughter”.  
Numerous whites in the South, including those in Texas, felt the time 
had not yet come for this to happen.4 
 Despite the white supremacy argument presented to Dean Hawk, 
Southern Methodist University continued to move forward, not backward, 
between 1948 and 1950 in race relations on campus. Once again, the 
faculty began clamoring for more change.  The post-World War II era  
was a time when social mores were altered, and faculty members at SMU 
wanted to help facilitate that at Perkins.  The Church and the public 
responded well to what had already taken place so it was now time to 
move forward again.  Prior to the Board meeting in November of 1950, 
the faculty of Perkins asked Dean Hawk to present a plan to the Board 
of Trustees to allow blacks to enter the School of Theology as regular 
students.  Enter Umphrey Lee.  He went to the Board of Trustees in 
November of 1950 with the idea that they should change the charter of 
SMU to allow for the entrance of blacks.  Lee knew the possibility was 
coming in the near future, and “wouldn’t it be wise, he reasoned to 
get rid of the restrictive wording in the By-Laws?  Then, when and if 
desegregation comes, we won’t have to suffer through the argument in 
4 Ibid, 34-35. 
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the Board”.  Merrimon Cuninggim provided a first-hand account of how 
things went in Dallas and said of Lee’s decision in 1950, “Part of 
Lee’s facing the desegregation question so early was genuine 
statesmanship. He knew it was coming, and he knew that, when it came, 
it would create grave discord; so he wanted to settle the matter in 
advance, if possible”. By this point Silas Hunt had already been 
admitted to the University of Arkansas in 1948, Ada Sipuel was 
enrolled at the University of Oklahoma that same year, and Heman 
Sweatt won in the courts to allow him to attend the University of 
Texas in 1950.  The precedent had been set by these actions.  While 
these cases dealt specifically with public institutions, it appears to 
be an impetus for why Lee went to the Board in November of 1950 and 
his proposal was passed without much fanfare.  The way was now open to 
bring in African Americans as regular students at Perkins.5 
 Just the idea of changing the school’s charter to eventually 
allow black student to enter SMU was more than what the other major 
private schools in the South were willing to do in 1950.  Melissa 
Kean, author of Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South, 
noted in her book that, “Before the schools bowed to the inevitable, 
though, each one endured nearly two decades of internal argument about 
how best to respond to these demands for change”.  The trustees at 
Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt fought throughout the 1950s 
and early 1960s to keep the lily white status quo at their 
universities.  This was not the case at Southern Methodist University.  
5 Merrimon, Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way: The Story of Desegregation 
at Southern Methodist University (Dallas: Perkins School of Theology, 
Southern Methodist University, 1994), 8-9. 
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The debate about allowing blacks to enter had already been settled by 
the Board’s decision in November of 1950.  This is not to say that 
there would not be opposition at SMU, but it would be about other 
matters in regard to black students at the school, not the actual 
admission of these students.6  
 Lee’s decision to change SMU’s bylaws to allow for blacks as 
regular students coincided with his effort to make the theology school 
more nationally known.  He wanted to upgrade the facilities, the 
faculty, and even the dean of the school. In Lee’s opinion all of 
these changes would enhance the image of Perkins.  One of the first 
things Lee did was search for a new dean for the Perkins School of 
Theology.  Hawk was not the person Lee envisioned to lead Perkins to 
national prominence.  Bishop Lee probably shared the opinion expressed 
by John W. Hardt about Hawk when he declared, “There was a feeling, I 
believe that Hawk wasn’t an academic, and he had done about what he 
could do…it was time for him to move on”.  Hawk had been an able 
administrator, but he was not the visionary figure Lee needed in his 
quest to make Perkins great.  Instead, Lee chose Merrimon Cuninggim.  
Lee and Cuninggim began talking in December of 1950 about the 
possibility of Cuninggim becoming the dean.  Cuninggim had the 
academic credentials as well as the preaching background that Lee felt 
was necessary to move Perkins forward.  Cuninggim’s list of academic 
achievements was very impressive. In 1931, he received a Bachelor’s of 
Arts from Vanderbilt University.  He followed this in 1933 with a 
6 Melissa Kean, Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South: 
Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, and Vanderbilt (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 
2008), 1-2. 
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Master’s of Arts in English from Duke University.  His next two 
degrees came from Oxford where he received a B.A. in 1935 and a 
diploma in theology in 1936. These degrees came while studying at 
Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar for three years. His final two degrees came 
from Yale in 1939 and 1941 respectively and included another 
Bachelor’s Degree as well as a Ph.D. in religion and education.  In 
addition to the degrees, Cuninggim was an ordained priest of the 
Methodist Church.7 
 Cuninggim’s professional record was as impressive as his list of 
degrees.  Prior to coming to SMU he had been director of religious 
activities at Duke from 1936 to 1938.  He taught religion at Emory and 
Henry from 1941 to 1942 and at Dennison College from 1942 to 1944. In 
addition, Cuninggim served as a chaplain in the Navy while aboard the 
battleship Tennessee from 1944 to 1946.  From 1946 to 1951 he taught 
at Pomona College in Claremont California.  It was during this time 
that he also served as chaplain for the Associated Colleges of 
Claremont from 1948 to 1950.8 
 While Cuninggim’s time as an ordained priest and a chaplain was 
important, it was his academic pedigree that caught Lee’s eye.  Lee 
was looking for someone who was an educator first that also had a 
religious background and Cuninggim fit this description very well.  
The previous deans at Perkins had been clergymen first and educators a 
distant second, but Cuninggim was the opposite and, thus, was the 
perfect person to change SMU’s School of Theology into a nationally 
7 Simon, “Breaking the Color Bar at SMU”, 37.  Grimes, A History of 
Perkins School of Theology, 92. 
8 Grimes, A History of  the Perkins School of Theology, 92. 
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known entity.  The school had new buildings and a new endowment, and 
Cuninggim could provide the leadership that would take Perkins to new 
heights.  Cuninggim was hired in January of 1951, and started that 
summer.9 
When Lee decided to hire Cuninggim as the dean of the Perkins 
School of Theology, Cuninggim was adamant that he would not take the 
position unless Lee allowed him to desegregate.  In Cuninggim’s own 
account of the meeting that he had with Lee prior to his hiring he 
recalls, “Among the many things I asked Lee, whom I had long known and 
admired, was this:  How soon would the way be open for admitting 
Negroes into the regular student body?”  Lee responded, “The way is 
open now.  You can start working on it the day you come”. This gave 
Cuninggim the assurance he wanted. Cuninggim took the position as dean 
of the Perkins School of Theology in the summer of 1951 and 
immediately began laying the groundwork for opening the school’s doors 
to African American students.10 
In order to fully understand the ramifications of Cuninggim’s 
position on the issue of race, it would be appropriate to look at his 
upbringing.  He was born in Dallas in 1911 and grew up in academia.  
Early in Merrimon’s life his father, Jessie Lee Cuninggim, was a 
professor at what was then called SMU’s School of Theology.  In 1921 
Jessie Lee became President of Scarritt College, a small Methodist 
9 Grimes, A History of the Perkins School of  Theology, 93. 
10 Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 9.  Merrimon Cuninggim, Memorandum 
on the Negro Problem, Perkins School of Theology, SMU, September 1, 
1953,  1, found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers, Bridwell Library, 
Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, 
Texas. 
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college in Nashville, Tennessee. It is here that the young Cuninggim 
was introduced to the idea that blacks deserved an equal chance at 
education.  While president of the College, Jessie Lee Cuninggim 
worked with Fisk University in order to provide an opportunity for 
blacks to be trained at Scarritt.   Merrimon Cuninggim recalls what 
his father had done at Scarritt, and it definitely helped shape his 
ideas for the future.  It would be his modus operandi his entire 
academic career to help blacks get this equal chance as much as 
possible, and he carried this over with him as dean of Perkins.  
Cuninggim explained that “as a son of my father who had worked for 
better race relations all through his career at Scarritt and elsewhere 
I wanted no part of the job at Perkins unless the way was open for 
Negroes to be admitted to the school as regular students.11 
African Americans started attending SMU as regular students in 
January of 1951.  Since Cuninggim agreed not to take over the deanship 
until the summer of 1951, this occurred while Hawk was still dean. Two 
black men, ministerial students who graduated from Samuel Huston 
College in Austin and Jarvis Christian College in Hawkins, entered the 
theology school in early 1951.  When this occurred, Perkins became the 
second voluntary postgraduate seminary desegregation in Texas.  The 
first was Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, a small school 
11 Ibid, 9, 30. Simon, “Breaking the Color Bar at SMU,” 37.  Letter 
from Merrimon Cuninggim to Dr. Charles Braden, August 7, 1964, 1, 
found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School 
of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
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with only 100 students, so breaking the color line at Perkins, “was 
more influential because of the size and prestige of SMU”.12 
Dean Eugene Hawk implemented a strict, straightforward 
interpretation of the board’s November ruling in regards to what these 
few students could and could not do while studying at Perkins.  Hawk 
felt that the students should be allowed to take classes at Perkins 
and nothing else.  The black students were from Dallas, so they had no 
need to live in the dorm.  That made the situation easier because Hawk 
would not have allowed it anyway.  He wrote in a letter that, “They 
[the black students] do not eat in the dining hall nor occupy the 
dorms.  The understanding with the Board of Trustees is that they will 
not share the living or eating facilities”.  When Lee was asked about 
his take on blacks being regular students, he spoke in vague terms.  
Lee was asked specifically about meals and rooms and he often replied, 
“that when and if Negro students were to be admitted, proper 
restrictions would be placed on their activities”.  When Lee discussed 
the matter with Cuninggim, his answer was different.  Lee told 
Cuninggim on numerous occasions that he would support Cuninggim’s 
promise to allow black students as regular students with no 
restrictions.  Numerous Board members agreed with Hawk on the 
interpretation of the change in the bylaws.  They left the board 
meeting in November believing, “the sole intention was to let the 
Negroes come and sit in the back of classrooms”.  The Board minutes 
from the meeting were entered on November 10, 1950 and included the 
12 Simon, “Breaking the Color Bar at SMU,” 37.  Cuninggim, Memorandum 
on the Negro Problem, 1.  “SMU Accepts Two Negroes in Theology”, 
Dallas Morning News, January 9, 1951, 1. 
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statement that the administration would be “given power to act if, as 
and when it seemed timely and proper”.13 
The student reaction to the new members of the 1951 Perkins 
family was decidedly better than Hawk’s.  Marion McMillan was one of 
the first black students in 1951 and was described by his peers as “a 
kind of happy-go-lucky guy and easy to get along with”.  He had an 
outgoing personality and numerous white students enjoyed eating with 
him and spending time with his family at his home in Dallas.  Despite 
McMillan’s demeanor, his academics were not up to par.  His career, 
along with that of the other two black students at Perkins, did not 
last past the first semester.  This brought an end to the first 
experiment of black regular students at SMU.14 
With the failed attempt at desegregation under Hawk, it would be 
up to Cuninggim to bring success to the endeavor.  He was charged with 
creating a national name for the school and this included bringing in 
highly acclaimed faculty.  Cuninggim started working on this goal as 
soon as he took over the dean’s chair in the summer of 1951.  When he 
brought on new faculty members Cuninggim made sure that they held 
similar views to his on the race question.  This is seen in the hiring 
of Cuninggim’s good friend Albert Outler, who was at the time a 
professor of theology at Yale.  One of Cuninggim’s selling points to 
Outler was that he could help him bring black students to Perkins.  He 
told Outler, “As Southerners we’ll have a great chance to work on 
desegregation; Lee says we can admit Negroes as regular students right 
13 Ibid, 36-37. 
14 Simon, “Breaking the Color Bar at SMU”, 37-38. 
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away”.  This was incentive enough to get Outler to leave Yale for SMU 
and the national reputation of Perkins was already taking shape.15 
It is important to point out part of Cuninggim’s statement to 
Outler as crucial to his understanding of desegregation at SMU.  
Cuninggim told Outler that Lee said they could admit blacks as regular 
students to the university.  This took on a very different meaning for 
Cuninggim than it had for Hawk.  Regular students could live where 
they wanted and take part in any activity that they pleased.  This was 
what Cuninggim envisioned for the black students at Perkins.  However, 
the Board as well as members of the Methodist Church did not 
necessarily see eye to eye with this interpretation.  Leaders of the 
University, notably Hawk and benefactor J.J. Perkins, were not 
comfortable with giving black students full access to the school, and 
Cuninggim freely admitted had he known that was the case he would not 
have come to SMU and for that matter neither would Outler.16 
Despite the setback of a failed experiment, Cuninggim was 
determined to make this happen by the fall of 1952.  He made it his 
personal mission to do well in this undertaking and worked tirelessly 
to accomplish this goal.  He wrote letters to Negro educators to 
inquire about their students’ interest in SMU.  He also visited a 
number of the “stronger” black colleges across the South to personally 
drum up support for Perkins in this regard. This effort worked as 
Cuninggim was able to attract five black students from three different 
denominations to SMU in the fall of 1952. They were each from 
15 Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 10.  Letter from Merrimon Cuninggim 
to Dr. Charles Braden, August 7, 1964, 1-2. 
16 Ibid.  Cuninggim, Memorandum on the Negro Problem, 1. 
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different states: Arkansas, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and 
Texas.  He was proud of this accomplishment because it was not seen as 
tokenism.  When most southern schools went through desegregation they 
found one suitable candidate to begin the process.  But Cuninggim 
purposefully chose five young men with varying backgrounds to 
desegregate the Perkins School of Theology.  They were John W. Elliot, 
James A. Hawkins, James V. Lyles, Negail R. Riley, and Cecil Williams.  
These five men would pave the way for a new beginning at Southern 
Methodist University.17 
When the five black students started class at Perkins in the fall 
of 1952, Cuninggim made the decision to keep it quiet from the media.  
He insisted that there be no public announcement of the new students, 
and the university adhered to this idea.  SMU wanted the process to go 
smoothly and quietly and this is exactly what happened in the public 
eye.  Cuninggim claims that neither side wanted to get the story out.  
He referenced this in his pamphlet, Perkins Led the Way, when he 
wrote, “Those that would have stood in the doorway didn’t want their 
fellows to know they had failed.  And those of us who helped to open 
the door didn’t want to shout, for self-protection, or timidity, or 
distaste for boasting.  To have played Little Jack Horner would have 
been self-defeating”.  Desegregation at Perkins was allowed to go on 
without much outside interference because of the very quiet way in 
which it was implemented.18 
17 Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 10. 
18 Ibid, 2. 
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SMU was poised to start anew with the promise made in 1950 to 
bring in blacks as regular students in the fall of 1952.  Just like 
when the board made the decision in November of 1950, SMU was years 
ahead of the other major private schools in the South in this regard 
in 1952.  Nothing had changed since 1950 at Duke, Emory, Rice, Tulane, 
and Vanderbilt.  The board members, as well as the presidents of each 
of these schools, stuck to their convictions that their schools would 
remain all white in the early 1950s and indeed into the foreseeable 
future.  Even in the event that one, or more, of the presidents of 
these institutions wanted to push for change, they were not willing to 
do so as early as SMU. There were factors at each of these other 
private, southern schools that made desegregation too difficult of a 
policy to implement. 
 When Harvie Branscomb arrived at Vanderbilt in 1946 he was told, 
“no black man had ever been on the Vanderbilt campus except in a 
menial way”.  Branscomb was chancellor at the university from 1946 to 
1963, and the attitude towards race relations did not change much in 
his time at Vanderbilt.  Despite the fact that Branscomb did not 
personally like segregation, in Nashville, or on campus, there was not 
anything he could do about it because “changes in the practice of 
segregation could happen only slowly and only at the level of the 
exceptional Negro”.  Branscomb treaded with caution in his early years 
at Vanderbilt and he had a hard time reconciling what he wanted to do 
and what he could do at the school. He wanted to alter the racial 
policy at Vanderbilt, but it was going to be hard for him to get the 
Board of Trustees to accept that change.  In the end the board won 
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out, and Vanderbilt kept the status quo throughout the early 1950s and 
remained an all-white segregated campus.19 
Goodrich White at Emory University took a different path than 
Branscomb at Vanderbilt.  White was President of Emory from 1942 until 
1957, and Chancellor from 1957 until 1979, and he did not urge the 
board to take any measures towards the desegregation of the university 
until the early 1960s.  More than anything, White feared the volatile 
nature of Georgia’s racial politics and was concerned about a white 
backlash in the state if he tried to convince the Emory board to 
change its stance on segregation.  Instead, White worked to expand 
opportunities for blacks within the confines of segregation.  
According to Melissa Kean, “Rather than attempt to break down the 
color line at Emory, White turned his attention to the improvement of 
Georgia’s segregated institutions”.  While there were black workers, 
entertainers, and occasional speakers at Emory, the academic side of 
the school remained lily white and segregation thorough throughout the 
early 1950s as well.20 
Duke University was similar to Emory and Vanderbilt in barring 
black students. One difference, however, was that Duke did make it 
possible for black researchers to work on campus.  There were also 
some black staff members, all of whom were relegated to using 
19 Kean, Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South, 16-18.  
Vanderbilt allowed one black student, a Reverend Johnson, to take 
graduate classes in religion in 1953, but only because the black 
schools in the area did not offer the courses he needed.   It was not 
until the law school admitted its first black students in 1956 that 
the barriers truly began to fall at Vanderbilt. 
20 Ibid, 24, 29, 33.  Emory’s Board of Trustees voted to admit black 
students in November of 1961 and the first black student was admitted 
in the fall of 1962. 
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segregated facilities.  The auditorium and football stadium had black 
sections as well.   Duke Divinity students tried in 1948 to get the 
board of trustees to consider allowing blacks as day students to that 
specific division of the university.   By the time Hollis Edens became 
president of Duke in 1949, the divinity students had circulated a 
petition to attract the attention of the board on this matter.  In a 
brief letter to faculty members of the Divinity School, Edens wrote 
that, “I do not think that the interests of either the negro race or 
of Duke University will be served at this time by raising for 
discussion the question of admitting negroes to the Divinity School”.  
The petition was never presented to the board in 1949, and it would be 
many years before the matter was brought up again.  Duke, like Emory 
and Vanderbilt, would remain segregated for the time being, and the 
issue would not even be discussed with their prospective boards until 
much later.21 
Rufus Harris, president of Tulane from 1937 until 1959, took much 
the same approach to the race question as Harvie Branscomb did at 
Vanderbilt.  While Harris was personally offended by the treatment of 
blacks in a segregated society and saw the writing on the wall, he 
also felt that change had to be “realistic”—by which Harris meant slow 
and methodical.  Harris even stated that “temperate and realistic 
leaders would remain in control of the progress down a slow path of 
improvement”.  The Board of Trustees at Tulane would manage the pace 
21 Ibid, 37-41.  Duke’s Board of Trustees met in March of 1961, and 
voted to allow qualified black students to the graduate and 
professional programs of the University beginning in September of that 
year. 
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of change, and they were not willing to modify their policy on black 
students throughout the decade of the 1950s.  The Tulane board 
comprised “a group of powerful, local men who prided themselves on not 
bending tradition for anyone”.22 
Arguably Rice University was the most recalcitrant of the 
southern private schools in regards to race relations.  William 
Houston was the president of Rice from 1946 to 1961, and there was 
very little said, let alone done, about segregation during his reign.  
There is nothing from the Board meeting minutes or any other records 
at Rice that even mention racial matters before the late 1950s.  In 
addition, the school’s charter stated clearly that the Rice was for 
white students only. President Houston made this well known in 1948 
when the Thresher, the school’s student newspaper, began 
editorializing about the need to end segregation and base admissions 
on merit.  In February of 1949 Houston sent a letter to the editor of 
the newspaper that stated very plainly, “I have concluded that some of 
THE THRESHER staff, as well as most of your correspondents, must be 
unaware of the provisions of the Rice Institute charter. The Rice 
Institute was founded and chartered specifically for white students”. 
It was evident in this statement that this would not change anytime 
soon at Rice.23 
It seems that while a few of these aforementioned presidents may 
have been willing to move forward, albeit slowly, with race relations 
22 Ibid, 42-43, 48-49.  Tulane admitted its first black student in the 
fall of 1963 after a battle in the courts forced the issue. 
23 Ibid, 54-55.  Rice admitted its first black student in 1966, after a 
court-ordered change to tuition and the school’s racial policy.   
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at their various institutions, it was their prospective Boards of 
Trustees that presented problems. Umphrey Lee did not have this 
problem at Southern Methodist University.  The Board had already 
changed the bylaws to admit Negroes when the time came.  There had 
initially been some resistance but Lee’s proposal passed in the end. 
Lee knew that desegregation was coming and got out ahead of the 
problem. This by no means indicates that Lee was a visionary.  His 
biographers called him a “committed gradualist” when it came to race 
relations.  He did not, however, like the idea of being forced to 
desegregate by court order, so he made sure that SMU did so before 
this happened.  Lee was a realist and when he saw that things were 
about to change he began pulling strings within the board to work 
towards a peaceful solution.  This is the reason for the 1950 
decision, and the subsequent admission of the five black men in the 
fall of 1952. There would be successes and failures with desegregation 
at Perkins between 1952 and 1955, and Merrimon Cuninggim would guide 
every decision.  If there were to be more successes than failures it 
would be up to Cuninggim to achieve them.24   
24 Winfred T. Weiss and Charles S. Proctor, Umphrey Lee: A Biography 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1971), 176. 




The Continued Effort at Perkins: Merrimon Cuninggim and 
Desegregation  
 
Perkins was never the same after Merrimon Cuninggim came.  He recast 
the mission of the school; and it was his vision, supported by Umphrey 
Lee, which brought the first African-Americans to SMU.1 
 
If there was a visionary in the story of the desegregation of 
Perkins it was Merrimon Cuninggim. He set out in the fall of 1952 to 
keep his promise to John W. Elliot, James A. Hawkins, James V. Lyles, 
Negail R. Riley, and Cecil Williams that they would be regular 
students of the university now that they were enrolled at Perkins.  He 
called them into his office on the first day of class to discuss what 
being regular students meant.  Cuninggim recollected that the students 
had reservations about how the process was going to work, and he 
wanted to reassure them that they would have all the privileges of 
university life as regular students at SMU.  He told them that, 
“regular students make their own decisions about where they go and 
what they do.  So you will have that privilege too”.  Thus, Cuninggim 
began a series of conversations that he would have with the five black 
students during their time at Perkins, and it was the first assurance 
of many he would hold true to for the next three years.2 
Later in the initial meeting with the five black students 
Cuninggim told them he would help them deal with any problems that 
would arise.  He told the students that anytime something came up he 
1The Dallas Morning News, November 5, 1995, obituary by Joe Simnacher. 
2 Merrimon Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way: The Story of Desegregation 
at Southern Methodist University (Dallas: Perkins School of Theology, 
Southern Methodist University, 1994), 11. 
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would tell them about it and sit down with them to discuss how to 
handle it. Cuninggim would give them his own personal advice on how to 
deal with each problem, but would respect their wishes when they made 
a decision.  The final solution to issues on campus would be theirs 
and theirs alone.  They talked with Cuninggim at length in this first 
meeting about what complications could arise and how they would deal 
with each situation when it did.3 
The idea of letting the black students decide their own path at 
SMU was something that a lot of schools would not have been willing to 
do.  Cuninggim was giving them a say in what went on in their lives.  
SMU was not bringing about desegregation by fiat or administrative 
rule.  The Board did not step in and tell the five blacks what they 
could and maybe more importantly, what they couldn’t do.  Cuninggim 
truly wanted to help, and in the process in fact did treat the five 
men as regular students.  It was a controversial move that would cause 
problems—as well as heartaches—for Cuninggim in the coming years. 
However, it was his conviction to do so and Cuninggim stuck to this as 
much as he possibly could while the five men were at Perkins.  There 
were some tense moments where Elliot and the other four had to make 
difficult decisions that went against their personal beliefs.  But 
Cuninggim was doing his part to keep his promise that they would be 
regular students of Southern Methodist University.4 
3 Ibid, 11-12. 
4 Letter from James A. Hawkins  to Merrimon Cuninggim, August 6, 1953; 
Letter from Negail R. Riley to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 14, 1955; 
Letter from James Lyles to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 20, 1955; 
Letter from Cecil Williams to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 22, 1955; 
Letter from John W. Elliot to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 26, 1955.  
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One of the first situations that Cuninggim discussed with the 
pioneers was what to do about eating on campus.  He reassured them 
that there would not be any problem in the cafeteria at Perkins.  
However, this may not always be the case in other eating facilities on 
campus.  He pointed out to them that if they were to go to the student 
union and try to eat that there was a possibility they would not be 
served.  As a result, the black students agreed, at least for the time 
being, that the only place they would dine would be in the cafeteria 
at the school of theology.  Cuninggim did not foresee problems in the 
Perkins cafeteria.  The five black men disagreed did.  The kitchen 
staff was all black and did not take too kindly to “these uppity 
young-uns comin’ in here and pretendin’ to be regular students”.  
Cuninggim personally went to talk to the kitchen staff and told them 
that they were in fact regular students and were the first in a long 
line to come.5 
Another potential concern that came up in Cuninggim’s first 
meeting with the five black students was the issue of their attending 
SMU’s home football games at Cotton Bowl Stadium.  Cuninggim 
approached the people at the stadium and raised the question.  The 
Cotton Bowl representatives responded that the stadium had a Jim Crow 
law, but it would not be a big deal for the black SMU students to sit 
in the Negro section.  Cuninggim then asked that since the blacks were 
regular students what would happen if they sat in the student section.  
All five letters were found in Black Seminarians at Perkins: Then and 
Now, Introduction by Harry S. Wright, Jr. (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University, 1994).  
5Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 12. 
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The Cotton Bowl representatives responded that they would not do 
anything because “you can bet we don’t want to raise the problem”.  
The answer was sufficient for Cuninggim because he was certain that 
the problem would not be made public by either side.  An important 
component to the success of the mutual discussion experiment was 
discretion, which became Cuninggim’s mantra with the Perkins students.  
He was successful in getting things done for the new students, because 
he negotiated behind closed doors.  After the Cotton Bowl reps gave 
the nod of approval, the SMU Athletic Department was contacted and 
responded very well to the situation.  The athletic department set 
aside five tickets in the middle of the student section for the 
Perkins students, and did so without them having to enter a drawing 
for the seats like most students.  The athletic department then set 
aside an additional twelve to fifteen seats around the black students 
so they could be surrounded by people sympathetic to their cause.  The 
five students attended the first home game in the fall of 1952, and 
they were treated with respect and encountered no problems in Cotton 
Bowl Stadium the entire year.6 
Seating was not the only thing the athletic department had to 
deal with in the fall of 1952 in regards to the new black students.  
Shortly after the fall term began, the question of whether they would 
play intramural sports was brought to the attention of intramural 
representatives of the athletic department.  Originally, the black 
students were not the ones who brought up the issue. Rather, it was 
the white student responsible for putting together Perkins’ intramural 
6 Ibid, 14-15. 
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teams.  This student (unnamed) took it upon himself to go to the SMU 
Athletic Department and demand that the black students be allowed to 
play intramurals immediately.  An athletic department representative 
said they would have no problem with the black students playing, but 
advised the student to check with the faculty senate just to be 
certain.  No one in the senate had a problem with allowing the blacks 
to participate in intramural sports, but they tabled the motion in 
order to discuss it with administration first.  Word got back to 
Cuninggim, and he called the Intramural Director, Matty Bell, a close 
personal friend.  Cuninggim told Bell that since the blacks were 
regular students they would be participating in intramurals. Cuninggim 
wanted to warn Bell so he could notify his umpires and referees in 
advance that black students would be participating in intramurals.  
Bell, who was also the athletic director, told Cuninggim that he was 
glad that “you’re treating it normally; no point in making a big scene 
is there?”.  The matter was settled, and the black students 
participated in intramurals from the time they entered Perkins.  
Elliot and company decided not to take part in intramural football 
because of the physical contact associated with the sport.  The five 
black men did play baseball, and there was one “incident” associated 
with the Perkins baseball team that could have caused a problem.  One 
of the black students decided to play catcher, and in one game in the 
spring of 1953 there was a play at the plate.  The black catcher 
blocked the plate, tagged the white runner, and he was called out.  
Nothing happened as a result, and Cuninggim wrote in a letter to 
Charles Braden that “as a result (of the play) there developed a 
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magnificent, interracial, healthy rhubarb”.  This proved that blacks 
and whites could get along, even when minimal physical contact 
occurred, without a racial dilemma occurring in the aftermath.7 
Not all the decisions came as easily in that first meeting, or 
subsequent meetings, with Cuninggim.  While the new theology students 
would have liked to do everything, just like other regular students, 
there were a few things they avoided in order to keep their problems 
to a minimum.  One thing the black students avoided was swimming in 
the university pool.  Negail Riley described the situation to 
Cuninggim in a letter he wrote in October of 1955, which was right 
after he had graduated from Perkins.  Riley’s assessment was that 
swimming in the pool would be a step back in the desegregation 
process.  Family Swim Night at SMU was open to the public, and Riley 
et al. knew that this might cause a problem.  Riley opined to 
Cuninggim that, “We saw very frankly into the nature of much of the 
prejudices of the whole area.  To swim or not to swim was the 
question.  The decision to swim would have been retrogressive, 
especially since Family Night was the program of the larger community 
that did not have a unanimous benignant attitude”.  Sacrifices, like 
not swimming in the university pool, were made so that desegregation 
as a whole could work.  While Cuninggim may have steered Riley and the 
7 Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 17.  Letter to Charles Braden from 
Merrimon Cuninggim, August 7, 1964, found in Merrimon Cuninggim 
Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School of Theology, Southern 
Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
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others into this decision he let them decide, and they chose to do 
something for the betterment of the entire process.8 
When decisions had to be made between Cuninggim and the black 
students, all six men discussed the issue, and generally came to an 
agreement about how to deal with the potential problem.  There was one 
episode where the blacks and Cuninggim deviated from the consensus 
model.  In March of 1955, the last semester for the five at Perkins, 
James Lyles and Cecil Williams decided to take part in an NAACP Youth 
Council protest against the segregated Melba Theatre in downtown 
Dallas.  Cuninggim advised them not to get involved in the protest, 
because it would bring unwanted attention to what was happening at 
Perkins.  Lyles and Williams did not listen, and participated despite 
Cuninggim’s warning.  Lyles recalled in an interview with William R. 
Simon years later that, “That was the closest we came to open conflict 
with Cuninggim.  That was the only time we really stood our ground.  
We said we reserved the right to participate because we felt it would 
be a violation of our conscience not to do so”.  Even though Cuninggim 
did not like Lyles’ and Williams’ decision, he did not forbid them 
from participating.  If the black students were truly allowed to make 
their own decisions, Cuninggim had to allow them to get involved in 
the protest if they wanted.9 
8 Letter from Negail R. Riley to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 14, 1955, 
found in Black Seminarians at Perkins: Then and Now. 
9Simon, “Breaking Down the Color Bar at SMU”, 42.Merrimon Cuninggim, 
“Integration in Professional Education: The Story of Perkins, Southern 
Methodist University”, 113, reprinted from The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, March, 1956,  
found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School 
of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
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The mutual decision making process between Cuninggim and the five 
black students usually worked very well with little outside 
interference.  There were a few instances when other university 
officials tried to step in and take over the process.  The list 
included Umphrey Lee, Eugene Hawk (who had been made vice president 
after Cuninggim took over as dean of Perkins), and benefactors like 
Joe Perkins to name a few.  Lee understood the process that Cuninggim 
had set up better than most, and gave his support to that technique as 
much as possible.  However, Lee tried to “assist” Cuninggim in the 
decision making process in November of 1952.  As aforementioned, the 
black students had agreed to only eat at the Perkins cafeteria.  The 
only time one of the students strayed from eating at Perkins was on a 
Sunday when he was on campus (which was actually pretty rare as they 
had obligations with local churches in Dallas that usually kept them 
busy all day).  The Perkins cafeteria was not open on Sundays, and one 
of the black students (which one was not mentioned), was invited by a 
white student to accompany him to a University dining hall.  While in 
the dining hall, the two Perkins students sat down with a white 
undergraduate female that they were both acquainted with from a 
Methodist youth conference.  The white girl had never ever eaten with 
a black person before, and she wrote home to her mother where she 
expressed her delight about the experience.  She penned, “I had lunch 
today with a black student from Perkins, and it was a wonderful 
experience…”.The mother was appalled at her daughter’s “wonderful 
experience”, and she contacted President Lee to discuss the matter.  
Lee sent word to Cuninggim that he had to tell the black students they 
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could not dine anywhere but the Perkins cafeteria.  Cuninggim replied 
to Lee that he could not do so in good conscience because of his 
promise to the blacks that they were to be treated as regular 
students.  The cafeteria incident caused tension between Lee and 
Cuninggim, and could very easily have led to Cuninggim’s termination.  
Even so, Cuninggim did not back down.10 
The tension led to a meeting between the President and the Dean.  
Lee was concerned because he had received some serious objections from 
the mothers involved.  The mothers’ objections threatened to put an 
end to the Perkins experiment, and Lee wanted Cuninggim to understand 
the ramifications. Cuninggim went into the meeting with the mindset 
that he would respect Lee’s decision. If Lee decided to tell the black 
students they would not be able to eat anywhere but the Perkins 
cafeteria, then that would be the decision. Cuninggim simply said he 
would not do it because of his pact with the students.  Both men asked 
the other questions about how things would go with the cafeteria 
situation. Lee wanted to know what the young men would decide, and 
Cuninggim wanted to know if Lee would uphold the black students’ 
decision no matter what they chose.  Both Lee and Cuninggim were 
satisfied with the answers they got in the meeting, but Cuninggim was 
particularly pleased with “knowing that Lee both approved of the 
method in principle and was willing to allow it to be used even in a 
most awkward circumstance”.  Lee was happy knowing that Cuninggim had 
assured him that more than likely the Perkins students would agree to 
eat only at the cafeteria in the theology school.  When Cuninggim 
10 Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 15-16. 
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presented the problem to the black students, they “realized how silly 
it would be to let our experiment founder on some inconsequential 
liberty”.  They agreed to eat only at the Perkins cafeteria until the 
rest of the University was ready to fully accept them.  Lee and 
Cuninggim both walked away from the meeting with the notion that the 
desegregation experiment would not be brought down by a minor issue.11 
The aforementioned dining hall problem was important because it 
showed that Cuninggim and Lee were willing to talk out any potential 
problems. The situation did not always go so smoothly when other 
university officials got involved.  The most volatile issue for the 
five black students was housing.  When they arrived in the fall of 
1952, four of the five were put in the dorms, and initially this did 
not cause a stir. However, by the spring several of the black students 
expressed interest in rooming with whites.  No one forced integrated 
housing on the black students.  Several of the black men had been 
asked by white classmates at Perkins to room with them.  When word got 
to the Board of Trustees about the new arrangement, the members were 
not pleased.  The Board felt they had not been asked for permission to 
allow the black students to be housed in the dorm.  The Board 
certainly had not approved any of the five rooming with whites.  When 
Lee went to the board in 1950 to get them to change the bylaws, the 
question of living quarters inevitably came up.  When asked what he 
was going to do about rooms and meals Lee responded, “Oh, that won’t 
be a problem”.  A handful of influential board members (none of them 
named) took Lee’s comment to mean that blacks would not be allowed in 
11 Ibid. 
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the dorms or room with whites.  When the Board found out the living 
arrangements for the black students in 1953, they began to backtrack 
on what they had promised the black students.  More specifically, the 
Board began speaking of what they had not promised.  The members of 
the Board had agreed to admission and nothing more.  They felt 
betrayed, because Lee and Cuninggim had gone behind their backs to 
allow the students in the dorm without permission.  The matter had to 
be dealt with, and would be put to a vote in the upcoming board 
meeting in May of 1953.12 
As the board meeting drew closer, the members that wanted the 
students removed from the dorm purposely kept Cuninggim out of the 
loop.  Since he was not privy to the back channel dealings, Cuninggim 
was forced to use his own connections to resolve the matter in a way 
that was beneficial to the black students.  Because Lee did not want a 
fight, he was caught in the middle.  He could agree with the board and 
allow them to vote on the issue, but that decision would more than 
likely result in the black students’ removal from the dorm.  If Lee 
sided with the board it might even lead to expulsion for the black 
students.  The other possibility for Lee was to continue to let 
Cuninggim proceed with the idea of mutual consultation, but that path 
would alienate the board.13 
The opposition began to form behind closed doors, and included 
several of the conservative businessmen on the board.  The decision to 
question Cuninggim’s method was not done just by the board.  Rather, 
12Ibid, 9, 19. 
13Ibid, 19. 
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the ringleader among those dissatisfied was former dean of Perkins, 
Eugene Hawk.  While it had been several years since his removal as 
dean, Hawk still harbored bitter resentment that he had been removed 
without even being contacted.  At first, Cuninggim did not know that 
Hawk was involved, but when he found out, Cuninggim surmised that Hawk 
was not mad at him per se, but at Lee because it was Lee that had gone 
behind Hawk’s back and hired Cuninggim in the first place.  The issue 
of the black students being in the dorm was the perfect opportunity 
for Hawk to embarrass Lee.  After all, Lee had given a less than 
definitive answer to what the role of the new black students would be 
when he had the board change the bylaws in 1950.14 
Hawk sought to use the dorm question to his advantage with the 
upcoming board meeting in May of 1953.  He started to whisper to 
several of the board members that their authority had been usurped by 
Cuninggim and Lee.  The situation quickly became an attack on 
Cuninggim, and by extension Lee.  The Board did not like the fact that 
Cuninggim was making decisions for the black students without their 
consultation.  Furthermore, Cuninggim could remove the students from 
the dorm, and the problem would be solved.  However, the blacks wanted 
to live in the dorm, and Cuninggim felt they should have that choice 
whether the board approved the verdict or not. If the board made 
14Letter to Charles Braden from Merrimon Cuninggim, August 7, 1964, 
found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers. 
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decisions by fiat, then there would be no point in the students 
conferring with Cuninggim when problems arose.15 
Cuninggim began to worry that Hawk was going to get his way, and 
the board was going to rule to remove the black students from the 
dorm.  Cuninggim could not let Hawk win, so he began conferring with 
his own group of friends on the board to figure out a solution.  
Cuninggim’s cohorts included Bishop A. Frank Smith, chairman of the 
board, Bishop Paul Martin, chairman of the Board’s Committee on the 
School of Theology, and Bishop William C. Martin, Resident Bishop in 
Dallas and President of the National Council of Churches.  The School 
of Theology Committee decided to meet the night before the scheduled 
board meeting to solve the problem. In the meeting, Smith, Martin, and 
Martin tried to get Cuninggim to back down and place restrictions on 
the black students.  Smith tried to at least convince Cuninggim that 
he should tell the black students they could not room with whites.  
When Cuninggim got home from the meeting, he told his wife that if 
Smith did not change his mind he would have to start looking for a new 
job.  When the meeting was over, nothing had been decided.  However, 
Smith called Cuninggim the next morning to arrange a meeting in his 
hotel room.  When Cuninggim got to the meeting, Smith told him that 
the Committee would “handle the matter”.  Once the board met later 
that morning the issue was not even brought up.  While this did not 
necessarily end the fight, things went on as they always had at 
15 Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 19-20.  Letter to Charles Braden 
from Merrimon Cuninggim, August 7, 1964, found in Merrimon Cuninggim 
Papers. 
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Perkins.  The black students stayed in the dorm, and continued on with 
their normal everyday activities.16 
While many involved thought that the board’s lack of action on 
the subject at the May board meeting was the end, it really was just 
the beginning.  Hawk and others that wanted to see restrictions placed 
on the black students felt that the reason they had not gotten a 
response from the board was because they had failed to get the support 
of Joe Perkins, the main benefactor and namesake for the school of 
theology.  The university could not afford to lose the money he gave. 
Hawk wrote a letter to Perkins in the summer of 1953 telling him about 
the situation at hand.  Originally, no one told Cuninggim who sent the 
letter, but it was Mr. Perkins himself who eventually told Cuninggim 
that Hawk was behind the scheme.  Once Perkins was notified, he began 
expressing his concern about the situation to the board.  He sent a 
letter to William Martin on August 17, 1953 where he told Martin that 
this was a matter of “extreme importance and it should not be delayed 
any longer”.  Perkins also alluded to the fact that he may go 
elsewhere with his money if the present conflict was not resolved 
quickly.  Perkins mentioned directly in his letter that, “My interest 
and zeal in SMU would suffer a very severe heart attack if this is not 
straightened up in the very near future”.  Perkins wrote a scathing 
letter to Cuninggim on August 27.  He made it very clear to Cuninggim 
that he had become quite disturbed about the “Negro question in 
connection with the University”.  Perkins also made it clear that 
16 Ibid. 
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Cuninggim had overstepped his bounds, and that the board had never 
approved or authorized letting the black students into the dorm.17 
The situation was compounded in the summer of 1953 by the fact 
that Cuninggim’s main supporters were all indisposed by illness or 
travel.  According to Cuninggim’s personal account of the situation, 
“In the early summer of 1953 three things happened to help their 
cause, one to each person who they thought stood in their way”.  Lee 
had a debilitating heart attack that eventually caused him to step 
down as president. Bishop Smith’s wife was deathly ill, and he had to 
stay close to her in Houston.  Bishop Paul Martin was overseas on 
church business.  Cuninggim was left to fend off the wolves by 
himself.  Hawk especially felt that since Lee, Smith, and Martin were 
out of touch the time was ripe to strike.  It was during the period 
where the aforementioned men were gone that Hawk sent his letter to 
Joe Perkins.  If Perkins bought into Hawk’s line of reasoning, it 
could ruin the university financially.  Cuninggim did not know what to 
do, and told Charles Braden in a letter years later.  Cuninggim 
quipped to Braden, “Though nobody wanted to buck Mr. Perkins, nobody 
wanted to tell me to get the Negroes out of the dormitory or to issue 
the order over my head.”18 
When University officials heard of Perkins’ letter, they had to 
act.  They tried two things to keep the situation under control.  
17 Letter to Bishop William C. Martin from J.J. Perkins, August 17, 
1953.  Letter to Merrimon Cuninggim from J.J. Perkins, August 27, 
1953.  Both letters were found in the body of the letter from 
Cuninggim to Charles Braden, August 7, 1964 which was found in the 
Merrimon Cuninggim Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School of 
Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
18 Ibid. Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 20. 
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First, they wanted to keep Joe Perkins calm so he would not press for 
board action before Paul Martin got back from his trip.  If the board 
had acted before Martin got back, then the outcome probably would have 
been radically different.  Secondly, university officials tried once 
again to get Cuninggim to remove the blacks from the dorm, and 
possibly even the school all together.  Frank Smith sent an urgent 
letter to Mr. Perkins persuading him “to let this matter ride as is 
until the return of Bishop Paul Martin which will be late fall”.  The 
second request was not as easy to accomplish.  Cuninggim, who was out 
of town on business, called the school and told university officials 
that under no circumstances should the black students be removed from 
the dorm and nothing was to be changed.  Cuninggim had some time to 
think about the situation before he got back to SMU. Before he got 
back to Dallas, Cuninggim wrote his “Memorandum on the Negro Problem” 
where he outlined every step and precaution that had been taken since 
Lee had the bylaws changed in 1950.19 
When Cuninggim got back to campus, he had meetings with several 
university officials, including one with Dr. Hosford and Willis Tate, 
who were jointly acting as president in Lee’s absence.  In each 
meeting, Cuninggim produced his newly written memorandum and read it 
to those present.  Each time he read the memo, university officials 
came away convinced that Cuninggim’s methods were working.  During the 
meeting with Hosford and Tate, Cuninggim recollected that both men 
responded “Well, we are with you” after he read them the memo.  
19Letter to Charles Braden from Merrimon Cuninggim, August 7, 1964, 
found in Merrimon Cuninggim Papers. 
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Cuninggim was allowed by Bishop Smith to read his memorandum at the 
Faculty Pre-school conference in mid-September, and after reading it 
he gained the support of nearly all the faculty (most of which agreed 
with him anyway).  Once Paul Martin got back to the United States, he 
had a meeting with Joe Perkins to try and convince him that based on 
Cuninggim’s memorandum, things needed to move forward not backward.  
The meeting went well, and despite the fact that Perkins still was not 
completely comfortable with the situation he relented.  More 
importantly, Perkins agreed to continue giving money to SMU. In the 
meeting Perkins asked Paul Martin directly if the matter was not 
settled amicably would it hurt the university.  Martin replied that it 
would, and Perkins seemed to change his tune a bit.  He told Martin, 
“That is the only consideration.  The University must rise above any 
hurt feelings that can develop.  The School of Theology is our first 
love”.  The image of Perkins, and SMU, needed to be protected and 
Perkins backed down.  Perkins’ wife, Lois, was present at the meeting 
and after hearing her husband speak on the subject she stated, “I 
don’t agree with my husband on this particular matter.  And if he had 
shared with me the letter from Dr. Hawk last summer, we would never 
have had any trouble”.  Lois Perkins was on the same page as 
Cuninggim.  She was “indeed a heroine of the story” according to 
Cuninggim.   Her social conscience as well as her work with various 
women’s groups within the Methodist Church made her more aware of the 
plight of blacks particularly those at SMU.  Mrs. Perkins stating that 
there would have not been a problem had she been consulted is an 
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oversimplification of the issue, but provides context on how delicate 
the situation was in the summer and fall of 1953.20 
As the summer came to a close, Cuninggim had a meeting with 
Negail Riley, James Hawkins, Jim Lyles, and Cecil Williams.  The 
meeting lasted hours, and was focused on the black students living in 
the dorm with whites.  Eventually, they decided that it would be best 
for them not to room with white students for the time being.  The four 
men sent a letter to Bill Berner, housing director at SMU, presumably 
at the end of the summer of 1953 stating that they would not room with 
white students that fall.  But they stated, “In light of the 
situation, we regard our decision as a retreat; although we accept it, 
we realize that it is a compromise that should not have to be taken”.21 
Once the housing hurdle had been cleared, there were no other 
major incidents in regards to the five black men at Perkins.  Before 
they left in 1955, a few other black men came to study at Perkins, and 
the process continued without much problem.  All five graduated on 
time in the spring of 1955.  Once again, the university chose not to 
publicize their graduation.  There was not even a mention of the black 
students graduating in the University Commencement program.  The five 
men did, however, receive much applause from the crowd as their names 
20Ibid.  Norman Spellman, Growing a Soul: The Story of A. Frank Smith 
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1979), 330.  Howard Grimes, A 
History of the Perkins School of Theology (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University, 1993), 115.  Grimes was a professor of Christian Education 
at Perkins during the desegregation process and was good friends with 
both Cuninggim and the Perkins family. 
21 Letter to Bill Berner from Negail Riley, James Hawkins, Jim Lyles, 
Cecil Williams, date not listed.  This letter was found in the body of 
Cuninggim’s letter to Charles Braden, August 7, 1964, Merrimon 
Cuninggim Papers, Bridwell Library, Perkins School of Theology, 
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
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were called.  By 1955 they were participating in nearly every activity 
across campus, and it had been a good experience.  According to 
Cuninggim, “It was almost altogether positive.  The ready acceptance 
of the step by the overwhelming majority of students and faculty was 
patent for all to see.  As the word got around the country, largely by 
the academic grapevine, it made SMU look good nationwide”.  This is 
not surprising, because it is why Umphrey Lee had taken a chance and 
hired Cuninggim in the first place.22 
When the Perkins experiment came to an end, the first five black 
graduates expressed their gratitude to Cuninggim for giving them the 
power to decide their own futures at SMU.  Several sent him letters 
while still at Perkins, while a couple sent them after they graduated.  
James A. Hawkins wrote Cuninggim a letter in August of 1953, right 
before the start of his second year, and summed this attitude up well. 
He wrote to Cuninggim, “The means of our keeping each other informed 
on problems that arose, sharing in the discussions, and eventually the 
solution of them proved to be one of the important steps we took last 
year”.  Hawkins was very appreciative that Cuninggim gave them a voice 
in the matter.  He noted this in his letter by stating, “I must give 
you praise for letting us decide in the final analysis the steps we 
should follow.  I, along with the others, am truly grateful to you for 
this”.  Riley, Lyles, Williams, and Elliot all made similar statements 
22 Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 27. 
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in letters to Cuninggim in October of 1955, the semester after they 
all graduated from Perkins.23 
The desegregation of Southern Methodist University was handled 
quietly and without much problem.  Desegregation started when Umphrey 
Lee decided to get the board of trustees at the school to change the 
bylaws to allow for blacks to come to SMU as regular students. The 
admission of blacks came to fruition under the leadership of Merrimon 
Cuninggim, as well as others like Lee, Bishop Frank Smith,and Bishop 
Paul Martin.  SMU desegregated at a time when no other southern 
private school, let alone a Methodist school, was even thinking about 
the idea.  While Lee and others played a role in breaking down SMU’s 
racial barriers, Cuninggim is the one that deserves the lions’ share 
of the credit.  Cuninggim’s obituary in the Dallas Morning News summed 
up his leadership at SMU noting, “Merrimon took over the leadership in 
a very shrewd way, of the desegregation of Perkins. He fought the 
battle with a real keen sense of Southern diplomacy”.  The quote sums 
up Cuninggim’s importance to the school of theology, as well as the 
university as a whole.  He made Perkins into a nationally known 
school, and raised the level of academics at SMU.  In the process, he 
opened the door for African American students at SMU as well as other 
private institutions in the South.  And he did so two years before 
Brown.  SMU was not forced by court order to desegregate, and Merrimon 
23Letter from James A. Hawkins  to Merrimon Cuninggim, August 6, 1953; 
Letter from Negail R. Riley to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 14, 1955; 
Letter from James Lyles to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 20, 1955; 
Letter from Cecil Williams to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 22, 1955; 
Letter from John W. Elliot to Merrimon Cuninggim, October 26, 1955.   
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Cuninggim can be seen as a visionary for his role in accomplishing 
that goal.24 
 
24Cuninggim, Perkins Led the Way, 1.   




Forging On…Gradually: Desegregation at SMU after Perkins  
 
I explained to the trustees that I was assuming they expected me to 
deal with desegregation or integration and that unless I was 
instructed otherwise, I would deal with it at the pace I believed 
best.  And so we moved quietly.1 
 
 When Willis Tate became president of Southern Methodist 
University in 1954, desegregation was already underway at the school.  
However, the Perkins School of Theology was the only department at SMU 
that had black students.  One of his duties as president was to 
oversee the continued effort of desegregation of SMU’s colleges and 
school.  Tate’s quotation above shows how he planned on forging ahead 
with the process of bringing more black students to the university.  
Like Cuninggim before him, Tate felt it was best to proceed quietly 
and deliberately.  He did not feel that SMU should rush into any rash 
decisions and open all of its doors immediately.   Tate preferred to 
follow the model of other schools in Texas, namely the University of 
Texas in Austin, in regards to further desegregation measures.  By the 
time Tate became president in 1954, SMU’s fervor for being a leader in 
desegregation had waned.  The school was successful in breaking down 
one barrier, but it did not hurry to break down others.  Full 
integration at SMU did not come until later, as it did at UT.  While 
Texas admitted its first black graduate student in 1950, the first 
undergraduates were not admitted until 1956.  Subsequently, Texas did 
not go beyond the academic programs until the 1960s.  SMU did the 
1 Interview with Willis Tate by Gerald McGee, “On the Ups and Downs” in 
Johnnie Marie Grimes, Willis Tate: Views and Interviews (Dallas: 
Southern Methodist University Press, 1978), 167. 
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same, and would also not have black students in all of its colleges 
until the 1960s. 
 While the spring of 1955 marked the end of SMU’s first successful 
foray into desegregation, the “second step toward integration” was 
started then as well.  When the Board of Trustees met that term, the 
members agreed to admit “qualified” Negro students to evening classes 
in the law school. By 1955, several schools in the Southwest 
Conference had black law students, including the University of 
Arkansas and the University of Texas, and SMU made the decision to 
join their ranks.  The first black student was admitted to the Dedman 
School of Law in the fall of 1955.  She was Mrs. Ruby Braden Curl, a 
teacher at Carver Elementary School. Curl was a 1944 graduate of 
Samuel Huston College in Austin, Texas with a degree in social 
science.  Prior to entering SMU, Curl had been a teacher in the Dallas 
school system for nine years, with her last at Carver.  Curl wanted to 
go to law school so she could use her legal training to work with 
juveniles.  While Curl is in the 1956 SMU yearbook, the Rotunda, she 
does not appear in any subsequent yearbook.  It seems that she only 
attended the law school for one year.  Several other black students 
followed a similar path.  Elmer Richard Medlock from Dallas was listed 
as a first year student in the 1957 Rotunda, but not was not in 
subsequent editions.  Earldean V. Robbins, also from Dallas, appeared 
in the 1959 yearbook but also does not appear to have finished more 
than that first year. Curtis Pearson was listed as a second year 
student in the 1960 Rotunda, but has no mention the following year.  
The 1960 yearbook does provide some insight into what appears to be 
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the first black graduate.  Richard A. Strecker was listed in the 1960 
yearbook as a first year law student.  Four years later his name 
appeared in the 1964 SMU commencement booklet having earned his 
bachelor’s in law.   Once he was added to the alumni directory the 
bachelor’s had been changed to a J.D. of law as SMU had changed the 
title of the degree to coincide with other schools doing the same. 
Presumably he is the first black graduate of the Dedman School of Law 
at SMU.2   
 SMU now had two schools that were desegregated, the Dedman School 
of Law and the Perkins School of Theology.  However, there were no 
plans, at least in the immediate future, to add any other departments 
to the list.  In fact, Tate stated in the same article announcing the 
entrance of Mrs. Curl to the law school that he did not “know of any 
further plans for integration in any other schools of the university”.  
The Board was scheduled to meet in November of 1955, but Tate was not 
sure if they would be discussing any future desegregation plans.  
Nothing changed as late as 1958, when SMU student president David 
Musslewhite told fellow delegates to the Student Conference on 
National Affairs that he saw no reason for SMU to integrate the 
2 “SMU Accepts Negro for Law School: Qualified Applicants Will be 
Admitted in Evening Classes”, Dallas Morning News July 17, 1955.  “SMU 
Law School Grants Admission to Negro Student”, Dallas Morning News, 
May 26, 1955, 3.  1956 Rotunda, SMU Yearbook, 490; 1957 Rotunda, 161; 
1959 Rotunda, 307; 1960 Rotunda, 467.  All yearbooks accessed at 
memories.smu.edu.  Southern Methodist University, 49th Annual 
Convocation, Commencement Exercises and Conferring of Degrees, June 1, 
1964, Southern Methodist University Convocation and Commencement 
Records, box 9 folder 3, Degolyer Library, Southern Methodist 
University, Dallas, Texas.  SMU alumni directory, 744, the data 
company, 2005.   
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graduate school at the present time.  Musslewhite was adamant that 
“there’s no reason to integrate just for the sake of integration”.3  
 Despite Musslewhite’s statement in 1958 and the fact that SMU had 
only desegregated the law school and school of theology, the 
university was similar to numerous schools in Texas.  According to 
Richard Morehead of the Dallas Morning News, thirty five schools in 
Texas had blacks by 1958.  At least twelve additional institutions of 
higher learning had desegregation policies by that point, but did not 
have any black students.  Several others, including Texas Christian 
University and Baylor University, were like SMU in that they had 
desegregated their graduate programs.  However, none of the three 
major Protestant affiliated schools, SMU included, in Texas had opened 
the undergraduate doors to blacks in 1958.  By 1959, three colleges in 
Dallas had black students.  In addition to SMU, Southwestern Medical 
School of the University of Texas and the University of Dallas had 
black students enrolled in January of 1959.  Most colleges in Texas 
had desegregated by 1960.  Morehead notes that more than forty 
colleges and universities had black students in the state in the 
summer of 1960.  The next step was to open the doors to black 
undergraduates.4  
 Even though Southern Methodist University had desegregated all of 
its graduate programs by the early 1960s, the undergraduate school was 
3 Ibid.  Richard Morehead, “College Students Favor Gradual 
Integration”, Dallas Morning News, December 12, 1958.   
4 Richard Morehead, “35 Schools Lower Ban” Dallas Morning News, March 
23, 1958.  Richard Morehead, “Three Dallas Institutions Accepting Few 
Negroes”, Dallas Morning News, January 7, 1959.  Richard Morehead, 
“Integration Now the Rule in Most Colleges”, Dallas Morning News, July 
7, 1960. 
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still lily-white.  Pressure started mounting, from inside and outside 
SMU, to get the school to break down yet another barrier.  The campus 
held Ministers Week in February of 1961, and delegates were greeted 
with student appeals to bring in black students as undergraduates.  
The students also urged the participants of Ministers Week to persuade 
Methodist hospitals to provide equal treatment to black and white 
patients. The “protestors” displayed placards outside the entrance to 
McFarlin Auditorium (where the ministers where meeting), and 
distributed a mimeographed sheets signed “The Policy Committee”. The 
same group was believed to be responsible for a sit-in at University 
Pharmacy prior to urging the ministers to further desegregate the 
campus.  The only student to be identified specifically was Charles 
Merrill from the Perkins School of Theology.  He noted that what the 
students did was not a demonstration, but rather, “It is primarily an 
appeal to the Methodist Church and its principles”.5   
In October of 1961, an unofficial poll of nearly one-fourth of 
the student body at SMU indicated that students favored the 
integration of the undergraduate level at the school.  The following 
year, in May of 1962, the North Texas Methodist Conference urged the 
trustees of SMU to “integrate all its facilities as rapidly as 
possible”.  Delegates to the annual meeting unanimously adopted a 
resolution that called for the integration of all Methodist 
institutions in the area.  The conference also agreed to assist 
schools financially that were encountering difficulties in moving 
5 “Desegregation Appeals Greet Visitors at SMU”, Dallas Morning News, 
February 9, 1961. 
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towards integration.  SMU was now being asked to join the ranks of the 
University of Texas, Texas Tech University, and the University of 
Arkansas as the only schools in the Southwest Conference that allowed 
black undergraduates in 1962.6   
 SMU did join the aforementioned schools in the fall of 1962.  The 
Board of Trustees took the poll into consideration during its next 
meeting, but did not make any official changes to university policy 
regarding desegregation.  It seems the only decision needed on the 
matter was the one made by Umphrey Lee in 1950.  With this being said, 
Paula Elaine Jones enrolled on Friday September 14, 1962 as a full-
time undergraduate at the school.  Miss Jones was the first black 
student to attend SMU on the undergraduate level, and she helped the 
university “complete the full desegregation of all educational 
facilities”.  Jones registered in the SMU coliseum with the other 
incoming freshmen, and she did so without incident.  The university 
followed that same pattern when it brought in the first black students 
at Perkins in the early 1950s, as well as at the law school and other 
graduate programs.   There is another way that Jones’ entry into SMU 
followed a well-established model, and that is the fact that she was a 
great student.  She attended the Harwood Girls School in Albuquerque, 
New Mexico where she was a “straight A” student that graduated with 
honors.   All students admitted to SMU were held to a high academic 
standard according to President Tate.  He stated to the Dallas Morning 
6 “Desegregation Appeals Greet Visitors at SMU”, Dallas Morning News, 
February 9, 1961.  Jack Castleman, “SMU Urged to Integrate”, Dallas 
Morning News, May 31, 1962.  “SMU Enrolls Negro Girl as Freshman”, 
Dallas Morning News, September 14, 1962. 
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News that “Every student granted admission to SMU is a person of high 
scholastic personal qualifications.  This is the case of Miss Paula 
Jones”.  He went on to say, “Each student so admitted will meet 
extremely high standards of scholarship and character”.7 
 The standard for African American students, especially ones that 
were considered the first in an area, were even higher.   Schools like 
SMU were not going to risk their reputations on a less than 
extraordinary black student, because the student had to be able to 
withstand the pressures that came with being the first.  Jones was one 
that could handle the burden, just like the first five had been able 
to do at Perkins.  She came to SMU on a scholarship, and had been 
offered a similar scholarship by the University of Texas.  By having a 
scholarship, and planning on chemistry as her major, Jones showed that 
she was ready for the academic and social rigor that would be expected 
of her at Southern Methodist University.  Tate made this clear when 
speaking of Jones to the Morning News.  She was president of her class 
in Albuquerque and is “intellectually and personally qualified to 
pursue her studies in this university”, Tate told reporters.  Jones 
graduated from SMU in 1966 with a degree in speech pathology and 
audiology, and she became active in several clubs during her tenure at 
the university as well.8 
 Even though SMU had desegregated all of its schools by 1962, the 
gap between the first and the last was eleven years.  Southern 
7 “SMU Enrolls Negro Girl as Freshman” Dallas Morning News, September 
14, 1962, 19 and 21.  “Negro Girl Enrolls as Freshman” Dallas Morning 
News, September 15, 1962. 
8 Ibid.  SMU Rotunda, student yearbook 1966, 75. 
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Methodist University had been before its time in 1950/1951 by opening 
the Perkins School of Theology to blacks.  When Paula Jones came to 
SMU in 1962, the school was simply following the protocol set by other 
universities in the Southwest Conference, namely the University of 
Arkansas and the University of Texas.  Silas Hunt came to the 
University of Arkansas in 1948, and was considered the first black 
student in the law school.  In August of 1955, Arkansas Attorney 
General Tom Gentry made it clear that the state’s flagship institution 
would have to open its doors to black undergraduates.  Gentry’s 
motivation for doing so came on the heels of the second Brown decision 
in May of 1955 which called for schools to desegregate with “all 
deliberate speed”.  With Gentry’s prodding, the University of Arkansas 
allowed black undergraduates to matriculate at the school starting 
that fall.  However, by the fall of 1956, there were only eight black 
undergraduates at the University of Arkansas.  More importantly, 
Arkansas had waited eight years to complete the desegregation of all 
of its educational units.  The University of Texas was only slightly 
quicker to adhere to Brown.  A week after Brown II was handed down, 
University of Texas President Logan Wilson announced that the Board of 
Regents would meet on July 8, 1955 to “define the path the University 
will follow on undergraduate integration”.  During the July 8th 
meeting, The University of Texas Board of Regents announced that the 
school would now accept black undergraduates.  While Arkansas had 
taken eight years, Texas took six.  Heman Sweatt was admitted to the 
University of Texas Law School in 1950, and black undergrads were 
admitted to UT in the fall of 1956.  SMU took a bit longer than 
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Arkansas and Texas to bring in its first black undergraduate to 
campus.  The school was no longer a leader in desegregation. Rather, 
SMU was now a follower, simply doing the same thing the two power 
schools of the conference had done in previous years.9  
 While SMU may not have been a leader in undergraduate 
desegregation as compared to the public schools of the SWC, it was 
still one of the first to open its doors to black undergraduates among 
the major private schools in the South. Emory University did not admit 
its first black graduate student until the fall of 1962.  Tulane’s 
first black graduate student was in the spring of 1963, and Rice 
University’s was not until 1965.  The Board of Trustees at Duke 
University decided in November of 1962 to admit black students to the 
undergraduate level.  Vanderbilt University changed its policy on the 
admission of black undergrads in the spring of 1962 placing it at best 
on par with SMU with regards to a desegregation timeline.  None of the 
major private institutions in the South had black undergraduates 
before SMU.  Therefore, when compare SMU to its private counterparts, 
it was still a leader on the desegregation front.10 
 Now that all the educational programs were desegregated at SMU, 
it was time for the school to move on to other areas in the process.  
While SMU desegregated the undergraduate program in 1962, there were 
9 Charles Robinson and Lonnie Williams, Remembrances in Black: Personal 
Perspectives of the African American Experience at the University of 
Arkansas, 19402-2000s (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 
2010), 16-17.  Dwonna Goldstone, In the Shadow of the South: The 
Untold Story of Racial Integration at the University of Texas at 
Austin, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas, 2001, 74, 75, 84. 
10 Melissa Kean, At a Most Uncomfortable Speed: The Desegregation of 
the South’s Private Universities, 1945-1964, Ph.D. Dissertation, Rice 
University, 2000, 343, 361, 387, 410, 433. 
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no black athletes, faculty members, or student organizations. SMU made 
the first step in that direction in December of 1964.  President Tate 
announced a new program that would bring in twenty five students from 
Bishop College, an all-black undergraduate institution in Dallas, 
starting in January 1965.  The black students were to take classes at 
SMU that were not offered at Bishop.  Tate called the new phase a 
“revolutionary pilot program between a white and a Negro institution”.   
Tate felt it necessary to bring in the black Bishop students to 
encourage them to stay in Dallas for graduate school rather than going 
north for higher degrees.  The Bishop students were each slated to 
take one 3-hour course and attend class three times a week for one 
hour.  While they were not SMU undergraduate students, the university 
was pushing to further integrate the campus.11 
 Another racial barrier fell at SMU in 1965 when William S. Willis 
Jr. became the first black faculty member.  Willis had attended Howard 
University as an undergraduate, and eventually obtained his Ph.D. from 
Columbia University in anthropology in 1955.  Despite having a 
doctorate from a prestigious university, Willis’ job opportunities in 
academia were not great.  As late as 1964 Willis had not found a 
permanent teaching job, so he moved to Dallas hoping to find a 
position.  Willis was given a position in the Sociology and 
Anthropology Department at SMU. However, the appointment was not 
solely at SMU.  Rather, two-thirds of his time would be spent there, 
and the other third would be at Bishop College on the other side of 
11 Carlos Conde, “Negroes to Study at SMU”, Dallas Morning News, 
December 18, 1964. 
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town.  Willis would have joint teaching duties at both schools.  The 
job was incredibly taxing with lots of time spent traveling, 
conflicting class schedules, and meetings at both schools that kept 
Willis beyond busy.12  
 Willis’ joint position at SMU and Bishop College quickly became 
more than he could handle, to the point that he only stayed with the 
job for one year.  By the fall of 1966, Willis had given up the Bishop 
position, and only taught part-time as an assistant professor at SMU.  
In the fall of 1967, he became a full-time assistant professor, and 
was promoted to associate professor with tenure in May of 1968.  
Despite the taxing nature of his schedule, Willis felt that he and his 
wife’s “efforts to integrate had been successful to a large extent”.  
The feeling of acceptance did not last long though.  He became 
disillusioned by the fact that he had the largest course load, and was 
the lowest paid faculty member in the department.  Willis became 
increasingly more militant in his belief that he was mistreated by the 
Department of Anthropology, and that African Americans in general were 
not given their due in anthropological circles.  Also, white faculty 
members began causing Willis problems with overtly racist jokes and 
comments.  By the spring of 1972, Willis had had enough and resigned 
from Southern Methodist University.  He sent a letter to Tate, who by 
that time was chancellor, notifying him that he was leaving his 
12 Peggy Reeves Sunday, “Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet: The 
Life and Work of William S. Willis Jr.”, in African American Pioneers 
in Anthropology edited by Ira E. Harrison and Faye V. Harrison 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 247-248, 252. 
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position at SMU.  Willis was not happy about his decision, but felt it 
was necessary for his own peace of mind.13 
 One of the most controversial racial walls also came down in 1965 
at SMU.  In the summer the football team signed “a wizard athlete from 
Beaumont Herbert named Jerry LeVias”.  When LeVias signed with the 
Mustangs, he became the first black athlete to receive a scholarship 
from a school in the SWC.  The football program was the most visible 
part of a university, and many were not ready for LeVias to break the 
sanctity of the gridiron in the SWC.  However, he did sign with the 
Mustangs despite having 92 offers coming out of high school.  Even 
though there were times LeVias wanted to quit, he never reneged on his 
word to SMU, and he went on to have one of the most illustrious 
careers in the history of SMU football.14 
 The story of LeVias coming to SMU did not actually start in 1965.  
Rather, it began with the hiring of Hayden Fry as the new football 
coach in 1962.  At the time, Fry was an assistant coach under Frank 
Broyles at the University of Arkansas.  When SMU contacted Fry, he 
made it very clear that he was not interested in taking the job in 
Dallas if they would not allow him to recruit black players.  SMU 
officials told Fry in his first meeting that no school in the SWC had 
an integrated athletic program, and they were not going to be the 
first.  Fry told SMU in that case he was going to stay at Arkansas, 
and the meeting ended.  Fry was not surprised by SMU’s stance, but he 
was a little disappointed.  A few days after the initial meeting, SMU 
13 Ibid, 252-257. 
14 Temple Pouncey, Mustang Mania: SMU Football (Huntsville, Alabama: 
Stroud Publishers, 1981), 200, 202. 
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called Fry a second time and asked if he was still interested in the 
job.  He said if they would let him bring in black players then yes, 
and SMU once again dodged the subject and told Fry they would get back 
to him.  Not long after, Fry got a third call from the university and 
they told him that he could recruit one or two black players “with the 
understanding that they would not only be good players, but also good 
students and fine citizens”.  The school told Fry that he would have 
to screen potential black athletes very heavily, and that the process 
could take time, even a year or two. Assistant Athletic Director 
Lester Jordan spoke for the department when he said at the time of 
Fry’s hiring, “We had to be very careful.  We wanted to get a man from 
a cultured background with good scholastic standing”. Fry said he 
understood and took the job as the head football coach of Southern 
Methodist University in 1962.15 
 Fry’s steadfastness on desegregating the SMU football team had 
its sources early in his life.  He grew up in Odessa, Texas which was 
a town with a great mixture of races, nationalities, and religious 
backgrounds.  Fry had numerous black and Hispanic friends growing up, 
and he was disturbed by the way they were treated.  He did not like 
the fact that his friends had to sit in the balcony of the movie 
theater, or that they had to ride in the back of the bus to name a 
15 Hayden Fry with George Wine, Hayden Fry: A High Porch Picnic 
(Champaign, Illinois: Sports Publishing Inc., 1999), 67, 68.  Andrew 
Boyer, “LeVias Crosses Goal for Ponies, Civil Rightists: SMU Cheers 
Integration Symbol”, from the Washington Post and reprinted in the 
Daily Campus, October 18, 1966, 4.  The quote from Lester Jordan 
appears to be the only direct statement at the time from the Athletic 
Department and can be assumed to echo the sentiment of the Athletic 
Director Matty Bell as well others in the department at SMU. 
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few.  When Fry reached high school, he was not pleased that his black 
friends had to play football at a different part of the city.  He made 
a commitment that if he were ever in a position to change the racial 
make-up of a football team, he would do so.  SMU offered him that 
chance, albeit grudgingly.  He would now be able to test the promise 
he had made to himself in his school days.16 
 Once Fry took the job at SMU, he began the process of finding the 
right black athlete to break the color barrier in the SWC.  He and his 
staff “quietly started to survey some of the black high schools of 
Texas, looking at their top players”.  Fry was not concerned with how 
long the search might take.  Rather, he wanted to make sure they found 
the right fit for SMU.  The more Fry searched, the more he became 
enamored of Jerry LeVias.  LeVias was not big, only 5-8 and 160 
pounds, but he was as Fry put it “a great athlete, an exceptional 
student, mentally tough, and came from a strong family”.  LeVias’ 
parents and grandparents instilled in him strong moral and religious 
values, so much so that he carried a Bible in his pocket.  Because of 
his religious devotion, LeVias had been taught not to hate, and that 
all people were children of God who had been put on earth for a 
reason.  LeVias had never been in trouble on the field or, more 
importantly, off the gridiron.  LeVias was perfect for Fry and SMU.  
He was exactly what the school, and the coach, were looking for to 
help bring black athletes into the SWC.17 
16 Ibid. 
17 Fry, High Porch Picnic, 69.  Jerry LeVias: A Marked Man, video 
documentary on Fox Sports Southwest, February 12, 2010. 
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 Hayden Fry searched for two years to find a person the caliber of 
Jerry LeVias, both on and off the field, to be the first black 
football player at SMU.  But finding him was only part of the battle.  
Now Fry had to convince LeVias to actually take on the burden of being 
a trailblazer and sign with SMU.  As noted, LeVias was highly 
recruited out of high school with over 90 college offers, and SMU was 
the only one to express interest in LeVias that was a predominantly 
white school with no black athletes.  Winning over LeVias would not be 
an easy task, as there were recruiters sending him letters and making 
phone calls as early as his sophomore year.  LeVias had also made 
several trips to the University of California at Los Angeles, and 
essentially was ready to commit when Fry and an assistant coach named 
Chuck Curtis showed up in Beaumont.  When Fry visited with LeVias, he 
took a very different approach than most coaches.  Fry didn’t talk 
much about football with Levias, or tell him how important he would be 
to the Mustang program.  Rather, Fry told LeVias that he would get a 
top-rated education from SMU. He talked about the academic prowess of 
the school, and LeVias came away impressed with Fry’s tactics.  LeVias 
said it was the first time that a coach spent so much time talking 
about education, and “Coach Fry showed an interest in me as a person”.  
Not only did Fry make an impact on LeVias, he had an effect on Jerry’s 
grandmother as well.  When she met Fry she told Jerry, “There’s 
something Godly about that man”.  Fry left Beaumont with a commitment 
from LeVias, and the process to bring in the first black football 
player to the SWC was underway.18 
18 Ibid. 
                                                          
125 
 
 When LeVias made his way to Dallas in the fall of 1965 as a 
freshman, he entered a new world.  According to his uncle, Joe Sasser, 
LeVias experienced culture shock in Dallas. His environment in 
Beaumont was nearly 100% black, and now he was thrown into almost the 
complete opposite.  SMU was not completely lily-white in 1965, but it 
was far from being totally integrated.  In his first year at SMU, 
LeVias experienced some minor trouble with whites on campus.  Abner 
Haynes, the first black athlete to play college football in Texas at 
North Texas State, knew LeVias would have at least some problems.  He 
stated in a Fox Sports Southwest documentary that, “I can assure you 
being black in Dallas at the time he was going to SMU he could not 
avoid headaches”.  Early on, Jerry’s father was not too happy with him 
going to Dallas.  He told Fry, “There was too much prejudice…They had 
just killed the president, and I didn’t want them to kill him too”.  
LeVias recalls numerous times where he had small run-ins with his 
white counterparts on campus.  White students did not want to sit next 
to him in class.  LeVias said that tardiness to class was cut down 
significantly by his presence, because students that were late had to 
sit by him, and they did not want to do so.  The professors were 
better in that they supported him, but early on in his SMU academic 
career the students did not want anything to do with him.  One time 
when LeVias was in a Nature Of Man course, a white student raised his 
hand and asked the professor point blank was it true that “coloreds’ 
brains are smaller than that of whites.”  The teacher proceeded to 
chastise the student, and posed to him a scenario where a black child 
would be given all the advantages in life over a white child.  She 
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then asked the student which one would be more educated.  Once the 
white student had been dressed down, LeVias felt somewhat more 
comfortable in that particular class.  One of the worst things to 
happen to LeVias while he was a freshman was that he had a white 
roommate whose mother protested her son living with a black person.  
The white student was removed at the mother’s request, and LeVias 
lived by himself.  While he liked having a larger room to himself, the 
incident had an impact and was one LeVias never forgot. As LeVias’ 
freshman year continued, he recalled other times where white students 
acted in similar fashion.19   
The problems that LeVias faced during his freshman year were not 
limited to the general student population.  Some of his teammates and 
a few coaches opposed his presence as well.  LeVias remembers being 
spit on in practice his freshman year.  He recalls that several 
assistants did not want to tape him up. The head trainer, Eddie Lane, 
was the only one who would help Jerry with his injuries when he first 
started with the football program.  LeVias was frequently injured his 
freshman year due in no small part to his own teammates.  Lane kept 
the infirmary open late because he knew Jerry would be the last one 
there, and Lane would help him with his injuries.  When LeVias would 
enter the shower all of his teammates would leave, and he was the last 
one in the locker room. At team meals Jerry would sit down at a table, 
and everyone there would get up even if they were not finished eating.  
19 Jerry LeVias: A Marked Man, Fox Sports Southwest.  Phone interview 
with Jerry LeVias Feb. 22, 2010.  Richard Pennington, Breaking the 
Ice: The Racial Integration of Southwest Conference Football (London: 
McFarland and Co. Inc. Publishers, 1987), 83. 
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None of his teammates invited him to social gatherings, or even out to 
eat a hamburger after a game. LeVias did not find solace outside the 
team either because there were very few blacks at SMU in 1965.  Fry 
told Jerry from the start that “there were very few blacks there at 
the time and that his social life might be hindered”. In other words, 
SMU was a lonely environment for LeVias, even among his so called 
teammates.20 
LeVias did not encounter much trouble during his freshman year, 
because he was not really in the public eye except on campus.  
Freshmen were not allowed to play on the varsity football team in 
1965, so LeVias was not on the field for thousands to ridicule.   AS a 
sophomore LeVias was a focal point of the Mustangs’ offense; therefore 
he became the subject of criticism and hatred.  Having a black athlete 
on the football team as a freshman was one thing.  When that black 
player became a big part of the program, like LeVias did in 1966, the 
racial incidents became increasingly more likely.  According to Temple 
Pouncey, author of Mustang Mania: SMU Football, LeVias only took part 
in 66 plays his sophomore year in 1966, but he “accomplished more than 
any other player in the Southwest Conference”.  As LeVias became a 
bigger part of the offense, the hate mail and threats poured in even 
more.  Levias noted that “when I started making a difference in the 
Southern Methodist University football program and we started winning, 
that’s when people started writing hate letters, hate mail, and phone 
calls”.  Harold Jeske, a member of the SMU Athletic Committee from 
1966 to 1974, said that there was so much hate mail that came in 
20 Ibid. 
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during that period that the athletic department had a person whose 
only job was to sort through Jerry’s mail.21 
The hate mail was only part of the ordeal for LeVias. Once he 
started seeing significant playing time for the Mustangs, there were 
incidents both on and off the field that were cause for concern.  He 
recalls playing Texas in 1966 where the Longhorns fans and players 
gave him a hard time during warm-ups. The fans were catcalling, 
insulting him, and people in the stands were even holding up ropes 
like nooses.  The players spit on him and talked about his parents.  
Afterwards, Texas’ quarterback Bill Bradley went up to LeVias and 
apologized for his teammates, and Bradley and LeVias remained friends 
for years after the game.  Similar incidents occurred when SMU played 
Texas A&M that same year.  The corps cadets blocked the Mustangs’ bus 
on the way to the stadium, and the players had to walk half a mile to 
the dressing room.  When they came out for the pre-game, someone 
released a number of black cats on to the field.  During the game, 
Jerry was tackled by a white player from the other team who spit in 
his face and called him names.  LeVias was furious when he reached the 
sidelines.  He threw his helmet, and sat down on the bench away from 
his teammates.  Fry came over to console him, and told him to forget 
about the game.  Not long after the Aggies had to punt, and LeVias 
told Fry he was going to return the punt for a touchdown. Jerry went 
out to receive the punt, and he returned it 86 yards for a touchdown.  
LeVias did not lash out at the player who spit on him.  Rather, he 
21 Pouncey, Mustang Mania, 210.  Jerry LeVias: A Marked Man, Fox Sports 
Southwest. 
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struck back the best way he knew how—on the field.  The punt returned 
for a touchdown helped the Mustangs win the game.22   
The most serious problem in 1966 occurred when SMU played Texas 
Christian University.  Fry had LeVias work out in the locker room, and 
Jerry thought it was because he was the best player and was receiving 
star treatment.  Just before the game started Fry pulled LeVias aside 
and told him there had been a threat on his life.  Someone had sent 
word to Fry that there was a sniper in the stands who was going to 
shoot LeVias.  He stayed in the middle of the huddle throughout the 
game, and ran to the sidelines as fast as he could.  Anytime LeVias 
came near the TCU bench, the coaches moved away out of fear.  In the 
end nothing happened, but Fry and LeVias had to treat the threat as if 
it were real.23 
The hate mail, threats, and physical contact took its toll on 
LeVias, to the point that he thought seriously about leaving SMU 
during his sophomore year.  He told his sister, Charlena, that he was 
fed up with the abuse, and was going to leave because he could not 
take it anymore.  Charlena told him that their father always told them 
that if they make their bed hard they have to sleep in it.  In other 
words, Jerry had chosen SMU and had to stick to that commitment.  Fry 
also told LeVias that he is “the symbol of his race and if he quit he 
will handicap the program for other people”.  LeVias stayed at SMU, 
22 Jerry LeVias: A Marked Man, Fox Sports Southwest. 
23 Ibid. 
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and went on to have one of the most illustrious careers in Mustang 
history.24  
LeVias was not the only person at SMU who caught flack for his 
being on the football team in the late 1960s.  Fry was constantly 
criticized for his recruitment of black players. According to LeVias, 
there was a gentleman’s agreement in the SWC not to recruit black 
athletes.  When he was brought to SMU, the other conference coaches 
were not pleased with Fry for breaking the unwritten code.  Once 
LeVias left SMU the Mustangs did not win as much, and administrators 
used the fact that Fry was going to recruit too many blacks as an 
excuse to get rid of him.  Fry was fired in 1972, and LeVias believes 
one of the main reasons was because Fry had been the first to break 
the color line in SWC football.  Journalists who wrote glowing reports 
about LeVias’ play on the field were the subject of scorn as well.  
Dallas Morning News reporter Sam Blair said the first time he wrote 
about LeVias’ dazzling play against Navy in the Cotton Bowl, he 
received anonymous threatening phone calls the next day. So, LeVias’ 
time at SMU was not just detrimental to his own wellbeing, but to 
others as well.25 
LeVias, Fry, and the journalists who praised his efforts on the 
field appear to be the only ones who received any ridicule and scorn 
during his playing days at SMU.  LeVias was the Southwest Conference’s 
first black scholarship athlete in football. The football program was 
24 Ibid.  “LeVias Makes Clutch Plays Despite Abuse” Dallas Morning 
News, November 20, 1966. 
25 Jerry LeVias: A Marked Man, Fox Sports Southwest. Phone interview 
with Jerry LeVias. 
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a source of pride for SMU, Dallas, and numerous people of East Texas.  
People came by the thousands to cheer on the Mustangs each week, and 
the shock of having to do so for a black player was something they 
simply were not ready for.  SMU was like most southern universities in 
that the football program was one of, if not the last, area of the 
school to desegregate.  This was mainly due to the nature of the sport 
and the physicality involved.  The possibility of physical contact 
between whites and blacks was a major factor in keeping the races 
segregated, and this was extended to the gridiron. If black players 
were kept off the field, and off the team, the “sanctity” of one of 
the last all-white areas of a university could be maintained.  Since 
LeVias, “violated” that principle, he was the subject of verbal and 
physical abuse, death threats, and hate mail.  There were other black 
students at SMU during LeVias’ tenure with the Mustangs, but they do 
not recall having been threatened in the same manner.  Anga Sanders, a 
freshman at SMU during LeVias’ sophomore year in 1966 noted, “I’d have 
to say that our tenure was characterized more by benign neglect than 
anything else.  We were an invisible minority, and little if any 
thought was given to our feelings about or response to things that 
were simply accepted at SMU”.  The invisible minority she was 
referring to were black students who were not involved with sports 
teams.  She never received any of the ridicule that aimed at LeVias, 
nor did she recall any other black student mentioning threats like 
made against LeVias.  The main reason was because she, nor other black 
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students, were never put on as visible a stage as the football team 
while at SMU.26   
Jerry LeVias’ senior year at Southern Methodist University was 
his most productive as a Mustang.  He led the nation with 80 
receptions, was named All-Southwest Conference, and All-American for 
his play on the field.  Off the field, LeVias was named an Academic 
All-American.  At the end of Jerry’s senior year, Fry noted that it 
had been very successful.  He stated, “the Jerry LeVias era was over 
at SMU and integration of the SWC was a success.  We had certainly 
chosen the right person to integrate the conference”.  As a player 
LeVias had never missed a game, and he very rarely missed class.  
LeVias graduated from SMU in the spring of 1969 with honors, near the 
top of his class.  By the time he left the program, SMU had several 
other black players on the team that would follow in LeVias’ 
footsteps.  Rufus Cormier and Walter Haynes arrived in Dallas during 
Jerry’s sophomore year, and both went on to have illustrious careers 
in their own rights as members of the Mustang football program.  The 
visible racism was gone from the football field once Cormier and 
Haynes started playing for the Mustangs.  Cormier does not recall 
having any incidents of hatred directed toward him on the gridiron 
like LeVias.  Cormier did not receive death threats, nor have players 
try to physically hurt him more than was standard in regular game 
play.  By the time LeVias graduated, and Cormier and Haynes were 
26 Anga Sanders, Personal Email Correspondence, January 10, 2013. 
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juniors, one of the most visible part of SMU had several black players 
on the football team, and others soon followed.27  
When SMU signed Jerry LeVias in 1965, it was the first school in 
the Southwest Conference to successfully recruit and sign a black 
football player.  Whereas SMU had followed the University of Texas and 
the University of Arkansas in regards undergraduate desegregation, it 
was once again the leader on the subject when it came to football.  
None of the coaches in the conference wanted to be the first to open 
its program to black players until Fry came to SMU. Baylor Coach John 
Bridgers echoed the sentiment of all the coaches in the SWC when he 
stated, “There was no policy, not at all. It was just a reluctance 
among the coaches to be the first to go out and recruit a black 
athlete”.  Fry recalled that he heard numerous head and assistant 
coaches at the SWC meetings every year say they would never have a 
black player on their team.  It was not until November of 1963 that 
the Board of Regents at Texas even allowed black athletes to be 
recruited to Austin.  Arkansas complied with the Texas ruling of 1963 
to bring in black athletes. However, neither program started with 
football. In fact, football was the last sport desegregated at both of 
the power schools of the SWC.  No coach at Texas had ever recruited a 
black player as late as 1967 when Jerry LeVias was in his junior year 
at SMU.  The Longhorns’ first varsity black football player was Julius 
Whittier, and the Razorbacks first was Jon Richardson.  Both were 
freshmen in 1969, and did not play their first varsity games until 
27 Jerry LeVias: A Marked Man, Fox Sports Southwest.  Fry, A High Porch 
Picnic, 82.  Rufus Cormier Phone Interview, August 17, 2012. 
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1970. The pair became the “last first black players in the SWC”.  By 
that time, Cormier and Haynes were seniors at SMU and LeVias had 
graduated the previous year.  Football provided a forum for SMU to 
take the lead on the desegregation front once again, at least in the 
Southwest Conference.28   
Despite the fact that Jerry LeVias was the first black football 
player at SMU, he never considered himself a pioneer.  According to 
Richard Pennington, “LeVias insisted that he didn’t choose SMU to make 
any racial statement, but to get and education and to play football”.  
LeVias made the same point personally in phone conversation when he 
stated, “We never talked about being a pioneer and I think if we had 
talked about it I wouldn’t have gone to SMU”.  When Fry recruited 
LeVias he talked to Jerry about academics at SMU and a little about 
football.  He was adamant that LeVias would get a good education from 
SMU, and that convinced him to sign as much as anything.  The fact is, 
however, that despite his reluctance, LeVias was a pioneer and opened 
the door for many black athletes to follow at SMU and the Southwest 
Conference.29 
Football was not the last racial barrier to fall at SMU.  There 
were no black fraternities and sororities on campus until the mid-
1970s, so black students did not have an important social outlet 
28 Dwonna Goldstone, Integrating the 40 Acres: The Fifty Year Struggle 
for Racial Equality at the University of Texas (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2006), 126, 131.  Gordon Morgan, The Edge of Campus: A 
Journal of the Black Experience at the University of Arkansas 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1990), 155-156.   
Pennington, Breaking the Ice, 15-16, 114.   
29 Phone interview with Jerry LeVias, February 22, 2010.  Pennington, 
Breaking the Ice, 83. 
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available to them at SMU.  Phi Beta Sigma was the first black sorority 
at SMU and was chartered in 1974.  Not long after, the Alpha Xi Omega 
chapter of Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority Inc. was established at the 
university.  Sophomore Rickie Clinton was the first female inducted 
into the sorority in the spring of 1975. By the fall, several other 
female students expressed interest in being a part of the historically 
black sorority.  They created an interest group called The Vine 
Sisters, and were initiated in March of 1976 when the sorority became 
an official part of SMU.  A few months later, in May of 1976, the Nu 
Iota chapter of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority Inc. was started by nine 
women on campus.  Dubbed the “Divine Nine”, they started a “legacy of  
unparalleled community service” at SMU.  In 1977 the Nu Kappa Chapter 
of Omega Psi Phi Fraternity Incorporated was started on campus by six 
make black students.  A charter was granted in November of 1977, and 
it was an immediate success despite the fact that there were only 175 
black students at SMU in 1977. The chapter went dormant in the mid-
1980s but was brought back in the early 2000s.30  
Student government and politics was one of the last avenues 
closed to blacks at SMU.  As late as 1978, there had never been a 
black student government president.  That changed in the spring of 
1978 when the top two offices in student government went to black men. 
David Huntley, a write-in candidate endorsed by the Daily Campus 
newspaper, defeated Beverly Bell 1,109 to 891 in a run-off for student 
body president. Huntley originally ran as a candidate for the advisory 
30 smu.edu/fsl/fraternities.  smu.edu/fsl/sororities.  Both accessed on 
August 7, 2012. 
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board to the vice president of student affairs and won “hands down”.  
However, once he won the president position he resigned his advisory 
board post. Huntley said he did not campaign at all for president in 
the general election, but once he made the runoff he made a more 
concerted effort to obtain the office.  He was very pleased with his 
write-in campaign and said it “proved SMU students were more concerned 
with the best possible candidate for the job than with race”.  Brett 
Ledbetter won the student body vice president position, also in a 
runoff, by a vote of 1,051 to 883 against Ken Mifflin.  It was the 
first time in the history of SMU that the two highest elected student 
officials were both black.31   
By the time Willis Tate became president at Southern Methodist 
University, the school had enrolled its first black graduate students. 
During his tenure, the institution continued to open more doors to 
blacks.  The Law School was desegregated by the mid-1950s.  Black 
undergraduates started coming to SMU in 1962.  The first black 
professor began his brief career in 1965, which was the same year the 
Mustang football program signed its first black player.  After 1965, 
other barriers began to fall as well.  However, it should be 
emphasized that SMU was still in the desegregation phase.  All the 
schools and academic programs were open to black students, but the 
campus was not truly integrated. The start of making African American 
31 1978 Rotunda, SMU Yearbook, 63, memories.smu.edu.  Accessed August 
7, 2012. “2 Blacks at SMU Win Runoff”, Dallas Morning News, April 4, 
1978, 47. The article in the Morning News does not give a specific 
reason why the student newspaper endorsed Huntley for president, but 
Huntley’s comment seems to suggest that it is because he was the best 
candidate for the position. 
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students feel fully welcome on campus did not come until the late 
1960s with the formation of a group called Black League of African 




A Calm Rebellion: Black Student Protest at SMU 
 
This is SMU. It was then and is now.  So any type of civil unrest was 
kind of unheard of because this is a very contained campus, very calm.  
It’s not Berkeley.  So we were very calm.  We stated the list of 
demands that we had… And thus the civil rights movement began at SMU 
because that’s when the negotiations started.1 
 
 Anga Sanders was one of thirty three black students at Southern 
Methodist University that presented a list of demands to President 
Willis Tate in the spring of 1969.  Prior to the meeting with Tate, 
the black students had formed a group called the Black League of Afro-
American and African College Students (BLAACS) because they wanted 
their voice to be heard.  Despite the fact that the campus had started 
desegregation as early as 1951, Sanders and the other members of 
BLAACS, were still a decided minority on campus who felt they were not 
being treated equally.  The thirty-three participants of the 
organization represented the entire black student population of SMU in 
1969, and they wanted SMU to do more to help them feel comfortable on 
campus.  The BLAACS organization was something new for SMU.  As the 
above quotation shows, Sanders was clear on that issue when she gave a 
speech on campus in 2011 reminiscing about her time in Dallas.  SMU 
had not experienced any violence with desegregation like was the case 
at the University of Alabama, the University of Mississippi, or 
countless other schools in the South.  Even so, black students like 
Sanders were not satisfied at SMU.  There were very few black students 
on campus, even fewer black professors, and black workers that were 
not getting paid enough.  These were not the only things on their list 
1 Anga Sanders speaking at SMU, February 22, 2011.  Found on YouTube.   
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of demands, just the most glaring problems.  In order to help 
alleviate the situation, Sanders and others followed the example of 
numerous students across the country and created an organization that 
would raise consciousness among black scholars at SMU.  They were not 
violent and did not break any laws.  Despite staging a sit-in outside 
Tate’s office BLAACS presented their demands to him in a scheduled 
meeting, and were respectful of his authority.  The black students 
involved in the sit-in did not take over the administration building 
as happened at many college and university campuses across the 
country.  BLAACS simply wanted to be heard and their demands met at a 
private, mostly white, Southern institution. In essence, they were 
starting a calm rebellion at Southern Methodist University. 
 The Black League of Afro-American and African College Students 
was organized at SMU in the fall of 1968.  While black students were a 
very small minority on the campus in Dallas, it did not mean that they 
were not aware of the growing social consciousness and student 
activism occurring among their peers across the country.  The 
formation of BLAACS was a sign of the times, and African American 
students at SMU “simultaneously recognized the need for a formalized 
group”.  By the end of February 1969, the Faculty Senate Committee on 
Student Organizations at SMU had approved BLAACS as a recognized 
university organization.  The constitution of the group that was 
approved by the faculty senate contained four major points.  The first 
was to create an outlet for social expression and exchange among black 
students.  The second was to “act as a unified center for the 
promotion of black creative endeavors”.  The third goal for BLAACS as 
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stated by the constitution was to encourage a fraternal spirit among 
black students.  Finally, the organization would provide a way for 
black students to feel like they were a more significant part of the 
university (literally and figuratively).  All four broad themes 
outlined more specific problems that were addressed during the group’s 
meeting later in the spring with President Tate.2 
 While general social consciousness and student activism played a 
role in the creation of BLAACS, neither idea fully explains why the 
organization was created specifically in the fall of 1968.  In order 
to get a better grasp on why black students at SMU felt the urge to 
create their group in that particular instance, a look at the social 
environment on campus is important.  Prior to the formation of BLAACS, 
SMU participated in what was known as Old South Week.  The event was 
put on every year by the Kappa Alpha fraternity and was a week-long 
celebration of the regalia of the plantation South.  During the week, 
the fraternity held a demonstration at the student center where the 
confederate flag was flown and a mock slave auction was held.  Black 
students were not fond of the symbolism portrayed by the display, so 
they went to Dean Howell to ask him to stop the program. He told the 
black students that there was nothing he could do because the 
fraternity was part of the university and allowed to have programs on 
campus.  Since the dean would not help them, the black students 
decided to stop the flying of the confederate flag and the slave 
auction themselves.  During the next demonstration at the student 
2 Anga Sanders, email correspondence, September 23, 2012.  “BLAACS, UCM 
get Recognition”, SMU Daily Campus, February 28, 1969, 1. 
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center, Jerry LeVias, one of the black members of the football team, 
climbed up to the balcony and cut down the confederate flag.  The 
other black students in attendance pulled out pocket versions of the 
same flag and proceeded to burn them as the crowd started to chant, 
“the South will rise again”.  For all practical purposes, the black 
students’ actions during Old South Week prompted the creation of 
BLAACS and a more formal organization from which to protest the 
inequities they faced on campus in Dallas.3 
 When BLAACS became a recognized organization there were a number 
of white students that came out in support of the group.  Gary Dragna, 
a junior at SMU, felt the growing racial tensions on campus needed to 
be addressed not just by the black students but by white students as 
well.  Evidence of this manifested itself through a fight in the 
student center between a few white and black students in early 
February 1969.  Even so, nothing had been done about racism on campus 
to that point according to Dragna, and if it was to change white 
students had to be willing to help.  Dragna and several other white 
students got together to create the Organization Against Racism (OAR) 
to “feel out what the white students felt about Malcolm X Day and to 
get an interested group of students to work on the issue of racism at 
SMU”.  All in attendance were in agreement that they wanted to do 
something about racism on campus and OAR president Bill White said, 
“Racism is a white problem”.  While OAR did not represent the entirety 
of the white population on campus, it showed that BLAACS had support 
beyond the thirty three African American members of the group.  
3 Anga Sanders Speaks at SMU, February 22, 2011. 
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Members of BLAACS said as much when they “emphasized the importance of 
the white organization to support the BLAACS in their three major 
concerns”.4 
 With the support of the Organization Against Racism, BLAACS 
proceeded to draw up a petition voicing their concerns to President 
Tate.  The list of concerns were broken into six categories covering a 
broad range of subjects including student recruitment, admissions, 
financial aid to students, curriculum concerns, and faculty to name a 
few. Max Drazen, co-chairman of OAR, spoke to the nearly 125 member 
organization and said OAR would be an “active organization to initiate 
reforms against racial discrimination on campus and to support the 
demands of BLAACS”.  Chairman Bill White said OAR would support most 
of the demands made by BLAACs “not because they help the black group 
but because their beneficial to the whole student body”.5   
 By drawing up a petition to be sent to the president, black 
students at SMU were following the protocol of numerous campus 
activists across the country.  According to Ibram Rogers, author of 
the Black Campus Movement, “Black campus activists usually wrote out 
their demands in essay format or as a simple numbered list.  At 
(Historically White Colleges and Universities), they regularly 
addressed the demands to the president”.  Southern Methodist 
University definitely qualified as a Historically White University, 
4 “Race Relations: Both Sides Trying for Harmony”, Dallas Morning News, 
April 27, 1969, 27.  Mary Lou Muns, “Students Organize Against 
Racism”, Daily Campus, March 4, 1969, 1.  Gary Dragna, Letter to the 
Editor of the Daily Campus “White Students React to Malcolm X Tribute” 
February 26, 1969, 5. 
5 Ibid.  Mary Lou Muns, “Group sets Goals to Fight Racism”, Daily 
Campus, March 5, 1969, 1. 
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and the black students on campus were doing all they could to present 
their grievances to the administration through the proper channels.  
The first step in that process was to draft the petition and present 
it President Tate.6 
 In order to fully understand the petition written by BLAACS that, 
an in-depth look at each of the demands is imperative.  The first 
issue that BLAACS wanted administrators to address was the idea of a 
free student union.  The group felt that the governing board of the 
center was not representative of the student body.  In addition, 
BLAACS felt that the student union, “should provide an atmosphere of 
harmony and be a focal point for every social and ethnic group it 
represents”.  Blacks that attended SMU wanted to have more of a say in 
how the student union was run, and Tate agreed.  Of the six problems 
discussed in the petition and subsequent meeting with Tate, the 
governance of the student union was the least controversial so Tate 
capitulated rather quickly.7    
 The second part of the petition from BLAACS concerned the 
recruitment of more black students and scholarship money for those 
recruited.  The organization saw the university’s admission policies 
as “fair” in providing “equal opportunity for all who wish to come to 
SMU”.  However, black students only made up 1% of the total student 
6 Ibram Rogers, The Black Campus Movement: Black Students and the 
Racial Reconstruction of Higher Education, 1965-1972 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 112. 
7 “SMU Planning to Begin on Replies to Negroes” Dallas Morning News, 
May 4, 1969, 10A.  “Demands from Black League of Afro-American and 
African College Students (BLAACS”), Spring 1969, Box 5, Folder 1, 
Protests, Controversies, Campus Disturbances, 1965-1973, Student 
Activities Records, SMU 2006.0375, Southern Methodist University 
Archives, DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University. 
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body.  Also, according to BLAACS, 93% of the total scholarship funds 
went to white students, with the remaining 7% going to all other 
students on campus. In order to rectify the situation, BLAACS proposed 
the creation of a university-funded recruiting committee made up of 
black students.  They also requested that 500 black students be 
enrolled by the fall of 1969.  In order to help achieve this goal, the 
petition called for a 50-50 split of financial aid to white and black 
students until “the proper ratio of black students to white students 
at SMU is achieved”.8   
When black students at SMU made a demand for more of their own on 
campus, they were following the model of countless others across the 
country.  Bringing in additional black students was very important to 
groups like BLAACS, and all the other requests centered on this idea. 
New Mexico State’s black students issued a list of demands in April of 
1969, and University of Mount Union in Ohio’s administrators saw 
demands brought forth the following March. Black students at the 
University of Maryland-Eastern Shore presented the administration with 
a fifty page report documenting changes that needed to take place on 
campus.  More than fifty grievances were given to school officials at 
Virginia Union.  Such demands were often very similar. Black students 
at Skidmore College in New York felt that they could not get a 
meaningful liberal arts education without more scholars of color on 
campus. In addition to increased numbers, black campus activists 
demanded the active recruitment of black students, and they wanted to 
8 “Demands from Black League of Afro-American and African College 
Students (BLAACS)”. 
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be a part of the recruitment process.  Students at the University of 
Arkansas created Blacks Americans for Democracy (BAD) to help with 
“the issues that mattered the most to students of color on the 
Fayetteville campus”.  BAD created its own newspaper, the BAD Times, 
so that black students on campus would receive fair coverage in 
university sponsored media.  BAD plead with university officials to 
bring more black football players and to black faculty campus.  The 
BAD Times wrote articles stressing that the black studies program 
needed to be increased beyond one course.  BAD created more social 
opportunities in Fayetteville including a choir, drama club, beauty 
pageants, and dances to name a few.  Members of BLAACS wanted to be 
heard just like black students across the country.9 
 The third topic addressed by the petition was the structure of 
the Liberal Studies Department at SMU which BLAACS felt was too Anglo 
oriented.  The department was “too white” in the professors it 
employed as well as in the courses taught. In order to change the 
dynamics of the department, BLAACS proposed that 20% of the professors 
employed by Liberal Studies should be black.  Courses should also be 
altered to include the role of blacks and other minority groups in the 
development of Western Civilization.10  
 All across the country, groups similar to BLAACS were calling for 
the teaching of more courses relevant to the black experience.  In 
9  Charles F. Robinson and Lonnie R. Williams, Remembrances in Black: 
Personal Perspectives of the African American Experience at the 
University of Arkansas, 1940s-2000s (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 2010), 144. Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 112-
113. 
10 “Demands from Black League of Afro-American and African College 
Students (BLAACS)”. 
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addition they wanted these courses to be taught by black professors.  
Students at Saint Peter’s in New Jersey questioned the “validity” of 
courses taught by white teachers.  Black students at San Francisco 
State thought it was impossible for white professors to teach these 
courses.  Some took it further by demanding that white instructors be 
fired and replaced with blacks.  Students at the University of North 
Dakota disrupted a black history course in February 1969 saying it 
should not be taught by a “honkie”.  In July of 1969, students 
involved with Stanford’s Black Student Union demanded that the new 
Black Studies Program be “black led and black taught”.11 
 The fourth item on the list of demands did not directly involve 
black students at SMU, but black workers on campus.  According to 
BLAACS, the majority of low-paid workers at SMU were black in 1969. 
Furthermore, the organization’s petition said there was only one black 
person in a supervisory role on campus as well.  There were no 
contracts or legal commitments regarding pay scales for workers, and 
there were no guarantees for pay raises either.  BLAACS also said 
workers were afraid to use the proper channels to issue complaints 
because all the supervisors (except one) were white.  Black workers at 
SMU feared reprisals by their white employers so they did not speak 
out against the pay injustices.  Since the workers felt they could not 
do anything to change their situation, BLAACS took it upon themselves 
to include the workers in their list of problems to be addressed by 
the administration.  SMU was not the only school to demand rights for 
black workers on campus.  By the fall of 1969, students at the 
11 Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 115. 
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University of North Carolina, Tufts University, and Harvard “fought 
for the rights of black campus nonacademic workers”.12 
 One of the most controversial of the issues presented by BLAACS 
in the petition was fifth on the list-the creation of an Afro-American 
Studies program.  The demand for the new program was the lengthiest 
part of the entire appeal by BLAACS, and one they felt could not be 
ignored.  Members of the organization felt that white colleges “white-
wash and condition black students” and prevent them from learning 
about their black heritage or culture.  They wanted their black 
identity to remain a separate part of America, not assimilated into 
white America.  By the same token, the Afro-American studies program 
should be an autonomous department at SMU, and the program should not 
fall under the control of other academic divisions.  In essence, by 
attempting to get the administration to create a separate Afro-
American studies program, the students in BLAACS were following the 
model of black pride that was sweeping the country in the late 1960s.13 
 Black students at SMU were not the first to come up with the idea 
to create a program devoted to the study of their culture and 
heritage.  Rather, it was started by students at San Francisco State 
in the fall of 1966 to foster “black power, self-determination, black 
pride, and criticism of white thought and institutions”.  What started 
as a notion to raise awareness at San Francisco State quickly evolved 
into discussions for the formation of a separate Black Studies 
discipline.   By the fall of 1967, several courses were taken out of 
12 Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 100,115.   
13 “Demands from Black League of African American and African College 
Students (BLAACS)”. 
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the Experimental College and offered for credit in Black Studies.  
However, a few courses did not satisfy black students at San Francisco 
State.  They wanted a separate department with a Black Studies degree, 
and continued to push for that.  The following spring (1968), word of 
the Black Studies Program began to reach other colleges, and black 
students on campuses across the country decided that they wanted 
similar programs at their schools.  A year later SMU followed suit 
when BLAACS drafted their petition.  By 1969, SMU joined the ranks of 
schools such as Harvard and Cornell University in the creation of such 
a program.14 
 The sixth and final demand made by BLAACS in the petition was a 
two-part item that fell under the general category of Human Relations.  
BLAACS wanted to see the establishment of a Human Relations Board that 
would supersede all functions of the present Student Senate at SMU.  
The board would control all governing bodies on campus and would meet 
the needs of all ethnic groups on campus, as well as promote better 
understanding of all people on campus.  In a subcategory to the human 
relations demand, BLAACS also “deem it necessary for the black 
students on campus to have a ‘house’ for themselves for the purpose of 
conducting social affairs and some business affairs”.15 
 Once the petition was drafted and sent to university officials, 
BLAACS requested an audience with President Tate and others to discuss 
the demands.  The meeting was granted and held on Monday April 28, 
1969 in Tate’s office and included Tate, Vice President-Provost Neill 
14 Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 93-94, 98. 
15 “Demands from Black League of Afro-American and African College 
Students (BLAACS)”. 
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McFarland, administrative Vice President Richard Rubottom, Vice 
President Thomas E. Broce, Dean of Students Joe Howell, and the 
members of BLAACS.  Tate office issued a report of the meeting that 
said it was conducted in “mutual faith and understanding”.  Since 
BLAACS had gone through the proper channels to ask for the meeting, 
Tate and the other officials were willing to sit down with them and 
see where changes could be made.  While Tate only stayed at the 
meeting for 50 minutes, McFarland and the other administrators met 
with the students for five hours.  All six demands were brought up in 
the meeting, and while Vice President Broce said “it would be 
difficult to fulfill all the requests, the discussions will continue 
between the students and the responsible administrators who were 
present”.16 
  When Tate left the meeting (after the scheduled time was up), 
the black students in attendance staged an impromptu sit-in and 
refused to leave the president’s office until their demands were met. 
Even when Tate threatened to expel them and told them to go back to 
class, the members of BLAACS did not leave.  Anga Sanders, a member of 
BLAACS, recalled that they told Tate they were not leaving, and that 
they were there for the duration.  Once the president left the other 
administrators present continued the meeting and started to negotiate 
the points with the group.  Sanders also remembers that after Tate 
left “We weren’t wild, we weren’t rowdy, we were just determined 
16 “Negroes Confront Faculty at SMU”, Dallas Times Herald April 29, 
1969.  Judy Wiessler, “Blacks at SMU Present Demands”, Dallas Morning 
News, April 29, 1969.   Marlyn Scwartz “5-Hour Talk Fails to Meet 
Black Demands”, Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1969, 1A and 11A. 
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because we had a mission, a goal”.  Others confirmed Sanders’ 
observation.  Vice President Broce noted, “There was at no time any 
kind of confrontation.  It was a discussion.  These were very 
responsible students”.  Tate’s widow Marian, who at the time was his 
secretary, said that the only “damage” done to the president’s office 
was some paper napkins and mustard packets left by the students after 
they were brought lunch by their friends.  The meeting did not turn 
violent, as was the case at a number of other schools.  Even so, 
rumors started flying that there were 30 black militants that had 
occupied the president’s office at SMU.  Sanders said that one girl 
had a nail file but that was about as serious as it got.  Marian Tate 
remembers taking a phone call from the governor’s office asking if the 
National Guard needed to be brought to campus.  She responded that the 
campus police could handle the situation because it was very much 
under control.  Amidst the rumors, the representatives of BLAACS 
continued to talk with the administrators present, and they began 
negotiating the demands on the list.  The talks were helped by a local 
African-American clergyman named Zan Holmes.  He had attended the 
Perkins School of Theology and was in the state legislature at the 
time of the meeting.  Holmes happened to be in Dallas the day of the 
encounter and rode straight to campus to help.  According to Sanders, 
“Five hours later, with the assistance of Reverend Holmes, we walked 
out with having most of our demands been met.”17 
17 Anga Sanders Speaks at SMU, February 22, 2011.  Marian Tate, 
interviewed by Jim Early, October 13, 2000, SMU  Video Archive Series, 
found at digitalcollections.smu.edu.  Marlyn Schwartz, “5-Hour SMU 
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 As far as the Black Campus Movement goes, SMU’s sit-in was mild 
in comparison to others.  By February of 1969, schools all across the 
country were experiencing much worse than the five hour meeting black 
students had with administrators at SMU.  Students at the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison caused a near riot.  Classes were boycotted for 
two weeks at the University of California at Berkeley.  Roosevelt 
University in Chicago saw a week of classes disrupted when students 
attempted to get the school to teach Black Studies.  Nearly 200 
protestors were expelled from Mississippi Valley State University on 
February 13 because protests on campus had gotten out of hand.  Even 
at Duke University, a private Methodist school much like SMU, protests 
escalated beyond simply a meeting with the president.  Forty-eight 
black students entered the administration early one February morning 
and told the clerical workers they had to leave the building.  The 
Duke students proceeded to nail the doors shut, threatened to burn 
university records if the police were called, and renamed the building 
“Malcolm X Liberation School”.  From here they issued thirteen demands 
including the creation of a Black Studies program controlled by the 
students, funds for a Black Student Union Building, the building of a 
dorm for black students, and an end to “racist policies” at Duke.  
Students at Cornell took the hostile takeover even further in April of 
1969 when they were seen brandishing weapons as they occupied 
buildings on campus.  A picture surfaced nationwide showing the armed 
students, and for the first time the nation was visually exposed to 
Talk Fails to Meet Black Demands”, Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1969, 
1A and 11A. 
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the violence on college campuses.  While these are just a few examples 
of the more extreme black campus movement, they illustrate that it was 
happening from coast to coast and all points in between.18  
 Not all campuses exploded in violence as is shown in the example 
of SMU.  Even though the takeover of administration buildings garnered 
media attention, it was not the chosen path for schools like SMU.  
SMU’s black students were not alone in their peaceful attempt to 
change policies in Dallas.  A number of institutions advocated 
nonviolent sit-ins like SMU.  When this tactic was used it was not 
hostile.  During peaceful protests in campus administration buildings, 
the normal flow of business was not disrupted.  Buildings were not 
shut down at SMU, nor at Radcliffe College in 1968, to give a similar 
example. Female students at the college sat outside President Mary I. 
Bunting’s office for seven hours in order to get her to listen to 
their demands.  Bunting eventually came out and promised the students 
that she would increase Negro enrollment.  After the president spoke, 
the students thanked her, and “left in a festive mood”.  Students at 
Radcliffe effected change without resorting to violence.  The same 
could be said about black student at SMU who felt it was better to 
negotiate with administrations in a calm demeanor rather than take 
over the campus.19 
Despite the fact that SMU’s “major” incident in the black student 
protest movement had not turned violent, Mike Morris did not think the 
meeting had gone as well as others.  As chairman of BLAACS, he felt 
18 Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 1-2, 127-129. 
19 Ropbert Reinhold “Negroes Stage Radcliffe Sit-in; Colleges Act on 
their Demands”, New York Times, December 11, 1968, 32. 
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that the administration did not go far enough to meet the demands.  
When discussing the meeting with the Daily Campus Morris said it was 
“not what the organization wanted.  We were not pleased. We were there 
for an answer and what happened was more or less a rejection”.  
Despite the fact that Morris was not pleased with the results of the 
meeting he did mention that negotiations would continue.  He did not 
give any indication that if all of the demands were not met in the 
manner that BLAACS wanted that they would turn violent.  Rather, they 
would meet with administrators again to “see what they can and can’t 
do”.20 
While BLAACS felt it necessary to stage a sit-in in the 
administration building to demand better treatment, some did not see 
it this way. Civil rights leader Bayard Rustin criticized the tactics 
and the motives used at schools across the country, including SMU, to 
bring about change.  Rustin was quoted by the Associated Press telling 
an audience in New York that, “In the real world no one gives a damn 
if you’ve taken soul courses.  They want to know if you can do 
mathematics and write a correct sentence”. Rustin felt that demands 
made like those by BLAACS at SMU were not practical.  The problems 
emphasized separateness and did not prepare black students for the 
“real world”. The only way for black students to progress was to work 
with mainstream society not against it.  Rustin and others felt that 
the petitions by groups like BLAACS were working against mainstream 
society, and according to an editorial in the Dallas Times Herald, “If 
20 Mary Lou Muns, “Negotiations still Underway on Demands from BLAACS”, 
Daily Campus, April 29, 1969, 1. 
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separation is the black students’ only goal, they are morally bound to 
look elsewhere for an education”.  Administrators at SMU, notably 
President Willis Tate felt the same way.21 
Several days after the meeting with BLAACS Tate issued a 
statement with his initial reactions.  He said that he promised the 
students “clear answers to the requests made”. Tate wanted the black 
students to realize that they would be treated just like any other 
student on campus.  Their personal growth and development would be 
furthered to the best of the administration’s abilities, just like 
with all other students on campus.  If that growth was achieved by 
saying yes to some of BLAACS demands then Tate acquiesced.  If the 
goals of the black students could not be reasonably attained by the 
demands then the president said no.  Tate made it clear in his 
statement that while anyone could apply to SMU, they would only be 
admitted if they met the academic standards put forth by the 
university.  If students did not meet the qualifications, then SMU had 
a right to deny admittance.  Tate noted that, “SMU is no microcosm of 
society.  It is highly selective, both in faculty and in the student 
body”.  In other words, SMU would not capitulate to the demand for 
more black students simply because BLAACS wanted more students of 
color on campus.  The school was only so big and could only offer so 
much, and Tate was determined not to allow any group, including 
BLAACS, to circumvent that ideal.  Ultimate authority on any decisions 
regarding SMU were to be made by Tate, the administration, and the 
21 “Blacks and the Real World”, Editorial to the Dallas Times Herald, 
April 30, 1969, 24A. 
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Board of Trustees and “no special interest group within or without the 
university can make our decisions for us and certainly there can be no 
autonomous structures within the university or it would cease to be a 
university”.  With several of the demands Tate felt BLAACS was trying 
to force his hand to make a decision that would only benefit a small 
portion of the academic community at SMU, and he would not allow that 
to happen.22   
Tate’s statement to BLAACS in regards to the demands was similar 
to that of numerous university presidents across the country.  Black 
students did not want to accept a slice of bread, according to Ibram 
Rogers, because they wanted the whole loaf.  Even so, administrators 
“habitually forced them to accept the slice, arguing the loaf was 
impossible, too expensive, against the law, reverse discrimination, or 
the opposition to academic freedom or the values of the colleges”.  
University officials were willing to give in where they could, like 
Tate, but they also wanted to keep the integrity of the school intact.  
Oftentimes, representatives of historically white colleges gave in to 
the call for more black students, faculty, black studies courses, and 
the like.  However, when it came to university control, administrators 
were not as willing to bend to the demands of organizations such as 
BLAACS.23 
The demands made by BLAACS were not completely dismissed by Tate 
and other university officials at SMU.  Rather, there were at least 
some changes promised on all six issues presented to the 
22 “BLAACS get Reply” Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12. 
23 Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 119-120. 
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administrators.  First on the list was the Free Student Union with 
more control going to the students.  The Student Center Governing 
Board felt that “the demands of the BLAACS concerning the revision of 
the Governing Board are pertinent and indeed constitute much needed 
reform not only in the make-up of the Governing Board but also in its 
function as a student controlled government body”.  One way to give 
the students more power in the union was to allow them to elect 
representatives to the Governing Board.  By 1970 students at SMU were 
allowed to elect four executive officers and two student members.  In 
addition a graduate student was appointed by the elected president of 
the Governing Body.  Two faculty members were elected by the Governing 
Body as well as two alumni members.  Other members were added ex 
officio to complete the Governing Board.  In essence, the students 
were given more of a say in how the board was put together.  Therefore 
they gained more power in what the Board did with the Student Center.24 
Several changes were made to increase recruitment of black 
students as well as giving them financial assistance to attend SMU.  
In the summer of 1969 two black students were employed by the 
university as admissions counselors to assist in bringing more black 
students to campus.  The two counselors were “encouraged to work 
closely with black students on campus and enlist their aid in 
recruiting activities”.  In addition, a black faculty member was 
invited to serve on the admissions committee to help the two student 
employees.  By the fall of 1969, 50 new black students had been 
brought in to SMU with more to follow quickly.  As for financial aid, 
24 “BLAACS get Reply”,  Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12. 
                                                          
157 
 
officials at SMU began exploring the possibilities of making funds 
available to students who would not have been able to attend the 
university without such help.25 
Altering the structure of the Liberal Studies Department was the 
next issue that university officials made recommended changes based on 
BLAACS petition.  Tate and others felt the program should be organized 
in a way that reflected the “accomplishments, problems, and 
aspirations of Black people both historically and in the contemporary 
world. In order to achieve the desired effect, the University College 
Council recommended revisions to the Nature of Man course as well as 
the Twentieth Century course at SMU to provide more content relevant 
to the black experience.  The Black and White class was also changed 
to provide a “more in-depth study of the Black and White situation”. 
In addition the council wanted to employ more black instructors in the 
department “on a substantial basis beyond the point of tokenism”. 
According to Dean of Students Joe Howell nine black faculty members 
were added in the fall of 1969 that were “scattered throughout the 
University College and the School of Humanities and Science”.26   
Black employees at SMU also garnered attention by Tate because of 
the petition by BLAACs.  The first thing Tate promised was to make 
sure as many employees on campus as possible received $1.60 per hour 
which was minimum wage at the time.  He noted that the university 
would take into account merit and length of service of workers in 
25 Ibid.  Ken Hunt, “Black Courses Readied for Fall”, Daily Campus, 
August 28, 1969, 6. 
26 “Blacks get Reply”, Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12.  Susan 
Maxwell, “Black Demands, Part II: Jobs and Classes”, Daily Campus, 
September 11, 1969, 2. 
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regards to pay increases.  The university established a review board 
to also determine financial compensation for all employees and the 
board would include black workers.  Black laborers were given a proper 
grievance procedure so they would not be afraid to complain about 
their white superiors.  Staff members were made aware on initial 
employment of the opportunities for their children to take advantage 
of grants in order to attend SMU.  The University also promised to 
continue to “recruit qualified black persons for supervisory 
positions, such as those recently hired as Director of Volunteer 
Services and Building Coordinator of the Student Center”.  Tate made 
it clear that there were several blacks employed in supervisory 
positions including the foreman at the Central Plant and a new officer 
on the campus security force.  Even so, SMU would continue to offer 
more opportunities for black employees on campus.27 
Forming an Afro-American Studies program was a big concern for 
BLAACS, and Tate provided a nuanced response that helped start the 
department at SMU.  The Planning Board of the School of Humanities and 
Sciences gave approval to appoint a committee that would develop a 
proposal for Afro-American Studies.  SMU committed to modifying and 
further developing present courses in the curriculum dealing with the 
subject.  Once the program was implemented, it would be under the 
tutelage of a black director. The coordinator would have input from 
faculty committees and students involved with BLAACS to help formulate 
the course work for the program.  Finally, according to Tate, “The 
27 Ibid. 
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most suitable academic structure for this enlarged program will be 
established”.28 
One of the crucial components of the Afro-American Studies 
program at SMU was that it would be under the leadership of a black 
director.  The person chosen to be in charge of the department was 
Irving Baker.  Former executive vice president of Bishop College in 
Dallas, he was appointed by Tate in the summer of 1969 to head Afro-
American Studies.  Baker was the perfect choice because he was 
familiar with SMU prior to his directorship. He had been a political 
science professor and in addition to his director duties, Baker was 
made special assistant to Tate.  In other words, he was familiar with 
both academics and administration of the university,  and each would 
be vital to his success as director of the new program.  Tate was not 
the only one to think that Baker was the right fit to lead the new 
program.  Vice President Neill McFarland also felt this way when 
he said upon Baker’s hiring that, “he is very enthusiastic and 
quite candid.  He’s a charming person and at ease and doesn’t really 
have the hang-ups most of us have.  I don’t care what color he is…he 
is a great asset to SMU”.29   
Once Baker was added to the staff, he began the process of 
building the Afro-American Studies program at SMU.  Baker quickly 
developed a degree program proposal that was ready for submission to 
the faculty in the fall of 1969.   He noted that he wanted to achieve 
28 Ibid. 
29 Irving Baker, Interviewed by Neill McFarland, October 12, 2001,  SMU 
Video Archive Series , #3003, found at digitalcollections.smu.edu.  
“Staff Adds Baker”, Daily Campus, August 28, 1969, 2. 
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two things with the new department.  One was the development of new 
courses that highlighted the black experience and culture.  The second 
thing Baker wanted was to give “a new, inclusive, relevant 
interpretation to factual material in the various disciplines—history, 
literature, economics, religion”.  Practically speaking, the program 
would raise black awareness which Baker felt was necessary “if 
students are to have the breadth and scope of the experiences they 
need for today’s society”.  Not only was this important for black 
students but for white students as well.30 
The last demand that Tate negotiated with BLAACS fell under the 
general category of human relation.   The first thing Tate recommended 
was the creation of a human relations board that would be made up of 
students from various ethnicities.  Tate also endorsed the idea that 
faculty and administration be allowed on the board as well.  In 
addition to the board Tate acknowledged “the request for a house for 
social and business affairs for Black students as a legitimate one”.  
Shortly thereafter, university officials began searching the campus 
for a house that would fit Tate’s criterion to help black students 
transition from an all-black world to the predominantly white one they 
faced on campus at Southern Methodist University.  The house had to be 
open to all students at all times and follow University regulations.31    
Tate’s concluding statements regarding the petition made it clear 
that he intended to honor all the commitments he had set forth for 
each demand.  He would constantly review the new polices put in place 
30 Ken Hunt, “Black Courses Readied for Fall”, Daily Campus, August 28, 
1969, 6. 
31 “BLAACS get Reply”, Daily Campus, May 2, 1969, 2, 5, 12. 
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by the administration and make changes as he deemed necessary.  One 
reason Tate was willing to do so is because the students involved with 
BLAACS went through the proper university channels to get their 
petition heard.  Tate made sure the university community knew this 
when he stated, “Commendation must be made again of the seriousness 
and rational conduct of the black students.  While free to dissent, 
they have not once resorted to pressure tactics or disruption to win 
their points”.  If violence and disruption had occurred, Tate would 
have been less willing to negotiate with BLAACS which in turn may have 
actually precipitated SMU’s black protests to become more like that of 
other schools.32 
Despite the fact that BLAACS had gone through the correct 
procedures in presenting their demands, not everyone on campus agreed 
with Tate’s decision to negotiate with the organization.  In the fall 
of 1969 twenty-eight student leaders at SMU voiced their difference of 
opinion with Tate and the administration saying they “surrendered to 
imposed threats and deadlines”.  BLAACS committed “systematic piracy” 
as university officials stood idly by and did nothing according to the 
group.  Warren Russell, senior history major and president pro tempore 
of the student senate, feared the administration’s negotiations with 
BLAACS would “cheapen the value of a degree” at SMU.  He was perplexed 
as to why Tate would capitulate to the demands of BLAACS because that 
is all they were-demands.  Russell, and other elected student 
officials, felt that the petition created by BLAACS was not presented 
to the people at “the level of its most immediate concern”.  Rather, 
32 Ibid. 
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they took it straight to the president ignoring student government 
protocol.  Because BLAACS went straight to Tate, he was coerced into 
giving in to the demands according to Russell.33 
Tate responded to the charge of the university student leaders, 
as well as civic organizations in Dallas, by denying that a breakdown 
occurred in SMU’s chain of command.  Tate told friends in the 
community that the academic integrity of SMU had never and will never 
be compromised because of a group like BLAACS.  His mantra to everyone 
concerned was always, “We are not going to give this University away”.  
In August of 1969 Tate sent out a letter to faculty, staff, and 
students that said disruption of the University’s normal functioning 
would not be tolerated.  Pledges to BLAACS were not made in duress and 
never would be according to Tate.  All students admitted to SMU would 
be expected to maintain the academic standards of the university.  
Tate reiterated that the university would not give in to violence like 
at other schools and he intended to keep it that way at SMU as long as 
he was president.  The Dallas Times Herald agreed that “while the 
educational process at many another American college has denigrated 
into turmoil and violence, SMU has, for the most part remained serene 
and at peace.  Tate has now come a long way toward ensuring it will 
stay that way”.34 
Whether there were critics of Tate’s plan to negotiate with 
BLAACS is irrelevant because Tate had already agreed to certain 
33 Jean Kelly, “Students Attack SMU: Surrender to Negro Threats 
Charged”, Dallas Morning News, August 16, 1969. 
34 “SMU’s President Eases Public Concern”, SMU Update, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
Fall 1969, 1 and 5. 
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changes on all six demands.  Being a man of principle, he was not 
going to back down on that promise.  The petition was SMU’s version of 
the Civil Rights Movement, and it had been offered without violence 
and disruption.  According to Anga Sanders, “The Civil Rights Movement 
at SMU did not take on the same violent tone as it did as many schools 
across the country.  Yet it was still enough.  We may not have been 
perfect, but we were perfect for SMU”.  Rufus Cormier was a black 
football player at SMU during the late 1960s who was also a member of 
BLAACS.  He echoed Sanders sentiment when he said, “There was not a 
sense that this was a place that was unaccepting or hostile to us.  It 
was a situation where we needed progress, but not a situation where we 
needed revolution”.35   
The progress described by Rufus Cormier was achieved in part 
because the Black League of Afro-American and African College Students 
was willing to participate in a calm rebellion at Southern Methodist 
University.  The organization pushed for change, but it did so within 
the boundaries of the university structure.  Because of the lack of 
violence, President Willis Tate was willing to bring change to benefit 
black students at SMU.   
35 Anga Sanders Speaks at SMU, February 22, 2011, Found on YouTube.  
Rufus Cormier, Phone Interview, August 17, 2012. 




The University followed a strategy of quiet but positive progress 
towards making SMU a university open to all who could meet its 
admissions standards.  I believed that we would get more done if we 
did not debate it or confront people with it.1 
 
Desegregation started at Southern Methodist University as early 
as 1950 when then President Umphrey Lee convinced the Board of 
Trustees to change the school’s bylaws to allow for the eventual 
admittance of African American students.  Little did Lee know that 
process would begin almost immediately.  SMU admitted two black 
students in the fall of 1951, and the university started down the path 
towards change.  While the two students failed by the end of the fall, 
and true desegregation did not pick up in earnest until the following 
year, SMU had begun a process that the university would not back down 
from in the coming years.  SMU started breaking down racial barriers 
before the Methodist Church with which the school was affiliated.  No 
one expected SMU to lead the way among the Methodist seminaries.  The 
hope was that Duke University and/or Emory University would lead the 
way in 1952.  Rather, it was SMU that became the first Methodist 
seminary to open its doors to black students.  The Church took sixteen 
more years before it came to terms with desegregation.  In the 
meantime, SMU moved ahead of the Church, as well as the other 
Methodist seminaries, in regards to race divisions. In addition to 
this, SMU also began removing the obstacles to equality before the 
city of Dallas.  While desegregation in Dallas occurred quietly and 
1 Gerald McGee, “On the Ups and Downs”, Interview with Willis Tate, in 
Johnnie Marie Grimes, Willis Tate: Views and Interviews (Dallas: 
Southern Methodist University Press, 1978), 167. 
                                                          
165 
 
without many problems, it was years after SMU had already achieved 
that same goal on campus.  Although many individuals helped bring 
about desegregation at SMU, none were more important in the 
advancement than Merrimon Cuninggim and Willis Tate.  Both received 
their respective posts at SMU in the early 1950s and worked tirelessly 
to open the doors of the university to black students.  They operated 
behind the scenes to make sure desegregation would occur at SMU 
without the fanfare and violence associated with numerous schools 
across the country.  Even when SMU experienced black student protests 
by the late 1960s, that “disturbance” took on a calm demeanor.   
 One of the unsung heroes of desegregation at SMU was also one of 
the most visible figures on campus.  When Hayden Fry became the 
football coach at SMU in the early 1960s, he accepted the job with the 
promise that he would be allowed to recruit black players.  By doing 
so he advanced desegregation not only at SMU, but also in the 
Southwest Conference.  Fry was willing to be the leader in the 
conference when other more powerful coaches were not.  He grew up in 
segregated Odessa, Texas and did not think it was fair that his black 
friends could not play football with him in high school.  From then 
on, Fry swore that if he was ever in a position of power to change 
that situation he would.  SMU afforded that position when they hired 
him to coach the Mustangs.  Once Fry was given the green light he 
recruited Jerry LeVias, and in doing so changed the course of football 
in the Southwest Conference. 
While Southern Methodist had dynamic leaders to bring about 
desegregation, the Methodist Church did not.  At least none that were 
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in positions of power until the mid-1960s.  The closest thing the 
church had was Edgar Love, but his initiative to reform the 
Methodists’ organizational structure failed in the early 1950s.  
Others tried after Love but were not successful, and it was not until 
the late 1960s when the Central Jurisdiction was finally ended. 
Unlike the Church, the city of Dallas did have at least a few 
dynamic leaders that were willing to bring about desegregation 
peacefully and quietly.  While the process was not started quite as 
early as SMU, the Dallas Citizens Council ensured that it would be as 
smooth as possible.  The group wanted to keep economic investment high 
in Dallas, and in order to do that desegregation had to come slowly 
and without incident. Because of the leadership of the DCC that is 
exactly what happened.  The personalities in the business community of 
Dallas were similar to those on campus at SMU.  In both instances, 
desegregation came in an organized manner facilitated by leaders that 
knew how best to control the pace. 
During the early 1950s, Southern Methodist University was a small 
private school.  Between 1950 and 1953, when the university started to 
desegregate, the average student population was just under 8,000 The 
school was in a city that was not a hub of the civil rights movement.  
It was affiliated with a church that had just started to formally 
segregate whites and blacks in 1939.  SMU does not seem to fit the 
traditional model of desegregation that is usually told.  There was no 
court order in 1950 to force SMU to desegregate like at the flagship 
university in Texas.  At some of these schools, federal troops were 
required to achieve desegregation despite the court orders.  No 
167 
 
similar institutions were even thinking about desegregation at the 
time. When other private universities did start to desegregate, 
problems with the administration often occurred.  Violence and 
controversy, especially when accompanying an issue as sensitive as 
desegregation, provided copy.  Media coverage was exponentially 
greater at the University of Mississippi, the University of Alabama, 
the University of Texas, etc. where bringing in the first black 
students provided a story.  SMU was the opposite in that it quietly 
admitted black students behind the scenes; therefore it was not as 
entertaining to the general public.   
On the surface, since SMU’s desegregation did not provide much 
news copy, it would seem the story does not need to be told.  On the 
contrary, that is what makes SMU relevant to the desegregation grand 
narrative.  SMU provides an alternative model to that of the large 
state schools in regards to desegregation.  Since it was a private 
school that did not have to desegregate when it did, the university 
was able to control the pace and do so quietly.  University officials 
purposely kept decisions on the matter in house so the media could not 
create a firestorm like at other schools.  This is precisely why 
desegregation went so smoothly at SMU, and why the account should be 
told.  SMU’s desegregation is one of peaceful change, perseverance, 
and university officials taking care of business in an orderly 
fashion.  Total integration did not happen overnight on campus, but by 
not pushing for too much change too quickly SMU had virtually no 
problems.  The same cannot be said of many of the larger state 
schools.  The courts did not get involved, the cameras were not 
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flashing, and the students did not riot.  While that may not be news 
worthy, it did allow SMU to ease into desegregation without any 
outside pressure to do more or less than the school wanted at any 
given time. 
In 1952, Southern Methodist University admitted five black men to 
the school.  The total enrollment of the university at the time was 
7,741 so the black students accounted for less than 1% of the student 
body. In the fall of 2012, there were 702 black students enrolled at 
SMU a figure that equates to 6.4% of the student body.  While the 
percentage may not be that high, it is a significant increase from the 
time the university started to desegregate to the present.  As a 
private school SMU continues to maintain high academic standards, but 
the statistic shows that the school did not turn away from admitting 
black students once the initial desegregation push had been made.  
Like desegregation itself, the number of black students on campus has 
steadily increased over the years to its current enrollment.  If you 
compare SMU’s current enrollment of black students to the University 
of Arkansas and the University of Texas the percentage is actually 
higher.  During the spring of 2013, the University of Arkansas had 
1,212 black students enrolled out of a student population of 23,286 or 
5.2% of the total of the campus enrollment.  In the fall of 2012, the 
University of Texas had 2,126 black students out of 52,186 which was 
4.1% of the total population. The reason these two statistics are 
important is these are the two schools in the Southwest Conference 
that desegregated before SMU.  Both are public institutions that are 
significantly larger than SMU. Both had more problems with 
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desegregation than SMU, not just in admitting the first black students 
but in getting people on their respective campuses to even allow for 
the possibility.  The small campus of SMU in the 1950s allowed for a 
better environment to start desegregation. That trend continues to the 
present as seen in the aforementioned statistics.2 
Today, there is no direct push for increasing diversity at SMU, 
but there are certain things in place to recognize the diversity 
already on campus.  The Multicultural Resource Center is designed to 
promote diversity awareness on campus.  In 2012, a Black Alumni of SMU 
Scholarship fund was developed to give financial aid to a rising 
sophomore or above that has shown academic success at the school.  In 
order to be eligible for the scholarship, the student has to be a 
member of the Association of Black Students, which appears to be a 
similar organization to BLAACS of the 1960s.  While SMU may not be 
actively recruiting black students, there are still entities on campus 
that tie SMU to its past—a past that saw SMU become one of the first 
schools of its kind in the South to open its doors to black students.3   
2 Bulletin of Southern Methodist University: Administration and 
Supplementary Information (Catalog Number: Part X) For the 1952-1953 
Sessions”, Southern Methodist University Archives, DeGolyer Library, 
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